L.T. ex rel. Hollins v. City of Jackson

• Decision Date: 31 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 3:98-CV-562WS.,CIV. A. 3:98-CV-562WS.
• Parties: L.T., A Minor, By and Through Tracey and Onita HOLLINS, As Next Friends Plaintiff v. THE CITY OF JACKSON; Kerry Collins; and Westwood L.P. Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

145 F.Supp.2d 750

L.T., A Minor, By and Through Tracey and Onita HOLLINS, As Next Friends Plaintiff v. THE CITY OF JACKSON; Kerry Collins; and Westwood L.P. Defendants

No. CIV. A. 3:98-CV-562WS.

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

March 31, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John Hedglin, Rimmer, Rawlings, Macinnis & Hedglin, P.A., Madison, WI, for Plaintiff.

Hugh W. Tedder, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, Patricia K. Monson, Office of the City Attorney, Jackson, MS, J. Stephen Wright, Wright & Martin, LLP, Douglas G. Mercier, Douglas G. Mercier, Attorney, Ridgeland, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WINGATE, District Judge.

Before the court are the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants, The City of Jackson, Mississippi, and Westwood L.P. Defendants bring their motions pursuant to Rule 56(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹ By their motions, these defendants contend that under the undisputed facts and applicable law they are entitled to a judgment in their favor as a matter of law. Plaintiff L.T., a minor, who brings this lawsuit through Tracey and Onita Hollins, as next friends, opposes defendants' motions for summary judgment, contending that here there are disputed issues of fact which should be resolved by a jury. Claiming sexual assault by a City of Jackson police officer, plaintiff has sued the City of Jackson, Mississippi the police officer, Kerry Collins;² and Westwood L.P., the apartment complex where the alleged assault occurred and where defendant Kerry Collins worked part-time as a security officer. In her complaint, seeking compensatory damages, plaintiff has alleged that the defendants committed a constitutional tort under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983³ and various state law claims pursuant to this court's supplemental jurisdiction under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367.⁴ Persuaded that here there are no genuine issues of material fact and persuaded by the applicable law that the defendants, the City of Jackson, Mississippi, and Westwood L.P., are entitled to the relief sought, this court hereby grants summary judgment to these defendants for the reasons which follow.

THE PARTIES AND JURISDICTION

Plaintiff, L.T., is a minor child who resides inside the City of Jackson, Mississippi.

Plaintiffs Tracey and Onita Hollins are adult resident citizens of Hinds County, Mississippi, who reside inside the City of Jackson, Mississippi. Onita Hollins is the natural mother of L.T., and Tracey Hollins is the child's stepfather.

The City of Jackson was the employer of Kerry Collins who, at the time of this incident, was employed with the City as a police officer.

Defendant Westwood L.P. is a property management corporation that owns and maintains Westwood Apartments, to which L.T. followed Collins after Collins came upon L.T. in a parked vehicle five miles removed from the premises. Westwood L.P. employed Officer Kerry Collins as a security guard for Westwood Apartments from approximately July 26, 1996, until his termination in April, 1998.

Jurisdiction over the plaintiff's federal claims is predicated on Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331⁵, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)⁶, and Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (see footnote 3). This court's jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims is based on Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (see footnote 4).

FINDINGS OF FACT

On or about February 22, 1998, in the evening hours, Officer Kerry Collins was employed with the City of Jackson, Mississippi, as a Jackson Police Officer and was on duty and performing his duties as a police officer. Defendant Westwood also employed Officer Collins as a security guard at Westwood Apartments, and had done so since July 26, 1996. In his capacity as security guard for Westwood Apartments, Officer Collins was responsible for arresting and detaining any individual engaged in unlawful activities or destruction of property until the arrival of the police, policing all areas of the apartment complex, enforcing children's curfews, enforcing loitering and alcoholic beverage restrictions, and monitoring excess traffic on the property. As sole compensation for his service as a security guard, Westwood Apartments furnished Collins an apartment rent-free.

