Laborers Local Union No. 204 v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, 725
| Decision Date | 20 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | W,No. 725,No. 93S02-8711-EX-1071,No. 157,725,157,93S02-8711-EX-1071 |
| Citation | 524 N.E.2d 318 |
| Parties | LABORERS LOCAL UNION NO. 204, William Eyre, Charles Toth, Michael J. Short, Robert Faulkenburg, IBEW Local Unionilliam J. Brooks, Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Unionilliam L. Fenton, Jimmie L. Strange, Appellants, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF INDIANA, Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, Nucor Corporation, and the Office of the Utility Consumer Counselor, Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
John F. Wickes, Jr., Lynne D. Lidke, Scopelitis, Garvin & Wickes, Indianapolis, for appellants.
Thomas E. Kieper, Robert K. Johnson, Indianapolis, for Office of the Utility Consumer Counselor.
Ronald J. Brothers, Plainfield, for Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc.
Daniel C. Kaufman, Ritts, Brickfield & Kaufman, Washington, D.C., Richard E. Deer, Stanley C. Fickle, Michael G. Banta, Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, for Nucor Corp.
Nucor Corporation (Nucor) plans to construct and operate a new electric steel making mill. The projected cost of the mill is two hundred to two hundred and fifty million dollars. Following negotiations with several states, Nucor elected to construct its new steel mill in Montgomery County, Indiana, conditioned upon Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (Commission) approval of an agreement between Nucor and Public Service Indiana (PSI), an electric utility company. The Commission, after public hearing, approved the agreement. Appellant's herein, several unions and individual PSI rate payers, seek judicial review of the Commission's final order approving the agreement.
Appellants' brief raises issues concerning the propriety of the Commission's findings and also the question of whether or not the rate package afforded Nucor is discriminatory as a matter of law. In response, all three appellees, Nucor, PSI and the Utility Consumer Counselor, challenge appellant's standing to bring the appeal.
The two statutes relevant to this issue are Ind.Code Sec. 8-1-3-1 and Sec. 8-1-3-3. The former provides a method for an appeal of a Commission decision by any person or entity "adversely affected" by a final order of the Commission. The latter provides a method for a person or entity to be named as a party "appellant or appellee" in an appeal of a Commission decision if that person or entity demonstrates a "substantial interest" in the determination of the appeal.
In this case, no appeal was taken by any party to the proceedings before the Commission nor was an appeal initiated by a person or entity asserting an adverse affect under Ind.Code Sec. 8-1-3-1. Rather, all appellants herein filed petitions to intervene alleging a substantial interest in the determination of the action (Sec. 8-1-3-3). While the petitions additionally contained language to the effect that the Commission's final order had an adverse affect upon appellants, in their reply brief appellants reassert that the petitions were filed in accordance with Ind.Code Sec. 8-1-3-3 and met the statutory "standing" requirement that a substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings be established.
At issue is whether or not a showing of "substantial interest" under Sec. 8-1-3-3 is sufficient to confer the right to bring an appeal or if it is simply a necessary showing to bring one within Sec. 8-1-3-1, which grants the opportunity to appeal only to those people or entities who are deemed adversely affected by a Commission order.
Appellants claim that a showing of "substantial interest" is sufficient, that this Court recognized that sufficiency in its order granting the petitions to be made party appellants, and, in the alternative, that the Commission's final order approving the agreement had an adverse affect upon them.
Appellants assert that this Court recognized their standing to bring this appeal when it granted their verified petitions to be named party appellants. The verified petitions were granted by this Court in the order accepting transfer of this cause. However, a determination of the validity of the issues raised in the petitions was not inherent in the decision to grant them. Rather, the only permissible inference from that decision is that the Court recognized appellant's substantial interest in any determination upon the merits.
Ind.Code Sec. 8-1-3-1 establishes that in order to bring an appeal, a party must be adversely affected by a ruling of the Commission. Ind.Code Sec. 8-1-3-3 is merely an avenue through which a person or entity may be heard in the appeal. The language of Sec. 8-1-3-3 establishes that a petitioner may request to be made a party appellant or appellee. It is difficult to imagine a request to be made an appellee in a non-existent appeal. Due to the nature of the duties of the Commission, persons or entities may be affected in many different ways. One who has a substantial interest in the outcome of the Court's review may wish to have certain views aired, even if an adverse affect would not result from the decision regardless of the outcome. The granting of the verified petitions to be named party appellants simply permitted those petitioners to proceed in the manner of party appellants. It did not relieve them of any of the burdens. A prerequisite to a review by this Court on the merits of the appeal is a showing that appellants suffered an adverse affect as a result of the Commission's decision.
Appellants contend that the rates being afforded Nucor are discriminatory and that this adversely affects them. However, the contention is not buttressed by a sufficient rationale showing what specific adverse affect they have sustained due to the Commission's order. Before this...
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