Labbe v. Hill Bros., Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 February 1964
• Docket Number: No. 10544,10544
• Citation: 197 A.2d 305,97 R.I. 269
• Parties: Joseph P. LABBE v. HILL BROTHERS, INC. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 305

197 A.2d 305

97 R.I. 269

Joseph P. LABBE v. HILL BROTHERS, INC.

Ex. No. 10544.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 6, 1964.

David B. Lovell, Jr., Hoyt W. Lark, Providence, for plaintiff.

Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, Guy J. Wells, Providence, for defendant.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff during the unloading of piling from a motor carrier owned by the defendant. The case was tried to a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $30,378.15. The trial justice thereafter denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, and the case is before this court solely on the defendant's exception to the denial of that motion. His other exceptions, being neither briefed nor argued, are deemed to be waived.

It appears from the record that on June 15, 1960 plaintiff was employed by a contractor engaged in the construction of a number of oil storage tanks on a tract of land in Providence lying east of Allens avenue and south of Henderson street. At that time the foundations upon which these tanks were to be built were under construction, which involved the driving of piles in substantial numbers. The defendant was engaged in the delivery of piling to the job site and for that purpose used a certain vehicle known as a pole trailer, hereinafter referred to as the carrier.

It is not disputed that on the morning of June 15 defendant's carrier arrived at the job site carrying a load of piles and was directed to take up a position on Henderson street by the contractor's general foreman, Amos W. Stender, hereinafter referred to as Stender. The surface of Henderson street at the point where the carrier was admittedly positioned is four or five feet above the surface of the work area. It appears that the carrier was loaded with approximately twenty piles which ranged in length from 45 to 50 feet and were secured thereto by a chain.

The only evidence as to the method employed in unloading piles from the carrier was adduced through the testimony of Stender, who stated that generally 'the piles have to be unloaded by hand with tools. They have to be rolled off the truck and they immediately drop off the side of the truck * * *'; and that 'very rarely a pile ever comes off a truck without the help of the men taking it off. Very seldom does a pile ever roll off of its free accord. We also have to use peevees to roll these piles off.' It further appears that certain skids are used to guide the piles away from the wheels of the carrier as they are unloaded and to provide runners along which the piles roll down the embankment and into the work area to positions where the construction carpenters prepare them for driving. From the testimony of Stender and othe witnesses for plaintiff, it is clear that at the direction of Stender these skids had been erected and placed by the contractor's employees before plaintiff was injured.

Stender testified that while he was standing on Henderson street about 10 feet to the rear of the carrier, he observed defendant's driver 'around his truck'; that the driver said to him: 'Whenever you're ready we'll let this load of piles go'; and that he replied, 'Okay,' meaning that when he was ready for the unloading he would so inform the driver. When asked as to what happened next, he testified: 'Well, I was surprised as I turned around and see two or three piles rolling from the truck.' These piles, according to Stender, rolled down the embankment, and one of them, swinging around, hit plaintiff, who at that time was working some 30 feet away trimming a pile with a chain saw.

In urging error, defendant contends that there was a failure of proof on the issue of causation, there being in the record no direct evidence that defendant's driver released the piles and the circumstantial evidence adduced on that point not being susceptible of a reasonable inference that the load had been released by defendant's driver. In so arguing, defendant, as we understand it, concedes that the trial justice complied with the obligation imposed on her by a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence but contends that he conclusion thereon, being based on a misconception of the probative force of the evidence adduced on the question of causation, must be disregarded as clearly wrong. Inasmuch as the trial justice obviously inferred from the evidence the release of the piles by defendant's driver, this argument raises a narrow issue as to whether the relevant evidence is reasonably susceptible of such an inference.

The 'clearly wrong' rule, so called, refers to the burden of an appellant who would overturn a decision of a trial justice who complied with the duty imposed by the motion for a new trial. The burden is on the defendant to show, in order to prevail on such a motion, that the trial justice either overlooked or misconceived some relevant and material evidence on a controlling issue. The defendant in this case, in seeking to meet this burden, contends that the trial justice misconceived the probative force of the evidence adduced on the issue of causation.

The precise ground upon which defendant relies is that the inference that its driver released the piles is not one that reasonably could be drawn from the relevant evidence on that issue. This raises a vexing question as to when is an evidentiary inference reasonable or, to state it otherwise, when are established evidentiary facts reasonably susceptible of a particular inference drawn therefrom by the trier of the fact? The ultimate question is, of course, when does an inference judicially drawn constitute legal proof of a material fact? This view has perhaps been aptly stated in Hornick v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 307 Pa. 264, 269, 161 A. 75, 76: 'It is easy to express the distinction between conjecture and absolute proof but it is not easy to formulate a definition which in every situation...