Lackey v. Bowling

• Decision Date: 06 April 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78 C 1980.,78 C 1980.
• Citation: 476 F. Supp. 1111
• Parties: Leroy LACKEY, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. William M. BOWLING et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

476 F. Supp. 1111

Leroy LACKEY, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. William M. BOWLING et al., Defendants.

No. 78 C 1980.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

April 6, 1979.

Alan Gilbert, Robert Masur, Lucy A. Williams, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Garfield-Austin Legal Services, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Moshe Jacobius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRADY, District Judge.

Plaintiff brought this suit on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated against the Illinois Department of Labor and various of its officers, alleging that defendants had withheld and were withholding unemployment insurance benefits to which plaintiffs were legally entitled. Plaintiff filed suit on May 19, 1978. On June 26, 1978, two days before we were to hear arguments on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, defendants received a letter from the U.S. Department of Labor's Associate Regional Administrator for Unemployment Insurance (Regional Administrator) informing them that they had "interpreted Federal law incorrectly." (Exhibit E). The following day, defendants reversed their policy and agreed to provide retroactive unemployment insurance benefits to the entire plaintiff class. The case was then dismissed as moot. Plaintiffs' counsel, members of the Legal Assistance Foundation, move for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, which provides:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, . . . or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

1. Whether Plaintiff Prevailed

Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot be considered the prevailing party because his complaint would have been dismissed had not the case been mooted. We question whether defendants should be able to reopen the merits of the case on a petition for attorneys' fees. Defendants have cited no law in support of their position, and we have been unable to locate any support for it. In fact, a party is generally considered to have prevailed within the meaning of Section 1988 if that party has "accomplished the objectives of his litigation." NAACP v. Bell, 448 F.Supp. 1164, 1166 (D.D.C.1978). This interpretation of "prevailing party" is consistent with the legislative history of Section 1988. The Senate report on the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act stated unequivocally:

For purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief.

Senate Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1976), reprinted in 5 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News (1976) at 5912. The House report similarly eschewed a narrow interpretation of "prevailing party":

The phrase "prevailing party" is not intended to be limited to the victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits. It would also include a litigant who succeeds even if the case is concluded prior to a full evidentiary hearing before a judge or jury. If the litigation terminates by consent decree, for example, it would be proper to award counsel fees . . . (citations omitted). A prevailing party should not be penalized for seeking an out-of-court settlement, thus helping to lessen docket congestion. Similarly, after a complaint is filed, a defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice. A court should still award fees even though it might conclude, as a matter of equity, that no formal relief, such as an injunction, is needed.

House Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1976). Thus, contrary to defendants' claim, the merits of the action are not controlling at this stage of the proceedings. We must determine only whether plaintiffs accomplished their objectives, and whether they did so as a result of this suit.

The discussion above concerns defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action; but defendants also challenged our subject matter jurisdiction. While we will not reopen the merits of the controversy on a petition for attorneys' fees, we should make some initial determination of our jurisdiction. Otherwise, we might find ourselves in the anomalous position of granting attorneys' fees in a case which we are without authority to adjudicate.

The complaint alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1343(3), (4),¹ which provides:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; (4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.

Defendants argue that Section 1343 does not provide a jurisdictional basis for actions brought under the Social Security Act. See Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1975); Acosta v. Swank, 325 F.Supp. 1157 (N.D.Ill.1971). We may exercise pendent jurisdiction over a claim brought under the Social Security Act, however, where that claim is coupled with a constitutional claim that is not "wholly insubstantial" or "obviously frivolous." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537-38, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); Wojcik v. Levitt, 513 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1975). Paragraph 32 of the complaint alleges that defendants violated plaintiff's rights to equal protection of the laws. We find this constitutional claim not "wholly insubstantial," and we therefore have pendent jurisdiction over the Social Security Act claims.

Plaintiffs applied for extended benefits prior to January 28, 1978, when the extended benefit program terminated because the relevant unemployment indicator fell below a specified mark. None of the plaintiffs had yet exhausted their extended benefits at the time the program terminated. In fact, some of the plaintiffs had applied for benefits but not yet received any by January 28. The extended benefits program resumed in April of 1978, when unemployment again rose above the triggering level. Defendants denied extended benefits to plaintiffs, but granted them to others who had been eligible for benefits prior to January 28, but had not applied by that time. Thus, defendants discriminated among applicants not on the basis of whether they had received benefits before January 28, but on the basis of whether they had applied for benefits by that date. Plaintiffs claimed that this disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals was irrational and violated their right to equal protection of the laws. We cannot say that this constitutional claim is "obviously frivolous."

Having determined that we would have had jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case, we must now ascertain whether plaintiffs achieved the objectives of the litigation, and whether this suit was a "catalytic factor" in the victory. See NAACP v. Bell, supra. On both questions, we think the facts are with plaintiffs. Before suit was filed, one of plaintiffs' attorneys, Lucy Williams, contacted the Region V Office of the United States Department of Labor, and informed Michele Fox, an Unemployment Insurance Program Specialist, that defendants had issued a policy statement covering extended benefits which, Ms. Williams urged, was contrary to federal law. Ms. Williams told Ms. Fox that she was drafting a complaint to challenge defendants' policy, and that she would file a lawsuit if immediate corrective action were not taken. At Ms. Fox's request, Ms. Williams mailed her a copy of defendants' bulletin. Later, Ms. Fox told Ms. Williams that the Department of Labor agreed with defendants' interpretation of eligibility under the Extended Benefit Program, and that a lawsuit might be necessary to change the policy. Ms. Fox subsequently announced that Labor was reconsidering its position on the issue of eligibility, but that months might pass before a legal opinion on the subject would be rendered. Plaintiffs' counsel filed this action on May 19, 1978, and sent a copy of the complaint to Ms. Fox. (Affidavit of Ms. Lucy Williams).

On June 14, the parties appeared before us on plaintiffs' motion to proceed as a class and motion for preliminary injunction or for summary judgment. Defendants' attorney informed us that "the Solicitor General is about to issue an opinion concerning the correctness of Illinois' interpretation of the federal law." (Transcript, at 7). In fact, no opinion from the Solicitor General was, or to our knowledge has yet been, rendered. Defense counsel was apparently referring to the Labor Department's re-appraisal of defendants' policy statement that had begun when Ms. Williams threatened this action. Two days before the scheduled hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, however, the Associate Regional Administrator for Unemployment Insurance in Region V sent a letter to defendant Moss expressing the legal opinion that "you have interpreted Federal law incorrectly . . .." (Exhibit E). The next day, defendants agreed to change their policy. Plaintiffs and defendants then jointly moved to dismiss the action as moot. On August 8, the parties filed a voluntary stipulation to dismiss which stated, inter alia:

4. Defendants agree that all members of the putative plaintiff class who report to their local office and are determined eligible for extended unemployment insurance benefits and who would have received extended benefits after April

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