Laborers Intern. Union v. HSA Contractors, Inc.

Citation728 F. Supp. 519
Decision Date22 December 1989
Docket NumberNo. 89-C-587.,89-C-587.
PartiesLABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. HSA CONTRACTORS, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

Matthew R. Robbins, Previant, Goldberg, Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman, S.C., Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff.

Russ R. Mueller, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

CURRAN, District Judge.

Laborers International Union of North America has commenced the above-captioned case against HSA Contractors, Inc. seeking a judgment declaring that it is not bound by the labor agreement between HSA and Laborers Local No. 113 and that the arbitrator in a pending grievance between HSA and Local 113 has no authority to bind the International Union to the labor agreement between Local 113 and HSA. The plaintiff also seeks an order enjoining HSA from attempting to submit to the grievance arbitration procedure under its agreement with Local 113 the claim that the International Union is a party or is bound by the labor agreement between HSA and Local 113. The plaintiff alleges that this court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of its claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 and 29 U.S.C. § 185.

HSA has answered by denying that the International Union is entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief and by asserting a counterclaim asking for a judgment declaring that the International Union is obligated to submit to arbitration with HSA and that the International Union has breached its contractual obligation in failing and refusing to do so. Shortly after this answer was served the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment which are now fully briefed and ready for decision.

I. FACTS

As a result of the settlement of unfair labor practice charges filed by Laborers Local No. 113 against HSA in 1985, HSA recognized Local 113 as the collective bargaining agent for certain of its employees and, in 1988, HSA and Local 113 entered into a collective bargaining agreement. A master labor agreement entitled "National Agreement Between the Asbestos Abatement Contractors Association and the Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO" was used as a model for the collective bargaining agreement between Local 113 and HSA. However, the plaintiff (International Union) did not take part in negotiations of the agreement and did not sign the agreement. See Complaint at Exhibit A.

On October 28, 1988, HSA filed a grievance alleging that Local 113 had violated the collective bargaining agreement. See Complaint at Exhibit B. When Local 113 and HSA could not resolve the grievance, Local 113 and HSA submitted the grievance to arbitration pursuant to Article X of the collective bargaining agreement. See Complaint at Exhibit A. On April 16, 1989, HSA notified the International Union of its contention that the International Union was bound by the labor agreement and that it was submitting this issue to the arbitrator. See Complaint at Exhibit C. After a hearing on May 19, 1989, the arbitrator postponed the proceedings pending a district court ruling on whether the International Union must submit to arbitration. See Answer and Counterclaim by the Defendant at Attachment B. This is the issue addressed in the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a party moving for summary judgment must show that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); McGraw-Edison Company v. Walt Disney Productions, 787 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir.1986). When faced with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant may not avoid judgment by simply resting on its pleadings. If the nonmovant bears the burden of production on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific showings, that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial. See First National Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corporation, 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir.1988).

A "genuine" factual issue is one that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A summary judgment procedure is not meant to be a trial on affidavits. "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. At the summary judgment stage the judge's function is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for that party to be entitled to judgment. See First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Company, 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). This inquiry implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits. Thus, in a civil case in which a bench trial has been requested, the record must show that the court could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the party upon whom the burden of proof is imposed is entitled to a judgment in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. If that party's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11.

"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Where, as here, the court is presented with cross motions for summary judgment, the court may fairly infer that no evidence other than the pleadings and supporting documents offered by the litigants need be considered in order to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists in the dispute. See Williams v. Frank, 702 F.Supp. 14, 16 (D.Mass.1988). The court must consider each party's motion separately. Each movant has the burden of presenting evidence to support its motion which would allow the court, if appropriate, to enter a judgment in its favor with the evidence being viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir.1988).

III. DISCUSSION AND DECISION
A. Contractual Basis of Obligation to Arbitrate

In the instant case the ultimate issue raised by both movants is whether the International Union must submit to arbitration with HSA. This issue is governed by federal labor law and the common law of agency.

As a threshold matter the question of whether an entity is contractually bound to submit to arbitration is a question for the district court rather than the arbitrator. See Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corporation, 868 F.2d 573, 577 (3d Cir.1989). Thus, the question of whether the International Union must participate in the arbitration of the underlying grievance with Local 113 and HSA is properly before this court.1

The federal court's task is to ascertain from the contract whether the reluctant party agreed to arbitrate. See R.J. Distributing Company v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 627, 771 F.2d 211, 214 (7th Cir.1985). The Seventh Circuit has recently explained that:

The principles governing the arbitrability of disputes between a union and a company under collective bargaining agreements are well-established. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) (collectively referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed these principles in AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986).
The foundational principle derived from the Steelworkers Trilogy is that the duty to submit a dispute to arbitration is contractual and therefore a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute when he has not agreed to do so. AT & T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 648 106 S.Ct. at 1418.

Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 7-1 v. Amoco Oil Company, 883 F.2d 581, 584 (7th Cir.1989). No legal obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute can arise by operation of law. A party is compelled to submit its rights to arbitration only if it has contracted to do so. See Gateway Coal Company v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 374, 94 S.Ct. 629, 635, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974); Laborers' International Union of North America, Local Union No. 309, AFL-CIO v. W.W. Bennett Construction Company, Inc., 686 F.2d 1267, 1274-75 (7th Cir.1982). Without such agreement, the arbitrator obtains no jurisdiction over the person sought to be charged. See Sheet Metal Workers International Association, Local Union No. 91 v. Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local Union 111, 495 F.Supp. 326, 331 (C.D.Ill.1980).

It is undisputed that the International Union is not a signatory...

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