Lace v. People

• Decision Date: 06 April 1908
• Citation: Lace v. People, 43 Colo. 199, 95 P. 302 (Colo. 1908)
• Parties: LACE v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

95 P. 302

43 Colo. 199

LACE v. PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Colorado

April 6, 1908

Error to District Court, Mesa County; Sprigg Shackleford, Judge.

James G. Lace was convicted of obtaining money by means of the confidence game, and brings error.Affirmed.

The plaintiff in error was prosecuted under section 1332 Mills' Ann. St., which reads as follows: 'Every person who shall obtain, or attempt to obtain, from any other person or persons any money or property by means or by the use of brace faro, or any false or bogus checks, or by any other means, instrument or device, commonly called confidence games, shall be liable to indictment, and on conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term not less than one year nor more than ten years.'The information charges the accused with the offense in the form prescribed in section 1333 of the statute.Omitting its formal parts, it is as follows: 'That James G. Lace, late of Mesa county, state of Colorado, on or about the 19th day of February, A.D. 1906, at and within the county and state aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously obtain from one Edward F. Eldridge the sum of $370.00 in money of E. F. Eldridge, by means and use of the confidence game.'A motion to quash the information on the ground that it did not advise the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was overruled.A motion to require the prosecution to furnish the defendanta bill of particulars specifying the nature and cause of the accusation against him was also overruled.Upon trial the defendant was found guilty as charged in the information.A motion for a new trial was overruled, and he was sentenced to serve a term of from five to seven years in the penitentiary.To this sentence and judgment this writ of error is prosecuted.Numerous errors are assigned upon the rulings of the court below, which, taken as a whole, present the following reasons, upon which counsel for plaintiff in error relies for a reversal: (1) That the information is too indefinite and uncertain to advise him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.(2)Section 1333, prescribing the form of indictment or information for the offense mentioned in section 1332, is in conflict with article 2, § 16, Const. Colo., which provides that the accused shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him and the information cannot be sustained under and by virtue of the provisions of said section 1333.(3) That the court erred in not requiring the prosecution to furnish to defendanta bill of particulars, stating specifically the nature and cause of the accusation against him.(4) That section 1332 was repealed by section 1399, Mills' Ann St.(5) Error in the admission of evidence, and the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.

A. H. Davis and Skelton & Morrow, for plaintiff in error.

William H. Dickson, Atty. Gen., and George D. Talbot, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

GODDARD, J.

1.The first and second propositions advanced by counsel for plaintiff in error that the information, although it is in conformity with the provisions of section 1333, is obnoxious to section 16, art. 11, Const., in that it is too indefinite to advise the accused of 'the nature and cause of the accusation' against him, is well answered by the reasoning of Chief Justice Breese in Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 468-474, wherein the validity of a statute of the state of Illinois identical in its terms with section 1332, and providing that the same form of indictment as prescribed in section 1333 sufficiently described the offense charged, was challenged because it was in violation of section 9, art. 13 Const. Ill., which is identical with section 16, art. 11 Const. Colo.At page 473 of 47 Ill.he uses this language: 'It is insisted by the counsel for the plaintiff in error that the accused cannot know, from this indictment, the exact charge against him, and the outer lines within which the evidence must be confined, and cannot know what evidence he will be required to meet; nor could a conviction under this indictment be pleadable in bar of another indictment for the same offense; nor can the court see in it that a legally defined crime has been committed.They insist that the term 'confidence game' has no definition 'in law or literature,' and that 'no fifty men can be found who will define alike the confidence game.'They further insist that the indictment should specify all the facts with such certainty that the offense may judicially appear to the court.'After quoting the sections of the statute defining the offense and prescribing the form of the indictment, he further said: 'The nature and character of the so-called 'confidence game' has become popularized in most of the cities and large towns, and even in the rural districts, of this broad Union, and is well understood, and this defendant was...