Labbee v. State

Citation362 Ga.App. 558,869 S.E.2d 520
Decision Date10 February 2022
Docket NumberA22A0246
Parties LABBEE v. The STATE.
CourtUnited States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

362 Ga.App. 558
869 S.E.2d 520

LABBEE
v.
The STATE.

A22A0246

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

February 10, 2022


869 S.E.2d 525

Monte Kevin Davis, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Oliver Jackson Browning Jr., District Attorney, for Appellee.

Barnes, Presiding Judge.

362 Ga.App. 558

Following the grant of his application for interlocutory appeal, Jimmy Wayne Labbee appeals from the trial court's denial of his plea in bar asserted on constitutional speedy trial grounds. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Labbee's plea in bar, we affirm.

The record reflects that on March 19, 2015, Labbee was arrested on charges of child molestation. He was granted bond on April 18, 2015. After his release on bond, Labbee lived and worked in Tennessee.

On May 17, 2016, a Haralson County grand jury indicted Labbee on one count of aggravated child molestation and four counts of child molestation based on his alleged sexual abuse of three children. On June 30, 2016, Labbee's counsel filed several pretrial motions, including "Defendant's Waiver of Formal Arraignment, Entry of ‘Not Guilty’ Plea and Demand for Jury Trial" and a demand for statutory discovery. On July 27, 2016, the State served discovery on defense counsel.

The case first appeared on the September 2016 trial calendar. Labbee filed a motion for a continuance, consented to by the State, in

362 Ga.App. 559

which he sought additional time to review 15 DVDs and approximately 200 pages of documents provided in response to his discovery requests. The trial court granted the motion.

The case was placed on each of the next seven available trial calendars for the Superior Court of Haralson County: February 2017, September 2017, October 2017, February 2018, September 2018, February 2019, and October 2019.1 In each instance, the case was continued. The trial court granted continuances to Labbee when his counsel was not ready for trial and when the defense's expert witness had a conflict during the scheduled trial week. The trial court granted continuances to the State when the new prosecutor assigned to the case announced that he planned to seek entry of a nolle prosequi order. In some instances, both parties consented to a continuance.

The next available trial calendar was for February 2020, but Labbee's case was not placed on that calendar because of the prosecutor's repeated statements that he planned to file a nolle prosequi motion. Ultimately, however, after meeting with the victims on several occasions and consulting with an assistant district attorney from another county, the prosecutor decided to continue pursuing the case against Labbee.

Before the case could be placed on a later trial calendar, the Governor of the State of Georgia declared a public health state of emergency on March 14, 2020, in response to the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic.2 See Ga.

869 S.E.2d 526

Exec. Order 03.14.20.01. That same day, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia entered an order declaring a statewide judicial emergency, pursuant to OCGA § 38-3-61,

362 Ga.App. 560

in light of "the continued transmission of Coronavirus/COVID-19 throughout the State and the potential infection of those who work in or are required to appear in our courts." Ga. S. Ct., Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency, at p. 1 (March 14, 2020). The judicial emergency order, among other things, suspended jury trials that had not yet commenced. See id. at p. 2. The judicial emergency order thereafter was extended several times with modifications.

On September 28, 2020, while jury trials remained suspended, Labbee filed his plea in bar and motion for discharge and acquittal, alleging that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated by the delay in his trial.3 A hearing on the plea in bar was conducted by video conference on February 11, 2021. At the conclusion of the hearing, Labbee requested that the trial court reserve ruling until he filed a supplemental brief. The trial court agreed, and Labbee filed his brief on March 3, 2021. The trial court subsequently entered its order denying Labbee's plea in bar on April 12, 2021. The trial court granted Labbee a certificate of immediate review, whereupon Labbee filed his application for interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted. This appeal followed.

362 Ga.App. 561

"Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution provide that a criminal defendant shall have the right to a speedy trial." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ellis v. State , 343 Ga. App. 391, 394 (2), 806 S.E.2d 839 (2017). See U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial[.]"); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a) ("In criminal cases, the defendant shall have a ... speedy trial[.]"). When considering constitutional speedy trial claims, courts must conduct the two-part test as delineated in the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). See Ruffin v. State , 284 Ga. 52, 55 (2), 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008). Under the Barker - Doggett test,

Courts ... first must consider whether the interval between the defendant's arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation and the trial is sufficiently long so as to be characterized as presumptively prejudicial. If the delay is long enough to invoke the presumption of prejudice, the trial court must balance four factors: (1) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, (2) whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay, (3) whether, in due course, the defendant
869 S.E.2d 527
asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cash v. State , 307 Ga. 510, 513 (2) (a), 837 S.E.2d 280 (2019). Application of this test "is committed principally to the discretion of the trial court, and this Court has a limited role in reviewing the trial court's decision." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Henderson v. State , 310 Ga. 231, 235 (2), 850 S.E.2d 152 (2020). "[W]e must accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous, and we must accept the ultimate conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion[.]" State v. Buckner , 292 Ga. 390, 391, 738 S.E.2d 65 (2013).

