Lachat v. Lutz

• Decision Date: 29 April 1893
• Parties: LACHAT v. LUTZ.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

22 S.W. 218

94 Ky. 287

LACHAT v. LUTZ.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 29, 1893

Appeal from court of common pleas of Jefferson county.

Not to be officially reported.

Action by Louis Lachat against F. F. Lutz to recover for personal injuries sustained through defendant's alleged negligence. There was judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Kohn Baird & Speckert, for appellant.

M. A D. A. & J. G. Sachs, for appellee.

LEWIS J.

A general demurrer to the petition having been sustained, the plaintiff in this case, who is an infant suing by his next friend, has appealed. The cause of action is stated substantially, thus: That on the _____ day of August, 1890 one Stoker, who was foreman or superintendent of defendant Lutz, requested plaintiff, Lachat, to go to defendant's place of business, and inform him that his (Stoker's) child was dead, and he would not come to work on that day; that while on his way to the building owned by defendant, for the purpose of delivering said message, he (plaintiff) was directed to go into a small room, where the person could be found who would convey said message to the defendant; that said room was very dark, and while he was attempting to make a step his leg was caught in an opening or hole that had been negligently left so, and a large revolving wheel crushed his leg; that he did not know of the danger to which he was exposed, and could not discover it, on account of darkness of the room. It is further stated that plaintiff had no notice or warning of the danger, but defendant, his agents or servants, negligently directed him into said room. It is not alleged that plaintiff, when injured, was in performance of any duty to defendant, or that he was at the place of defendant with his knowledge or consent. On the contrary, a fair inference from the statements of the petition is that he went there at the instance and for accommodation of only Stoker, who was for that day, at least, not in the service of the defendant. The defendant, therefore, owed to plaintiff no other duty or care than any other stranger or person intruding upon his premises without his consent or knowledge; and, as the actual condition of the room in question was not a subject affecting the rights or interests of any others than defendant and his employes, we have the case of a plaintiff, not alleged to be deficient in intelligence, voluntarily going where he need not...