Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Schultz Indus. Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | CV 20-06520-RSWL-SHK |
| Parties | LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL 1309, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. SCHULTZ INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC., a California Corporation; Chevron Products Company, a Division of Chevron U.S.A., Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Aaron Gibran Haq Lawrence, Alexander Bernard Cvitan, J. David Sackman, Arthur Nicolas Four, Reich Adell and Cvitan APLC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.
David S. McLeod, Nadine Shu Rong Tan, Parker Milliken Clark O'Hara and Samuelian, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant Schultz Industrial Services, Inc.
Caitlin E. Higgins, Christopher R. Rodriguez, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant Chevron Products Company.
Plaintiff Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local 1309, AFL-CIO ("Plaintiff") initiated this Action on July 22, 2020, against Defendants Schultz Industrial Services, Inc. ("Defendant Schultz") and Chevron Products Company ("Defendant Chevron") (together, "Defendants"). Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Arbitration (the "Motion") [23].
Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to the Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion.
Plaintiff is a labor union affiliated with the Los Angeles/Orange Counties Building and Construction Trades Council and the State Building and Construction Trades Council. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1. Defendant Chevron, a division of Chevron U.S.A., Inc., is an employer engaged in the petroleum refinery and construction industries. Id. ¶ 5. Defendant Schultz, a private contractor of Defendant Chevron, is an employer involved in the construction, alteration, demolition, installation, repair, and maintenance industries. Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff and Defendant Chevron are signatories to, and bound by, the Chevron California Refineries Construction & Maintenance Labor Agreement (the "Agreement"), a written collective bargaining agreement that sets forth the terms and conditions for the performance of "Covered Work"1 at the Chevron Refinery Facilities, including the refinery located in El Segundo, California (the "El Segundo Refinery"). Id. ¶¶ 8, 11; see Stipulation of Facts Ex. 1 ("Agreement"). Prior to beginning work at the El Segundo Refinery, Defendant Schultz signed an agreement to be bound by the Agreement. Id. ¶ 15.
Article 8 of the Agreement sets forth the grievance and arbitration procedures. Article 8.1 states, in pertinent part: "It is mutually agreed that any question arising out of and during the term of this Agreement involving its interpretation and application (other than jurisdictional disputes or successorship) shall be considered a grievance." Agreement § 8.1. Article 8.2 states that "[t]he Owner and other Employers, as well as the Unions, may bring forth grievances under this Article." Id. § 8.2.
Article 8.4 outlines a four-step grievance procedure, "except that grievances that do not involve an individual grievant shall be discussed by the Owner, State Council and Local Council and then, if not resolved within 5 working days of written notice unless extended by mutual consent, commence at Step 4 ...." Id. § 8.4. Step 4 provides, as relevant here, that a party to the grievance "may request the dispute be submitted to arbitration." Id. Article 8.8 states: "The Arbitrator's decisions shall be confined to the question posed by the grievance and the Arbitrator shall not have authority to modify, amend, alter, add to or subtract from, any provision of this Agreement." Id. § 8.8.
As noted, "jurisdictional disputes" are excepted from the grievance and arbitration procedures provided in Article 8. See id. § 8.1. Article 9 provides a separate procedure for resolving jurisdictional disputes, stating in pertinent part: "All jurisdictional disputes between or among the Unions and their employees, parties to this Agreement, shall be settled and adjusted according to the present [Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry] ...." Id. § 9.2.
Plaintiff alleges that, in May 2020, a dispute between the parties arose concerning the interpretation of Articles 1.6 and 5.4 of the Agreement. Compl. ¶¶ 18-20. Article 5.4 provides, in relevant part:
The Owner, Employers and the Unions are committed to fully and effectively implementing the requirements of SB 54 (Hancock, 2013). The parties agree that using a skilled and trained workforce is essential to ensure worker and public safety. To implement those requirements, except where requested by name by the Employer, the Unions shall dispatch journey-level workers who satisfy the criteria of Health & Safety Code section 25536.7 paragraph (b)(10)(C), and have graduated from an apprenticeship program as specified in paragraph (b)(10)(A), or have at least as many hours of on-the-job experience as specified in paragraph (b)(10)(A). The referral facilities will give priority in dispatch to workers who, prior to dispatch, will meet the requirements of SB 54 such that the Employer can satisfy the criteria of Health & Safety Code section 25536.7, paragraphs (b)(10)(A), (b)(10)(C), and (b)(11). When requested by an Employer that has requested workers from the referral facilities to meet the requirements of Health & Safety Code section 25536.7, paragraphs (b)(10)(A), (b)(10)(C), and/or (b)(11)(B)(iii) and, due to workforce shortages, the Employer is unable to obtain sufficient such workers within 48 hours of the request (Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays excepted), the Union will provide a letter to the Employer attesting that sufficient workers meeting those requirements are temporarily unavailable ("Attestation Letter"). The Attestation Letter shall be in the form attached to this Agreement as Attachment B.
Article 1.6 of the Agreement provides, in relevant part:
[I]t is the purpose of this Agreement, to ensure that a sufficient supply of skilled craft workers and qualified apprentices are available at the Project, that all construction work and related work performed by the members of the Unions on this Project shall proceed continuously, without interruption, in a safe and efficient manner, economically with due consideration for the protection of labor standards, wages and working conditions.
Plaintiff alleges that, on May 7, 2020, Defendant Schultz began employing Safety Attendants for the performance of Covered Work at the El Segundo Refinery who Plaintiff believes do not meet the definition of a "skilled and trained workforce" within the meaning of Article 5.4 or the "skilled craft workers and qualified apprentices" purpose of the Agreement as set forth in Article 1.6. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 25. On May 8, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a written grievance (the "Grievance"), alleging violations of Articles 5.4 and 1.6 and requesting that a meeting be held among Defendant Chevron, the State Council, and the Local Council pursuant to Article 8.4. Id. ¶ 26. According to Plaintiff, the Grievance does not contest Defendant Schultz's assignment of Safety Attendants among the various crafts or trades that are signatory to the Agreement but, instead, expressly disclaims any contention that Defendant Schultz should have assigned the Safety Attendant work at issue to Plaintiff's members. Id. ¶ 28.
Defendants have repeatedly refused Plaintiff's written demand for arbitration, asserting a variety of reasons. Id. ¶¶ 29-43.
On July 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed its Complaint [1]. Defendants Schultz and Chevron each filed an Answer on September 25, 2020 [13] and September 28, 2020 [18], respectively.
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion [23] on January 11, 2021. Defendant Chevron filed its Opposition [26] on January 25, 2021. Defendant Schultz also filed an Opposition [28] on January 25, 2021. Plaintiff replied [29] on February 8, 2021.
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that any arbitration agreement within its scope "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. "By its terms, the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 - 4 ). This mandate limits the court's role "to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue." Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC, 977 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) ). "If the response is affirmative on both counts, then the Act requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms." Chiron Corp., 207 F.3d at 1130.
The party seeking to compel arbitration "bears ‘the burden of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence.’ "
Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014) ). But "[t]he party resisting arbitration bears the burden[s] of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration ...." Munro v. Univ. of S. Cal., 896 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000) ). "[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the...
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