Lacas v. Detroit City Ry.

• Decision Date: 01 July 1892
• Citation: 92 Mich. 412,52 N.W. 745
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: LACAS v. DETROIT CITY RAILWAY.

52 N.W. 745

92 Mich. 412

LACAS v. DETROIT CITY RAILWAY.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 1, 1892

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; CORNELIUS J. REILLY, Judge.

Suit by Salame Lacas against the Detroit City Railway. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Sidney T. Miller, (John C Donnelly, of counsel,) for appellant.

William Stacey, for appellee.

MONTGOMERY J.

This suit is brought to recover for injuries received by the plaintiff while attempting to alight from one of the defendant's horse cars. The defendant asked that the jury be instructed that the plaintiff had not made a case by her testimony, and the refusal to give this instruction is the principal ground relied on for reversal. The plaintiff testified that on the 11th of August, 1890, she left Dr Brodie's house, where she had been at work during the day, and stopped and purchased some groceries, which she carried in a basket; that she got aboard the car in question and the moment she put her basket down she noticed that there was a strange conductor in the car; that she told him that she wanted to get off, as she was on the wrong car; that he laughed at her, and she turned back, and took her basket on her arm, and took hold of the post at the side of the car to get down easy; took hold of the post because she did not want to fall; took care of herself not to fall; as she was going to put her foot on the step, the bell was rung, and she fell and broke her arm. The car was an open one, and the step was a board running along its side. On cross-examination she testified that she stood beside the post, and took hold of it with her right hand, holding the basket in her left hand, expecting to hold onto the post until she got down, when she thought she would let go, so the effect of getting down with her right hand holding the post would be to have her face turned towards the rear of the car. The conductor started the car before she got her foot on the ground. He rang the bell before she got her foot on the board,-before she started to get down. "Question. Don't you know, Mrs. Lacas, that the car does not start instantly after the bell is rung? Answer. Yes, sir; they do. Q. Right instantly? A. The minute you ring they start right off. Q. Don't it take some little time,-isn't there time enough for a person standing on the steps of a car when the bell rings, for that person to get down before it gets in motion? A. But I was not on the step yet. * * * Q. Your testimony seems to be that the instant the bell rang you were thrown down? A. No; the time the bell rang I started to put my foot on the board; he started it himself. Q. Where were you when the bell rang? A. I was taking my basket, and getting ready to get down. Q. You were in the car when the bell rang? A. Yes, sir; of course I was. Q. When he started up? A. Yes, sir; when I was taking hold of the post, and was getting ready to get down, and the minute I put my foot on the board the car started. Q. But the bell rang before? A. Yes, sir; of course it would not go without they rang the bell." And on redirect examination she was asked: "Question. Will you explain to the jury just your position? Answer. I came into the car. This is the place. I came in here. This is Monroe avenue,-and I put my basket down here. I said to the conductor, 'I am in the wrong car.' I turned this way, and took my basket, and was just putting my foot down. I had my foot on the platform, I had my foot just going to put on the board. I didn't touch the board before he started. Q. Your foot was just coming down to that board? A. Yes. Q. What happened when your foot was in that position? A. He started the car, and it threw me off. Q. Where were you when the bell rang? A. I was right on the edge of the car to get off. Q. How long a time elapsed between the time the bell rang and you fell off? A. It was a pretty short time. I turned back to take my basket, and tried to get down; at the time he saw me touch the post to get down he rang the bell." We think the testimony was sufficient to justify the circuit judge in submitting the case to the jury. The testimony tended to show that the plaintiff had reached a point where it would be difficult to turn back before the bell was rung, and the car started in the very instant when she was acting. Under these circumstances, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in continuing her descent from the car. Railroad Co. v. Crunk, (Ind. Sup.) 21 N.E. 31; Railroad Co. v. Coulbourn, (Md.) 16 A. 208; Wyatt v. Railroad Co., 55 Mo. 485; Strand v. Railway Co., 64 Mich. 216, 31 N.W. 184.

2. The testimony of statements of present sufferings made by the plaintiff to witness Verdon were competent. The court took due care to exclude relations of past sufferings, and kept within the rule. Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich....