Lacey v. C.S.P. Solano Medical Staff

• Decision Date: 22 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. Civ S-96-1452 LKK DAD P.,Civ S-96-1452 LKK DAD P.
• Citation: 990 F.Supp. 1199
• Parties: Billy Jerome LACEY, Plaintiff, v. C.S.P. SOLANO MEDICAL STAFF, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

990 F.Supp. 1199

Billy Jerome LACEY, Plaintiff, v. C.S.P. SOLANO MEDICAL STAFF, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ S-96-1452 LKK DAD P.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

December 22, 1997.

Billy Jerome Lacey, Oakland, CA, pro se.

Jane L. Lamborn, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for defendants.

ORDER

KARLTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262.

On October 17, 1997, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations herein which were served on all parties and which contained notice to all parties that any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within twenty days. Defendants have filed objections to the findings and recommendations, and plaintiff has filed a reply.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 72-304, this court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper analysis.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The findings and recommendations filed October 17, 1997, are adopted in full: and

2. Defendants' April 29, 1997 motion to dismiss is denied.

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DROZD, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Scotti's motion to dismiss is before the court.

BACKGROUND

On April 29, 1997, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff did not file opposition to the motion. Accordingly, in findings and recommendations filed on June 25, 1997, the court recommended that defendant's motion be granted. After plaintiff filed timely objections to the findings and recommendations, the court granted plaintiff an extension of time to file and serve opposition to the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has filed opposition to defendant's motion with a certificate of service on defendant's counsel. Good cause appearing, the June 25, 1997 findings and recommendations will be vacated.

In his August 25, 1997 opposition, plaintiff requests that the court "re-check [his] file in search of[his] opposition filed on 4-29-97." (Pl.'s Opp'n filed Aug. 25, 1997.) The court's records reflect that defendant's motion to dismiss was filed and served on April 29, 1997. No documents were filed in this action between the filing of defendants' motion to dismiss on April 29, 1997, and the filing of the court's findings and recommendations on June 25, 1997.

Plaintiff requests that the court provide him with copies of documents submitted in support of his opposition. Plaintiff is informed that the Clerk of the Court cannot provide parties with free copies of documents and cannot serve documents on behalf of any party. Accordingly, plaintiffs request for copies is denied.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at California State Prison-Solano, filed this action on July 11, 1996, in the United States District Court for the Northern District. The action was transferred to the Eastern District by order filed on August 8, 1996.

Plaintiff's claim concerns medical care at California State Prison-Solano. In his September 24, 1996 amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Scotti told him he would be seen by an orthopedic surgeon as soon as possible after X-rays were taken of his knees, that he was not seen, and that his knees got worse. By way of relief, plaintiff requests compensation, including punitive damages, for the alleged lack of medical attention.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. The Parties' Contentions

Defendant Scotti seeks dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing the action, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that there is a grievance procedure available, that he filed a grievance concerning the facts relating to his civil rights complaint, and that the grievance process has not been completed. (Am.Compl. at 2.) Attached to plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss is a copy of an administrative grievance submitted by plaintiff on February 23, 1996, in which he states that he was injured on his job in February, 1996, and wishes to be seen as soon as possible by an orthopedic surgeon. At the informal level, a medical secretary responded on June 27, 1996, that plaintiff was scheduled to be seen again on July 12, 1996. Plaintiff bypassed the first formal level of appeal. At the second formal level, the appeal was partially granted by the Chief Medical Officer, who found that plaintiff's appeal had merit and that plaintiff had been seen on May 17, 1996.

II. The Statute

The question before the court requires interpretation of the exhaustion provision in the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-71.¹ The PLRA made several changes to the statutes governing federal proceedings in prisoner civil rights actions.² One of those changes is to require prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing certain suits. Specifically, the PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (as amended 1996).³

Little case law exists illuminating application of § 1997e(a) to actions such as this, thus leading to the lengthy analysis set forth below.

III. The Exhaustion Doctrine and Jurisdictional Implications

Defendant characterizes the motion to dismiss as being made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). In this regard, defendant asserts that because plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Therefore, the court must first determine whether the subject matter jurisdiction of the court is implicated by the statute.

A statute requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies may be jurisdictional if it is "more than a codified requirement of administrative exhaustion" and contains "sweeping and direct" statutory language that goes beyond a requirement that only exhausted actions be brought. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 757, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). For example, in Weinberger v. Salfi, the Supreme Court found language in the Social Security Act mandating utilization of administrative procedures to be jurisdictional. That determination turned on the fact that cited portions of the federal statute in question made the administrative decision of the Secretary "binding," set forth limited procedures for judicial review, and denied the existence of any civil cause of action arising under the Social Security Act. Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 757 (reading 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) to dictate that "[n]o action ... shall be brought" under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).

In contrast, § 1997e(a), as set forth above, contains no such sweeping and direct language barring district court federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Rather than proscribing the existence of a federal cause of action under the latter statute, the Civil Rights Act specifically creates a civil cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ..."). Section 1997e(a) merely provides that "[n]o action shall be brought ... until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." This is precisely the type of language held in Weinberger v. Salfi not to limit federal jurisdiction. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (holding that under Title VII the filing of a timely charge with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but rather a requirement, like a statute of limitations, that is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.); cf. Sharpe v. FDIC, 126 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir.1997) (finding the administrative exhaustion requirement imposed by FIRREA to be a jurisdictional bar in light of the broad language — "no court shall have jurisdiction" — contained in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)).

Other courts have also reached the conclusion that § 1997e does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. See Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir.1997) ("Section 1997e(a), in contrast, contains neither the sweeping and direct language of [42 U.S.C.] § 405(b) nor that statute's explicit bar to district court jurisdiction."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 263, 139 L.Ed.2d 190 (1997) (No. 96-1811); see also Palomino v. Stanton, No. C 96-2984, 1997 WL 350099, at *2 (N.D.Cal. June 17, 1997).

Thus, this court finds that, under the principles elucidated in Weinberger v. Salfi, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e does not impose exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction.⁴ Accordingly, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim.

Having determined that the...