L.S. v. State
| Citation | 446 So.2d 1148 |
| Decision Date | 13 March 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-2076,83-2076 |
| Parties | L.S., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Chaykin, Karlan & Jacobs and Sharon B. Jacobs, Sp. Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and G. Bart Billbrough, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before HENDRY, NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
In a petition for delinquency, the juvenile was charged with theft, in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1981) and burglary, in violation of section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1981). He was adjudicated delinquent on both counts. The state has conceded that the evidence was insufficient to support the theft conviction and accordingly we reverse on that count. As to the burglary, we affirm.
The record reflects that there were six fingerprints lifted from the window sill of the window used to gain entrance to the victim's home. Two of these prints matched the juvenile's fingerprints. Although the house had also been broken into one week earlier, the victim stated that the window sill had been dusted and cleaned between the time of the two illegal entries.
As to the burglary count, the information charged as follows:
This child ... did unlawfully enter or remain in a certain structure ... with the intent to commit an offense therein, to wit: THEFT in violation of 810.02, Florida Statutes (emphasis supplied)
L.S. argues that having charged him with the specific intent to commit theft, the state was required to prove that he had that specific intent. However, he contends that the state not only failed to prove this specific intent, but it failed to prove intent at all, erroneously relying on proof of the presumption of intent as provided in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981). 1 In support of his position, the juvenile directs our attention to State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla.1983). Waters held that the information need not identify the specific offense which the defendant intended to commit once inside the structure. It then addressed the issue of whether proof of the factual elements set out in section 810.07 would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of intent to commit an offense and concluded:
Looking at the plain language of the statute, we can see that it sets out three factual elements: entry, stealth, and lack of consent. If proved, the statute provides, the facts thus shown "shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense." That is, proof of the three elements will always be deemed to be a sufficient showing to allow a case of burglary to go to the jury even if there is no evidence of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the unlawful entering, and will be legally sufficient proof of intent to support a verdict.
The supreme court did not address the precise question before us; however, insofar as it held that specification of the offense intended is not essential, we find that its inclusion...
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