Laclede Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 20 May 1955
• Docket Number: No. 33404,33404
• Citation: Laclede Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 128 N.E.2d 718, 6 Ill.2d 296 (Ill. 1955)
• Parties: LACLEDE STEEL COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Frank Jones, Defendant in Error.)
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 718

128 N.E.2d 718

6 Ill.2d 296

LACLEDE STEEL COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error, v.The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Frank Jones, Defendant in Error.)

No. 33404.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 20, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 1955.

Emerson Baetz, Alton, and F. Wm. McCalpin and James A. Singer, St. Louis, Mo.(Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen & Chubb, St. Louis, Mo., of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Morris B. Chapman, Granite City, and Wiseman & Mondhink, Alton (John Gitchoff, Granite City, of counsel), for defendant in error.

Harlan L. Hackbert, Chicago, for amici curiae.

BRISTOW, Chief Justice.

This court has allowed a petition for writ of error filed by the Laclede Steel Company, hereinafter referred to as defendant, to review a judgment of the circuit court of Madison County confirming a compensation award entered by the Industrial Commission in favor of defendant's employee, Frank Jones, hereinafter called plaintiff.

The essential inquiry in this proceeding is whether an employee, who collapses from a coronary occlusion while performing his regular work of shoveling fuel into a furnace where steel is melted, has sustained an accidental injury for which compensation is payable under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The facts are undisputed.PlaintiffFrank Jones, age 46, had been an employee of the Laclede Steel Company for several years preceding his injury on July 24, 1951.On that day, in accordance with his customary duties, he loaded heavy ore by hand onto a wheelbarrow which he pushed for a block and one-half, and then dumped the contents near the steel furnaces.That process continued over a period of two hours, after which he assisted in tapping out the furnace by placing a long steel rod through an opening in the furnace door and knocking out a hole for the liquid steel to run out into a pit.He then began shoveling certain black material, weighing 15 to 20 pounds a shovelful, into the furnace where the steel is melted.This work involved going up close to the furnace with one foot at its door, where the heat was 'as hot as a man could stand.'As he stepped forward toward the open furnace door to throw in a shovelful, he blacked out and fell to the ground.

When he regained consciousness, he was taken to the company dispensary, and then to St. Joseph's Hospital in Alton, Illinois, where it was found that he suffered a coronary occlusion that caused myocardial infarction.He was hospitalized for about two weeks, followed by bed rest at home for some six weeks.When he returned to work, the company would not employ him in any capacity, and he is presently doing housework and chauffeuring for a resident of Alton, at a wage of $23 a week, as compared with his previous earning of $60 a week from the defendant company.

An employee of the company, who was working the same shift with plaintiff on the date of the alleged accident, testified for plaintiff that the heat in the furnace was approximately 1000 degrees Fahrenheit, and corroborated plaintiff's account of the intense heat near the furnace during the tapping operation and as they shovelled the material into the open furnace.The witness also related the circumstances of plaintiff's fall, and stated that he thought at first that plaintiff had suffered a heat stroke.

The medical evidence established that at the time plaintiff fell he sustained a coronary occlusion, followed by myocardial infarction due to lack of blood supply to the heart tissues.The doctor who examined plaintiff at defendant's request testified that there was no correlation between claimant's exertion and his occlusion, if that was plaintiff's usual work.That doctor did not know whether intense heat could be a precipitating factor in occasioning plaintiff's heart attack.However, the cardiologist, who testified for plaintiff stated that there was a causal relationship between the heat and exertion claimant was subjected to and his heart in injury, and explained the physiological basis for that conclusion.He further stated that any strenuous exertion of plaintiff would cause him serious consequences.

The arbitrator allowed plaintiff an award for permanent partial disability as provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act, which award was confirmed by the Industrial Commission on review, and by the circuit court on writ of certiorari.

In this proceeding the defendant company argues that a heart attack suffered during working hours in the performance of normal and regular duties does not constitute an accidental injury arising out of the employment, under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act.According to defendant's rationale of the Illinois cases, there must be either some unusual strain or type of work involved, not normally incident to the job requirements, or an internal breaking or tearing of the blood vessels or heart tissue, in order to constitute a compensable accidental injury.

Plaintiff, however, maintains that the injury sustained was sudden, unforeseen, and unpremeditated, and therefore accidental; that it resulted from a hazard or risk to which the employee was subjected as a natural incident of his work, not common to the neighborhood; that even in the absence of the intense heat, injury or death precipitated by exertion or strain is compensable; that where there is a conflict in medical testimony it is the province of the Industrial Commission to draw inferences of fact, hence this court should not set aside the findings of the commission for plaintiff, since they are not manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

Under the terms and provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act(Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 48, pars. 138.1-138.28), compensation may be awarded only for an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.The word 'accident' is not a technical legal term, and has been held to mean anything that happens without design, or an event which is unforeseen by the person to whom it happens Baggot Co. v. Industrial Comm., 290 Ill. 530, 125 N.E. 254, 7 A.L.R. 1611.As explained in Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378, 120 N.E. 249, and reiterated in the case law, while it is not intended, and perhaps not possible, to define the words used in the act, as applied to all possible circumstances, an injury is accidental within the meaning of the act when it is traceable to a definite time, place and cause, and occurs in the course of the employment unexpectedly and without affirmative act or design of the employee.Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378, 384, 120 N.E. 249;Van Watermeullen v. Industrial Comm., 343 Ill. 73, 174 N.E. 846;Marsh v. Industrial Comm., 386 Ill. 11, 53 N.E.2d 459.Moreover, there need be no external violence to the body to constitute an accidental injury, and compensation may be allowed where a workman's existing physical structure, whatever it may be, gives way under the stress of his usual labor.Baggot Co. v. Industrial Comm., 290 Ill. 530, 125 N.E. 254, 7 A.L.R. 1611;Town of Cicero v. Industrial Comm., 404 Ill. 487, 89 N.E.2d 354;March v. Industrial Comm., 386 Ill. 11, 53 N.E.2d 459;Carson-Payson Co. v. Industrial Comm., 340 Ill. 632, 173 N.E. 184.Contrary to defendant's contention, there need be no showing of unusual strain or activity beyond the habitual job requirements in such cases in order to establish an accidental injury.Baggot Co. v. Industrial Comm., 290 Ill. 530, 125 N.E. 254;Town of Cicero v. Industrial Comm., 404 Ill. 487, 89 N.E.2d 354;Jones Foundry & Machine Co. v. Industrial Comm., 303 Ill. 410, 135 N.E. 754.

In the Baggot casethe...