Labanoski v. Hoyt Metal Co.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1920
• Docket Number: No. 13008.,13008.
• Citation: 292 Ill. 218,126 N.E. 548
• Parties: LABANOSKI v. HOYT METAL CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

292 Ill. 218

126 N.E. 548

LABANOSKI

v.HOYT METAL CO.

No. 13008.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 18, 1920.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 1920.

Action by John Labanoski against the Hoyt Metal Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from City Court of Granite City; Harry Stuttle, Judge.

W. D. Chapman, of St. Louis, Mo., Morgan Le Masters, of Granite City, and Keefe & Baxter, of East St. Louis, for appellant.

Harold J. Bandy, of Granite City, for appellee.

FARMER, J.

This action was begun by plaintiff in the court below for damages alleged to have been sustained by him while in defendant's employment, resulting from defendant's willful violation of the statute known as the Occupational Disease Act. Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 1469.

Plaintiff began working for defendant May 2, 1918, and continued thereafter until October 2d following. When he began work he was a healthy man and weighed 187 pounds. Defendant was engaged in manufacturing and smelting lead products. Plaintiff worked at a furnace in the dross room. Fumes and vapor arose from the molten metal. Unless apparatus was provided to prevent it, the smoke and vapor would spread through the building and be inhaled by the workmen. Plaintiff had never worked in a lead plant before, and claims to have contracted lead poisoning. After he had worked for defendant about two months he began to suffer from attacks of colic. He became constipated and had to take purgatives constantly. He grew sallow, anaemic, and lost weight, so that when he quit work October 3d he weighed only 144 pounds. He had a blue gum line and other symptoms of lead poisoning. He became so ill that he had to quit work early in October. He called a physician, who found him delirious, and after treating him a few days sent him to hospital in Granite City, where he remained about a week. From there he was taken to the county poor farm, and afterwards was committed to the State Hospital for the Insane at Alton, where he remained about two months. His condition improved, the delirium disappeared, and he was discharged from the hospital. Thereafter he brought this suit.

The declaration contains six counts, and alleges in the first count the injury to the plaintiff was caused by the willful violation of the Occupational Disease Act in failing to provide plaintiff with a respirator, as required by section 2 of the act. The second count charges the defendant willfully failed to provide and maintain adequate devices for carrying off poisonous fumes from the furnaces, in violation of section 8 of the act. The third count charges a willful failure to keep hoppers, chutes, and other devices for containing melted lead covered, as required by section 10 of the act. The fifth count charges the defendant willfully failed to furnish plaintiff proper working clothing while he was at work for defendant, in violation of section 2 of the act. The sixth count charges that during all the time plaintiff worked for defendant it permitted the floors to be swept during working hours without first dampening them so as to prevent the raising of dust, as required by section 8 of the act. A generaldemurrer to the declaration by defendant was overruled, and defendant pleaded the general issue and a special plea setting up that the court had no jurisdiction of the cause; that if plaintiff had any right of recovery it was provided for under and by virtue of the Workmen's Compensation Act. A demurrer to the special plea was sustained. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appealed directly to this court on the ground that certain constitutional questions were involved in the decision.

It is first contended by appellant that section 15 of the Occupational Disease Act was repealed by implication by the Workmen's Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. c. 48, §§ 126-152i); second, that section 15 is unconstitutional because it embraces a subject not included or referred to in the title of the act; third, that it is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it denies the equal protection of the law. The nature and extent of the injury suffered by appellee and the amount of the judgment recovered are not questioned or discussed in the briefs.

The first Workmen's Compensation Act in this state was passed in 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 315). Its object, as expressed by its title, was to provide ‘compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of the employment,’ and that has been the purpose of the act, expressed in the title, in all the subsequent acts or revisions on that subject. The title of the Occupational Disease Act is:

‘An act to promote the public health by protecting certain employés in this state from the dangers of occupational diseases, and providing for the enforcement thereof.’

That act and the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911 were passed at the same session of the Legislature, and were clearly intended to apply to different conditions and situations. An accident or accidental injury was defined in Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378, 120 N. E. 249, and it was said the provision requiring notice within 30 days after the accident shows the accident must be traceable to a definite time, place, and cause. The words ‘accidental injury or death’ are used, and are to be understood in their popular sense. An occupational disease, such as lead poisoning, does not occur suddenly, but is a matter of slow development, and the Occupational Disease Act was passed for the protection of employés from such diseases. Whether the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Michigan, the title of which is very similar to ours, applied to occupational diseases was thoroughly considered by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Adams v. Acme White Lead & Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485, L. R. A. 1916A, 283, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 689. It was held not to apply to such diseases, but to injuries arising from accidents alone. The same ruling was made in Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349, 97 Atl. 345, L. R....