Laber v. Long View R.V., Inc.
Decision Date | 16 April 2020 |
Docket Number | 3:17-CV-00542 (KAD) |
Citation | 454 F.Supp.3d 158 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | Jason R. LABER, Plaintiff, v. LONG VIEW R.V., INC., Defendant. |
Daniel S. Blinn, Consumer Law Group, Rocky Hill, CT, for Plaintiff.
Charles Donald Neville, Douglas Mark Evans, Kroll McNamara Evans & Delahanty, West Hartford, CT, Jeremy M. Sher, Pro Hac Vice, LeClair Korona Vahey Cole LLP, Mary Jo S. Korona, Pro Hac Vice, Adams LeClair LLP, Rochester, NY, for Defendant.
This case arises out of the sale of a 2017 Thor Miramar 34.3 motorhome ("Miramar") by Defendant, Long View R.V., Inc. d/b/a/ Long View RV Superstore ("Long View"), to Plaintiff, Jason Laber ("Laber"), on June 9, 2016. Shortly after purchasing the Miramar, Laber alleges that the Miramar's slide-out, a feature that extends the walls of the motorhome to increase living quarters, was drifting approximately 1.5 inches while driving (the "slide-out defect"). Due to the slide-out defect, among other alleged issues, and failed repair attempts by Long View, Laber revoked acceptance of the Miramar and brought this instant action against Long View for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (Count One),1 breach of express warranty (Count Three), and negligent misrepresentation (Count Seven).2 Discovery is concluded and now pending before the Court is Long View's motion for summary judgment. Long View also filed a motion to preclude the expert testimony of Thomas Bailey, Laber's disclosed expert on both the merchantability of the Miramar as well as the diminished value of the Miramar. For the following reasons, the motion to preclude the valuation opinion is GRANTED. And accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
After purchasing the Miramar on June 9, 2016 and upon noticing the slide-out defect, Laber first brought the Miramar back to Long View for repairs in June 2016. However, in July 2016, Laber observed the slide-out defect had not been fixed. Laber brought the Miramar back to Long View for additional repairs in July 2016 and September 2016 but the slide-out defect was not fixed on either occasion. At that point, Laber agreed to send the Miramar to Thor Motor Coach, Inc. ("Thor"), the manufacturer of the Miramar, in Indiana for repairs. When the Miramar returned to Long View from Thor in January 2017, the slide-out defect was still not fixed. Eventually, in February 2017, while the Miramar was again in Long View's possession, Laber served notice on Long View revoking his acceptance of the Miramar.
While in his possession, Laber took the Miramar on several trips to and from his home in Centerville, Massachusetts. For example, Laber took his family on eight camping trips throughout Massachusetts. In July 2016, Laber, accompanied by his wife and three other couples, went to a concert at the Xfinity Center in Mansfield, Massachusetts. Then, in November 2016, Laber and a group of friends went to a Patriots game in Foxborough, Massachusetts. Laber also took various other trips for both leisure and repairs. When Laber last drove the Miramar in December 2016, the odometer showed 3,582 miles.
However, as mentioned above, due to his concerns regarding the potential safety risks associated with the slide-out defect, Laber revoked acceptance of the Miramar in February 2017 after Thor was unable to repair the slide-out defect. Laber then filed this instant action.
The motion for summary judgment is premised on the Court granting the motion to preclude. Therefore, the Court addresses this motion first.
Long View moves to preclude the testimony of Laber's disclosed expert, Thomas Bailey ("Bailey"). Bailey offers an opinion regarding (1) the merchantability of the Miramar ("merchantability opinion") and (2) the Miramar's value at the time of sale ("valuation opinion"). Bailey first opines that the Miramar was not merchantable at the time of sale. As to this opinion, Long View argues that Bailey is neither qualified to testify as to the Miramar's merchantability nor is his methodology reliable in finding that the Miramar is unmerchantable. Bailey next opines that the Miramar was worth $64,000 less than Laber paid for it at the time of the sale. As to this opinion, Long View argues that Bailey's methodology is unreliable. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Bailey's valuation opinion must be precluded because it is simply unreliable.3
FED. R. EVID . 702.
The party offering expert testimony bears the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of the testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. Lippe v. Bairnco Corp. , 288 B.R. 678, 685–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd , 99 F. App'x 274 (2d Cir. 2004). To be admissible, "[a]n expert opinion requires some explanation as to how the expert came to his conclusion and what methodologies or evidence substantiate that conclusion." Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. , 451 F.3d 104, 127 (2d Cir. 2006), aff'd on other grounds , 552 U.S. 312, 128 S.Ct. 999, 169 L.Ed.2d 892 (2008).
Indeed, "the Supreme Court has made clear that the district court has a ‘gatekeeping’ function under Rule 702—it is charged with ‘the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’ " Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) ). "As a threshold matter, trial courts must consider whether the witness is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to render his or her opinions as an expert, before reaching an analysis of the testimony itself." Vale v. United States of Am. , 673 F. App'x 114, 116 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order). Even if the witness is qualified to testify as an expert, "[e]xpert testimony is inadmissible as unreliable where it consists of conclusory and speculative opinions, or where it lacks foundation." Id. In determining whether an expert witness’ testimony must be excluded as unreliable, the "inquiry is fluid and will necessarily vary from case to case." Amorgianos , 303 F.3d at 266. "The Supreme Court has identified a number of factors bearing on reliability that district courts may consider, such as (1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) a technique's known or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation, and (4) whether a particular technique or theory has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "[W]hen an expert opinion is based on data, a methodology, or studies that are simply inadequate to support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony." Id.
In Smith v. Freightliner, LLC , plaintiffs sued the defendant-manufacturers of their motor home for, among other claims, breach of warranty due to various alleged defects. 239 F.R.D. 390, 392 (D.N.J. 2006). In conjunction with deciding the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court excluded plaintiffs’ expert's testimony as to the diminution in value of the motor home. Id. at 393. Although the court found that the expert was qualified to testify as to the motor home's value, "[the expert's] report and proposed testimony lack[ed] a discernable methodology and, therefore, [was] barred." Id. Although the expert identified factors he used to assess the motor home's value and testified that he (1) "test rode the vehicle and felt a vibration," (2) "reviewed the repair history of the vehicle and service complaints made by the plaintiffs," and (3) "determined that a ‘stigma’ attached to the motor home because it vibrated, and subsequent repairs did not fix the problem," to come to the conclusion that "the vehicle suffered a twenty-five percent loss in value," the court found that the expert could not testify as to the diminution in value of the motor home because "the [c]ourt cannot say that [the expert] did not pull the twenty-five percent reduction out of a hat." Id. The court appears to have focused on its assessment that the expert did not follow his own methodology and, therefore, his methodology could not be replicated, which is "[a] basic requirement under Daubert ." Id.
Similarly, in Castagna v. Newmar Corp. , the court excluded Bailey's expert opinion regarding the market value of a damaged RV in connection with a breach of warranty lawsuit. No. 3:15-cv-249 (JD), 2020 WL 525936, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2020). With respect to Bailey's market value opinion, the court noted that Bailey offered extensive background regarding appraisals in general, summarized the RV's condition, listed sixteen factors that could affect the value of an RV, opined that the RV could only be sold for salvage value, and then concluded that the RV's market value at the date of its sale would have been $25,000. Id. at *3. The court found that ...
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