Labow v. Rubin
Decision Date | 16 May 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 25283.,25283. |
Citation | 897 A.2d 136,95 Conn.App. 454 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Myrna LABOW v. Robert RUBIN et al. |
Nathalie Feola-Guerrieri, with whom were Myrna LaBow, pro se, and, on the brief, Daniel Shepro, Stratford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Barbara M. Schellenberg, Bridgeport, for the appellee (named defendant).
Gwen E. Adamson, for the appellee (defendant Ronald LaBow).
SCHALLER, FLYNN and HARPER, Js.*
The plaintiff, Myrna LaBow, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Robert Rubin and Ronald LaBow.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to the first count of her amended complaint, which sought to quiet title on the basis of collateral estoppel, (2) concluded that her pending appeal from a partition judgment did not act as a bar to the application of collateral estoppel to her quiet title count, and (3) granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to her intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy counts on the basis of the tort statute of limitations contained in General Statutes § 52-577. We disagree and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. "On July 9, 1974, [Myrna LaBow] initiated a dissolution of marriage action against her then husband, Ronald LaBow. At that time, the LaBows jointly owned with rights of survivorship, twenty-nine acres of property located in the towns of Weston and Fairfield. The property consists of a twenty-two acre parcel in Weston and an adjacent seven acre parcel in Fairfield.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Valentine v. LaBow, 95 Conn.App. 436, 440, ___ A.2d ___ (2006). The record reflects that the plaintiff filed a series of amended special defenses and a multiple count counterclaim, in which she continually challenged the validity of Rubin's ownership interest in the properties. LaBow v. LaBow, 69 Conn.App. 760, 763, 796 A.2d 592, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 903, 802 A.2d 853 (2002).
Valentine v. LaBow, supra, 95 Conn.App. at 440-41, ___ A.2d ___. Thereafter, in February, 2003, the plaintiff commenced the present quiet title action against Rubin and Ronald LaBow, as an individual and in his capacity as a trustee. On March 29, 2003, an additional hearing was held to determine whether the partition would be in kind or by sale. At the hearing, the plaintiff moved to consolidate the present action with the partition action. The court, Stevens, J., denied the motion and rendered judgment of partition by sale. Id., at 442. The plaintiff subsequently appealed.
On May 12, 2003, Ronald LaBow filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's complaint in the present action. Specifically, he argued that the plaintiff's complaint was barred by the special defenses of estoppel, res judicata or the statute of limitations contained in § 52-577.
On May 22, 2003, the plaintiff filed an amended, three count complaint. The first count of the amended complaint alleged a cause of action to quiet title to the Weston and Fairfield properties pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31. The plaintiff alleged that the properties were conveyed fraudulently to Rubin and that she was the "sole rightful owner" of the properties. The second and third counts of the amended complaint asserted claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy to defraud, respectively.
On August 28, 2003, Rubin filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to all three counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Rubin argued that the plaintiff's first count was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as well as the doctrine of laches. With respect to counts two and three, Rubin moved for summary judgment on the ground that each was barred by the three year statute of limitations contained in § 52-577.
On March 12, 2004, the court rendered summary judgment as to the first count of the plaintiff's amended complaint, which sought to quiet title, on the basis of collateral estoppel.2 Specifically, the court concluded that the issue of title to the Weston and Fairfield properties actually had been litigated and determined in the partition action. The court further concluded that the plaintiff's second and third counts, which alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy, respectively, were barred by several doctrines. With respect to these counts, the court rendered summary judgment in favor of Ronald LaBow on the basis of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The court also rendered summary judgment on these counts in favor of Ronald LaBow and Rubin on the ground that these counts alleged tort claims and, as such, were barred by the three year statute of limitations contained in § 52-577. The court, therefore, granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to all counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be provided where necessary.
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment as to the first count of her amended complaint, which sought to quiet title, on the basis of collateral estoppel.3 We disagree.4
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. Practice Book § 17-49 provides in relevant part that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 840-41, 888 A.2d 104 (2006).
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bouchard v. Sundberg, 80 Conn.App. 180, 186, 834 A.2d 744 (2003).
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