L.R. v. Manheim Tp. School Dist.

• Decision Date: 26 March 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 05-1283.
• Citation: 540 F.Supp.2d 603
• Parties: L.R., Plaintiff, v. MANHEIM TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

540 F.Supp.2d 603

L.R., Plaintiff, v. MANHEIM TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 05-1283.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

March 26, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffrey F. Champagne, McNees Wallace & Nurick, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge.

Plaintiff, L.R., is a person with disabilities who, until recently, was a student in the Manheim Township School District. Plaintiff contends that the School district failed to provide her with free appropriate public education, in violation of several federal statutes. Before the Court are Plaintiff's petition to appeal Judge Green's¹ interlocutory orders and Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), Pub.L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970).

I. BACKGROUND

L.R. has experienced developmental delays in speech and language from an early age. The educational classifications associated with these delays are a specific learning disability and a speech/language impairment. As a person with disabilities, L.R. is entitled to free appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).

L.R. entered the Manheim Township School District in 1995 for first grade. As required by the IDEA, and to ensure that L.R. would receive an appropriate education, the School District created an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") each year for L.R., describing her present levels of performance and creating educational goals and objectives tailored to her specific educational needs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).

L.R. remained a student in the School District through 6th grade, when in August 2001, expressing concern over their daughter's academic development, L.R.'s parents withdrew her from the School District and enrolled her in the Maplebrook School, a private educational institution. Although initially intending to challenge L.R.'s 7th-grade IEP as inappropriate, her parents eventually chose not to do so, and L.R. attended Maplebrook for her 7th grade year, from 2001-2002.

On November 19, 2002, following a reevaluation of L.R., the School District created an IEP for her 8th-grade year, 2002-2003. Dissatisfied with the 8th-grade IEP, L.R.'s parents commenced an administrative due process hearing on her behalf pursuant to the IDEA, arguing that the IEP was not reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful educational benefit upon L.R. The hearing began on December 6, 2002, before hearing officer Max Wald, Ed. D., and proceeded over four days. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer ruled in favor of the School District, holding that L.R.'s 8th grade IEP was appropriate.

Subsequently, pursuant to the IDEA, L.R.'s parents appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Special Education Due Process Appeals Panel ("Appeals Panel"), which affirmed the hearing officer's decision in relevant part.² The Appeals Panel also ordered the School District to conduct a reevaluation of L.R. and to create a new IEP for the 2003-2004 school year. The reevaluation report was completed on September 2, 2003.

L.R. now challenges the ruling of the Appeals Panel in this Court,³ seeking reimbursement of the tuition for her 8th-grade year at the Maplebrook School. L.R. has also brought related claims under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. PETITION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

The initial complaint in this case sought not only a tuition reimbursement for the 2002-2003 school year, but also monetary damages for "the loss of educational opportunities, loss of language therapy opportunities and emotional damages [L.R.] ha[d] suffered" during the years prior to 2002-2003, before L.R. was in the 8th grade (the "early years"). The initial complaint sought relief for the early years claims even though L.R.'s claims in the administrative hearing and appeal were limited solely to the appropriateness of the 8th-grade IEP, and did not concern the loss of educational opportunities in the early years.

The School District moved to dismiss the complaint, and this Court granted the motion in part, dismissing the counts of the complaint pertaining to the early years of education for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. L.R. now seeks to appeal the Court's interlocutory orders granting in part the School District's motion to dismiss.

A. Legal Standard

A partial grant of a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment, and thus is generally not appealable except by an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); e.g., Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F.Supp.2d 391, 407-08 (E.D.Pa.2002) (treating an order granting in part a motion to dismiss as interlocutory); cf. Bushman v. Halm, 798 F.2d 651, 654 n. 4 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that appeal was not final because summary judgment was only granted as to two of three claims and thus "there was no final disposition of the entire controversy").

The decision to certify an interlocutory order for appeal under § 1292(b) "rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." Douris, 229 F.Supp.2d at 408. "The burden is on the party seeking certification to demonstrate that `exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy against piecemeal litigation and of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.'" Id. (quoting Rottmund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 813 F.Supp. 1104, 1112 (E.D.Pa.1992)).

Under § 1292(b), a district court may certify an interlocutory order for immediate appeal if it 1) "involves a controlling question of law," 2) there is "substantial ground for difference of opinion" as to the question of law, and 3) "an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The statutory factors, however, are merely a guide for the Court's discretion. See Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 368 (3d Cir.1976) ("The certification procedure is not mandatory; indeed, permission to appeal is wholly within the discretion of the courts, even if the criteria are present."); Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. 03-2670, 2006 WL 2882990, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2006) (citing Bachowski).

B. The Interlocutory Orders

1. The March 30, 2007 Memorandum and Order

The Memorandum and Order of March 30, 2007 granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court held that Count II of the initial complaint, which sought "monetary damages" under the IDEA for the loss of educational opportunities for L.R.'s early years of education, was dismissed without prejudice for failing to exhaust administrative remedies.

[I]n order for this court to determine the merits of Plaintiffs'[⁴] claim the court must first determine whether and when the District was obligated to [evaluate] L.R.'s language needs. Were the court to pursue this line of inquiry, the court would also be required to determine whether the educational program offered during L.R.'s early years provided her with a free appropriate public education under which she could have made [meaningful] academic progress. Although Plaintiffs offer expert reports and opinions about L.R.'s loss of educational opportunity in her early years the District has not been provided with an opportunity, at the administrative level, to be heard on the issue and to attempt to rebut or resolve the claim. Plaintiffs rely upon W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir.1995), in support of their position. However, in Matula, the court specifically stated that "IDEA mandates resort in the first instance to administrative hearings so as to develop the factual record and resolve evidentiary disputes concerning for example evaluation, classification, and placement." Id. at 496. Unlike Matula, in the case sub judice, the factual record regarding Plaintiffs' claims with respect to L.R.'s early years and loss of educational opportunity has not been developed. Therefore, the court concludes that Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint will be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Mem., Mar. 30, 2007 (Green, J.), at 8.

2. The May 24, 2007 Memorandum and Order

Clarifying the March 30, 2007 Memorandum upon a motion for reconsideration, the Memorandum and Order of May 24, 2007 reaffirmed the Court's prior order and, in addition, dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs claims under the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and § 1983 to the extent that they concern Plaintiffs early years, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies:

As noted in the March 30, 2007 Memorandum, in order for this court to ascertain whether any violations of IDEA, the [Rehabilitation] Act, the ADA and § 1983 occurred with respect to the time period prior to the 2002-2003 school year, the court would necessarily have to inquire into whether an appropriate educational program was offered to L.R. and whether the District treated L.R. in a discriminatory fashion during those times. Administrative proceedings concerning L.R.'s educational program in her early years could have been instituted prior to the due process proceedings instituted for the claim for tuition reimbursement for the 2002-2003 school year.... This court cannot permit Plaintiffs to litigate — without an administrative record regarding the appropriateness of L.R.'s pre-2002 educational programs — issues which could have and should have been the subject of litigation prior to 2002.

Mem. May 24, 2007 (Green, J.), at 2-3.

The "issue of law" addressed by the interlocutory orders was whether Plaintiff was required to exhaust all administrative remedies, pursuant to the IDEA, prior to bringing her claims before this Court. Judge Green decided that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement does apply to all of Plaintiff's...