The incident in question began on or about February 22, 1998, while Officer Collins was engaged in his duties as a Jackson police officer, approximately five miles distant from the property of Westwood Apartments. Late in the evening, Collins came upon the parked vehicle of plaintiff L.T. in South Park, located in the City of Jackson. Officer Collins was on duty as a Jackson police officer, wearing his police uniform, driving his police cruiser, and was recognized by L.T. as a Jackson police officer. Upon investigation, Officer Collins discovered L.T. and her boyfriend inside the vehicle. L.T. testified in her deposition that she and her boyfriend were about to engage in sexual activity when Officer Collins came upon them.

Officer Collins detained L.T. and her boyfriend and asked them for identification. L.T. became anxious; she had informed her parents that she would be at work rather than spending time with her boyfriend. After L.T. pleaded with Officer Collins to release them, Officer Collins instructed L.T. to take her boyfriend home and he would follow her to make sure that she, in fact, followed his instructions.

After L.T. dropped her boyfriend off at his residence, she noticed Officer Collins following her in his police cruiser. Officer Collins pulled up beside her on Dixon Road. He then pulled L.T. over on Barnett Street and again asked L.T. to produce her driver's license, which she did. L.T. pleaded with Officer Collins and told him she would do anything to prevent Collins from telling her parents of her activities.

Officer Collins instructed L.T. to follow his car, which she did, to Westwood Apartments. Once upon the premises of Westwood Apartments, L.T. and Officer Collins engaged in sexual activity. After engaging in this sexual activity, L.T. immediately left Officer Collins' apartment and returned to her parents' home, where she informed her parents of the night's activities.

L.T. has admitted that she did not recognize Officer Collins, at the time of the incident, as a security officer for Westwood Apartments. She testified in her deposition: (1) that she did not even know that Officer Collins was employed by Westwood Apartments as a security guard; (2) that she believed him to be a Jackson police officer; and (3) that she did not submit to his sexual advances because of his authority as a security officer at Westwood. All of these admissions may be gleaned from her deposition whereat she testified as follows:

Q. [by Mr. Wright] Did he ever tell you he worked for Westwood Apartments?

A. [by L.T.] No.

Q. Never told you that?

A. No.

Q. That whole night you never knew he worked for Westwood Apartments?

A. No.

Q. He just took you to an apartment, which I guess you assumed was his apartment, correct?

A. Right.

Q. Never once did he say, "You better have sex with me because I am a security guard of Westwood Apartments?"

A. I didn't know that until we started having court, that he worked at Westwood, and he was the security.

Q. You only found that out after you filed a complaint against him with the police force. Is that what you're saying? And when you had sex with him that night, it was not because he was a security officer at Westwood Apartments, was it?

A. No.

Q. It was because he was a policeman who threatened to tell your parents what he had seen you do; is that correct?

A. Right.

Deposition of L.T. at 116-17.

Furthermore, at the time of the incident, L.T. was not a tenant of Westwood Apartments and was not on the premises of Westwood Apartments when Officer Collins came upon her parked vehicle.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The Rule requires that the disputed facts be material. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute over trivial facts which are not necessary in order to apply the substantive law does not prevent the granting of a motion for summary judgment. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The rule also requires the dispute to be genuine. A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id. This standard requires the non-moving party to present more than a scintilla of evidence to defeat the motion. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Of course, a moving party who does not have the burden of proof at trial may properly support a motion for summary judgment by showing the court that there is no evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the motion is so supported, the party opposing the motion must then demonstrate with "concrete evidence" that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

CITY OF JACKSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff seeks recovery against the City of Jackson under either one of two claims. First, plaintiff contends that the City is liable under § 1983, on the theory that at the time of the alleged assault Kerry Collins was a Jackson City police officer and on the theory that the City had in effect a policy which caused the misconduct. Plaintiff's second contention is that the City is liable...