Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 18 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-2518,87-2518 |
| Citation | 852 F.2d 290 |
| Parties | 48 Ed. Law Rep. 105 Ronald LACHMAN and Mary Ann Lachman, on Behalf of Benjamin Lachman, a minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; East Maine School District 63; and Maine Township Special Education Program, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Richard S. Rhodes, Chadwell & Kayser, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Lorence H. Slutzky, Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., Kevin R. Sido, Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Benjamin Lachman is a profoundly deaf seven-year-old child who resides within the district boundaries of the East Maine, Illinois School District No. 63 ("the school district"). The school district is a member of the Maine Township Special Education Program ("MSTEP") and through MSTEP contracts with Northern Suburban Special Education District to provide services for its hearing-impaired students through a Regional Hearing Impaired Program ("RHIP"). Since the time Benjamin became eligible for participation in the RHIP pre-school program, in September, 1984, his parents and the school district have disagreed as to the manner in which his education should be facilitated. That disagreement eventually led the Lachmans to initiate this private cause of action as provided for by Sec. 615(e)(2) of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1400-1420 ("EAHCA" or "the Act"). 1
The Lachmans believe that Benjamin can best be educated at a neighborhood school near his home, in a regular classroom with the assistance of a full-time cued speech instructor. 2 In contrast, the school district has consistently proposed that all or at least half of Benjamin's school day be spent in a RHIP self-contained classroom with other hearing-impaired children. Those self-contained classrooms are located in schools outside Benjamin's neighborhood. The placements advocated by the school district have all incorporated components providing that, to varying degrees, Benjamin would be integrated into classes and activities with the non-hearing-impaired children in the regular classrooms at those schools. The course of education recommended by the school district centers on the use of the total communication approach to educating hearing-impaired children which relies primarily upon sign language as a means of communication. The school district has proposed only interim utilization of the cued speech approach, to the extent necessary to effectively transition Benjamin into the total communication-based program.
In the Spring of 1986, with the approach of Benjamin's enrollment in kindergarten, the controversy between the Lachmans and the school district crystallized. Because the Lachmans did not agree with the Individualized Education Program ("IEP") that the school district proposed for Benjamin, they initiated the due process review procedure established by Sec. 615 of the Act. The Level I (local level) hearing and the Level II (state educational agency) hearing were conducted. The Level I Impartial Hearing Officer affirmed the school district's recommended placement of Benjamin and the Level II Review Officer upheld that decision.
On November 15, 1986, the Lachmans, as Benjamin's guardians, brought suit on his behalf against the school district, MSTEP and the Illinois State Board of Education. At its core, the complaint alleges that the IEP proposed by the RHIP and the school district, and approved by the Illinois State Board of Education, fails to provide Benjamin with a free appropriate public education as required by Sec. 612(1) of the EAHCA. 3 The complaint requests, inter alia, that the defendant/appellees be ordered to educate Benjamin in a local school (i.e., his neighborhood school) with the services of a cued speech instructor. The complaint also asks that defendant/appellees be enjoined from placing Benjamin in a self-contained classroom (with only other hearing-impaired children) and/or requiring him to learn sign language "as a goal of his education."
The district court fashioned its analysis along the lines of the Supreme Court's interpretation, in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District Board of Education, Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), of the procedural and substantive requirements imposed by the EAHCA. The critical portion of the district court's substantive analysis is set forth below.
The purpose of the Act was to open the door of public education to handicapped children by means of specialized educational services rather than to guarantee any particular substantive level of education once the child was enrolled. The Act does not require a state to maximize the potential of each child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children.
In an action such as this a court must first determine whether the responsible agencies have complied with the statutory procedures and then must determine whether the individualized program developed through such procedure is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. If these requirements are met, the responsible authorities have complied with the obligations imposed by the Act, and the court can require no more.
Courts must avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the responsible authorities. Once it is shown that the Act's requirements have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the responsible authorities.
Clearly, the consultation and procedural requirements of the Act have been met in this case. Careful, impartial consideration has been given to Benjamin's individual educational needs. A full, free appropriate public education has been offered to him. Plaintiffs, because of their and Benjamin's success with cued speech, assert, with support from their experts, that it is the proper methodology by which Benjamin should be educated. But defendants' experts give equal credence to total communication.
Defendants must provide a free appropriate public education for all of the handicapped children in their particular district. They have done so. Plaintiffs are not entitled to have defendants provide a separate educational opportunity for Benjamin.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the district dismissed the Lachmans' complaint. They appeal from that dismissal.
It is well established that in reviewing the outcomes reached through the Secs. 1415(b) and (c) administrative appeals procedure, a district court is to make an independent decision as to whether the requirements of the Act have been satisfied. That decision is to be based on a preponderance of the evidence, giving due weight to the results of those state administrative proceedings. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2). See School Board of the County of Prince William, Virginia v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1985) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. at 3051). See also Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1492-93 (9th Cir.1986); Bonadonna v. Copperman, 619 F.Supp. 401, 407-08 (D.N.J.1985); Flavin v. Connecticut State Board of Education, 553 F.Supp. 827, 831 (D.Conn.1982). The district court's determination that the IEP proposed for Benjamin by the school district constituted a free appropriate public education as required by the EAHCA is founded on its application of the relevant provisions of the Act to the facts attendant to Benjamin's circumstance. We review the determination of that mixed question of law and fact de novo. See Bryan v. Warden, Indiana State Reformatory, 820 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir.1987); United States ex rel. Shaw v. De Robertis, 755 F.2d 1279, 1282 n. 2 (7th Cir.1985); United States ex rel. Scarpelli v. George, 687 F.2d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir.1982). See also Gregory v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir.1987) (); Wilson v. Marana Unified School District No. 6 of Pima County, 735 F.2d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.1984).
The district court correctly ascertained that Rowley, supra, is the definitive Supreme Court pronouncement to date as to the standards a school district must meet in order to satisfy its Sec. 1412(1) obligation to provide all handicapped students with a free appropriate public education. In Rowley, the Court directed the lower courts to engage in the following two-part inquiry in suits, like the present one, brought under Sec. 615(e)(2) of the Act.
First, [the court must inquire whether] the State has complied with the procedures set forth in the Act[.] And second, [the court must ask] is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.
458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 (footnotes omitted). Appellants do not contend that the appellee education officials failed to comply with the procedures set forth in the Act. 4 Accordingly, we need not address the first part of the Rowley test. In determining whether the IEP proposed by the school district secures to Benjamin the right to a free appropriate free public education guaranteed him by Sec. 612(1) of the Act, our analysis will be limited to the second Rowley inquiry.
Examination of the district court opinion reveals that it considered the focal point of the disagreement between the Lachmans and the school district to be a question of whether Benjamin's education can...
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