In the present case, the trial court entered a detailed 79-page order that included extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining its decision. The trial court calculated the length of the delay as the time that had elapsed between Labbee's arrest on March 19, 2015, and the April 12, 2021 order denying his plea in bar, which totaled approximately six years and three weeks. The trial court found that the pretrial delay was presumptively prejudicial and thus triggered consideration of the four Barker - Doggett factors;

362 Ga.App. 562

that the length of the delay was uncommonly long and weighed against the State; that the reasons for the delay were attributable to one or both parties in varying degrees, with Labbee "assigned sole and shared responsibility totaling at least 59% of the total delay"; that Labbee waited over five years to assert his constitutional speedy trial right and the delay in asserting his right weighed heavily against him; and that while prejudice against Labbee was presumed because of the lengthy delay in the proceedings, there was no demonstrable evidence of actual prejudice in the record. The trial court then balanced the various factors and concluded that Labbee's constitutional speedy trial right had not been violated.

We will address these determinations by the trial court, each in turn.

1. The Threshold Inquiry: Presumptive Prejudice. "Speedy trial rights attach at the time of arrest or formal indictment, whichever is earlier." Salahuddin v. State , 277 Ga. 561, 562 (2), 592 S.E.2d 410 (2004). "Where a trial has not occurred, the delay should be calculated from the date of arrest or other formal accusation to the date on which a defendant's speedy trial motion was granted or denied[.]" State v. Porter , 288 Ga. 524, 526 (2) (b), 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011). Labbee was arrested on March 19, 2015, and the trial court denied his plea in bar on April 12, 2021. "A one-year delay is typically presumed to be prejudicial." Goins v. State , 306 Ga. 55, 57 (2) (b), 829 S.E.2d 89 (2019). Hence, as the State concedes on appeal, the trial court properly found that the approximately six-year, three-week delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial and triggered full analysis of the four Barker - Doggett factors. See State v. Pickett , 288 Ga. 674, 676 (2) (b), 706 S.E.2d 561 (2011).

2. The Barker-Doggett Factors.

(a) The First...

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    ......A communicable disease that presents a public health threat is, in part, "an illness of public health significance, as determined by the State Health Commissioner," that "is known to be readily transmitted .. from one individual to another and has been found to create a risk of death or ...Nov. 21, 2021) ; Callender v. State , No. C-02-CR-19-002678, 2021 WL 5371209, at *17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 18, 2021) ; Labbee v. State , 362 Ga.App. 558, –––– – ––––, 869 S.E.2d 520 (2022) ; State v. Rodriguez , No. Cr. 1811005093, 2021 WL 1221461, at *5 ......
  • State v. Hintze
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • October 14, 2022
    ......State , 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Or, to put it differently, a "defendant invoking his speedy trial right must do so in 520 P.3d 21 a manner concretely enough to put the government on notice that he would prefer to be tried as soon as possible." Labbee v. State , 362 Ga.App. 558, 869 S.E.2d 520, 532 (2022) (quotation simplified). And while this might not require the talismanic utterance of a particular phrase, "at the very least, a defendant should manifest his desire to be tried promptly." United States v. Duran-Gomez , 984 F.3d 366, 378 (5th ......
  • State v. Hintze
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • October 14, 2022
    ......State ,. 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Or, to put it. differently, a "defendant invoking his speedy trial. right must do so in a manner concretely enough to put the. government on notice that he would prefer to be tried as soon. as possible." Labbee v. State , 869 S.E.2d 520,. 532 (Ga.Ct.App. 2022) (quotation simplified). And while this. might not require the talismanic utterance of a particular. phrase, "at the very least, a defendant should manifest. his desire to be tried promptly." United States v. Duran-Gomez , 984 F.3d 366, 378 ......
  • State v. Hintze
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • October 14, 2022
    ......State ,. 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Or, to put it. differently, a "defendant invoking his speedy trial. right must do so in a manner concretely enough to put the. government on notice that he would prefer to be tried as soon. as possible." Labbee v. State , 869 S.E.2d 520,. 532 (Ga.Ct.App. 2022) (quotation simplified). And while this. might not require the talismanic utterance of a particular. phrase, "at the very least, a defendant should manifest. his desire to be tried promptly." United States v. Duran-Gomez , 984 F.3d 366, 378 ......
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