Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Neff
| Decision Date | 23 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-3653 |
| Parties | Laborers' International Union of North America, Local 860, on behalf of itself and its members, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Terease Z. Neff; Hon. Thomas F. O'Malley; Cuyahoga County, Ohio Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Argued: March 10, 2022
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. No. 1:20-cv-02714-Pamela A Barker, District Judge.
Austin T. Opalich, MANGANO LAW OFFICES CO., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio for Appellant. Max V. Rieker, WALTER ǀ HAVERFIELD LLP Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.
Austin T. Opalich, Joseph J. Guarino III, Ryan K. Hymore, MANGANO LAW OFFICES CO., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Max V. Rieker, R. Todd Hunt, Alejandro V. Cortes, WALTER ǀ HAVERFIELD LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
When contract negotiations broke down between an Ohio juvenile court and the union that represents the court's employees, the union took the court to federal court. Because the juvenile court is an arm of the State, the district court correctly held that sovereign immunity bars most of the union's claims. And because the union's remaining contentions fail to state a claim for relief, we affirm across the board.
Ohio's third branch of government is divided into three courts: the Ohio Supreme Court, the intermediate courts of appeals, and the courts of common pleas. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 1. There are twelve courts of appeals, each broken down into geographical districts, with some districts covering just one heavily populated county (e.g., the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which covers Cuyahoga County) but most of them covering several counties. Ohio Rev. Code § 2501.01. There are 88 courts of common pleas, the State's courts of general jurisdiction, one for each county in the State. See id. § 2301.01. Most courts of common pleas contain subject matter divisions for juvenile, probate, or domestic relations matters only. See id. § 2301.03. In addition to the courts that the Ohio Constitution creates, the Ohio legislature has established municipal and county courts, which possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain criminal matters and over civil matters where the amount in controversy does not exceed $15, 000. Id. §§ 1901.02, 1907.01, 1901.17, 1907.03, 1901.20, 1907.02.
Cuyahoga County has a Juvenile Court with six judges. Id. § 2153.02. Other than the limitation on subject matter, the judges have the same authority as other common pleas judges. Id.; In re Z.R., 44 N.E.3d 239, 242 (Ohio 2015).
In 2012, the employees of the Juvenile Court certified labor union Local 860 as their exclusive collective bargaining representative. The union represents 136 employees who work in a range of positions, including as legal services clerks, as probation officers, and as custodial and food service workers in juvenile detention facilities. It does not represent judges.
In 2016, the union and the Juvenile Court renewed their collective bargaining agreements. The new contracts dealt with wages, holidays, sick leave, health insurance, and other conventional topics. The parties agreed that the new contracts would extend from January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2019. Each contract added that the Court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed interest in the contract, or the employees decertified the union.
In 2019, the relationship soured. Attempts to negotiate a new agreement stalled. Consensus continued to elude them in 2020. On December 1, 2020, the union alleges, the Juvenile Court "unilaterally proclaimed" the contracts invalid. R.1 at 7. That day, the Juvenile Court filed a lawsuit in state court asking it to declare the agreements void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. In the days that followed, the union alleges, relations continued to spiral, as the Juvenile Court treated the union's members as nonunion employees, announced a plan to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.
The union sued the Juvenile Court in federal court. In addition to naming the court, it filed the lawsuit against Judge Thomas O'Malley, the court's administrative judge, and Terease Neff, the court administrator, in their personal and official capacities. As relevant here, the union claimed the Juvenile Court and the administrators violated the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution by breaching the collective bargaining agreements.
The Juvenile Court moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. It reasoned that sovereign immunity bars the union's claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. It reasoned that § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union's Contracts Clause claims against O'Malley and Neff. It reasoned that the union's request for an injunction under the Takings Clause failed because the union failed to plead an inadequate remedy at law. And it reasoned that qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against the administrators under the Takings Clause.
"When the States entered the federal system, they did so with their sovereignty intact." PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S.Ct. 2244, 2258 (2021) (quotation omitted). One feature of sovereignty is immunity from suit. Id. Whether reflected in the words of the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments or background principles to the Convention, sovereign immunity protects States and the Federal Government from litigation except in "limited circumstances." Id. That remains true for the States whether the case is filed in state or federal court, whether the plaintiff is a citizen of the defendant State or not, and whether the lawsuit's target is the State or an official acting on its behalf. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Broadly though these principles sweep, exceptions exist. Waiver by a State is one. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990). Authorized abrogation by Congress is another. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004). A lawsuit by the federal government is a third. West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987). On top of these and other exceptions, immunity applies only to lawsuits against the State or "an arm of the State," not to those against political subdivisions like counties. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
Familiar considerations shape the application of the arm-of-the-State inquiry to the Juvenile Court. Among them are: (1) the State of Ohio's "potential liability" for a judgment against the Juvenile Court; (2) the way in which state law describes the Juvenile Court and "the degree of state control and veto power over the [Court's] actions"; (3) the extent to which state officials control membership on the Juvenile Court; and (4) the extent to which the Juvenile Court's "functions fall within the traditional purview of state or local government." Ernst, 427 F.3d at 359. While the first factor-the potential impact on the state treasury of any judgment-is undoubtedly important, it does not control the inquiry. Id. at 364; see also Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 761-62 (6th Cir. 2010). Sovereign immunity after all guards against money-damages and injunction actions. Ernst, 427 F.3d at 364-65. It not only protects a State's treasury, but it also "pervasively . . . emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system," a consideration that applies to money-damages and injunction actions. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994).
Consider each factor in turn. First, everyone agrees that Cuyahoga County would pay any judgment against the Juvenile Court. That consideration favors treating the Juvenile Court as a component of the County.
Second, the State treats the common pleas courts and their subdivisions as segments of state government. The Ohio Constitution creates a "unified state judicial system," Pucci, 628 F.3d at 762, providing that the "judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, [and] courts of common pleas and divisions thereof," Ohio Const. art. IV, § 1; see Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1997). The legislature filled in the details, enacting "comprehensive state legislation" governing the State's courts. Ernst, 427 F.3d at 360; Pucci, 628 F.3d at 762; see Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2151.07, 2153.01, 2153.16. State officials are responsible for creating new courts and adding judgeships, Ohio Const. art. IV, § 15, and the legislature has the "exclusive constitutional authority to define" the common pleas courts' jurisdiction, State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 883, 887 (Ohio 2017). The courts may constitutionally exercise "statewide subject-matter jurisdiction." Cheap Escape Co. v. Haddox, LLC, 900 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ohio 2008). And a judge of a subdivision of the court of common pleas, including a juvenile court judge, is a judge of the State, complete with authority to serve temporarily throughout Ohio's lower court system if circumstances require. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(A)(3).
The State also exercises considerable control over the courts. The "fundamental law of Ohio imparts supervisory authority over all courts of that state, and the authority to promulgate rules for all courts of that state, to the Ohio Supreme Court." Mumford, 105 F.3d at 268. The State Constitution also "dictates standards controlling the election, residency, tenure,...
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