Lacoste v. Department of Conservation of State

• Decision Date: 22 April 1922
• Docket Number: 25051
• Citation: 92 So. 381,151 La. 909
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: LACOSTE et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION OF STATE OF LOUISIANA

92 So. 381

151 La. 909

LACOSTE et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION OF STATE OF LOUISIANA

No. 25051

Supreme Court of Louisiana

April 22, 1922

Rehearing Denied by the Whole Court, June 5, 1922

Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Wynne G Rogers, Judge.

Suit by Paul V. Lacoste and others against the Department of Conservation of the State of Louisiana. From a judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Merrick & Schwarz and Morris B. Redmann, all of New Orleans, for appellants.

A. V Coco, Atty. Gen., and Paul A. Sompayrac, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

LAND J. PROVOSTY, C. J., dissents. O'NIELL, J., concurs.

OPINION

LAND, J.

Petitioners, resident and nonresident, and engaged in this state, and especially in the city of New Orleans, in the business of buying and selling, importing, exporting, and dealing in hides, skins, and furs, some of which were originally taken from wild fur-bearing animals and alligators in this state.

They complain that the Department of Conservation of the State of Louisiana is illegally seeking to collect from them, under the provisions of Act 135 of the General Assembly of 1920, a "severance tax" of two cents on the dollar on the value of skins and hides purchased by them and taken from wild fur-bearing animals and alligators within the state, for the reason that said act is unconstitutional.

Petitioners therefore declined to pay said "severance tax," and, alleging the unconstitutionality of said act, obtained an injunction from the civil district court of the parish of Orleans, restraining the Department of Conservation from threatened seizure and confiscation of all shipments of hides and furs made or to be made by any of petitioners.

This injunction was dissolved and plaintiff's suit dismissed on exception of no cause nor right of action, which was maintained by the lower court.

Plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment against them, and attack the constitutionality of Act 135 of the General Assembly of 1920 on the following grounds:

"(1) That said act of the Legislature is violative of article 31 of the state Constitution of 1913, in that the title of said act does not embrace nor express the object in regard to limiting the privileges of trapping fur-bearing animals or alligators in this state to such persons only as shall have been bona fide residents of this state for at least the preceding six months, as set out in section 5 of the act."

In the title of the act we find, "to allow licensed trappers to hunt wild game without additional license"; "to define trappers, fur dealers, fur buyers, resident and nonresident"; "defining the time and making an open season for the trapping of all fur-bearing animals and the taking and killing of alligators in this state."

Section 1 of said act defines a "trapper" as follows:

"A trapper shall be considered to be a person who takes the animal in its wild state and removes the skin therefrom for sale."

Section 5 of said act provides:

"That only such persons that shall have been bona fide residents of this state for at least the preceding six months shall be permitted to trap fur-bearing animals or alligators in this state, or shall be permitted to receive license therefor."

Section 4 of said act also provides:

"That there be and are hereby levied the following licenses on each trapper, * * * to wit: Any trapper herein defined possessing a state wide hunting license, costing one (1.00) dollar, shall be permitted to trap under this law."

In other words, a trapper in this state is "defined" to be, not merely the person who takes the animal in its wild state and removes the skin therefrom for sale, but he must also be a resident for at least the preceding six months before he is licensed, and must possess a hunting license. The provisions of these sections are clearly within the title of the act, as the legal qualifications for a trapper are necessarily included in and form a part of the definition.

Petitioners also complain that the title of said act fails to show that a distinction is made between resident and nonresident dealers, in regard to the amount of license tax to be paid.

We find in the title of the act these words, "levying an annual license tax on persons, firms, corporations or associations of persons engaged in the buying of hides and skins taken from wild fur-bearing animals and alligators, and prohibiting the conduct of such business without such license." We find also in the title of said act the following words: "To define trappers, fur dealers, fur buyers, resident and nonresident." These provisions in the title clearly indicate, and give notice to persons reading the title of said act, that "nonresident" fur buyers and fur dealers are embraced within its scope, and that all such dealers are subject to the payment of such licenses. The levying of a different license on nonresident fur dealers and fur buyers in section 4 of said act is a mere classification, a mere detail which it was not necessary to embrace in the title of the act, as such detail is germane and incidental to the avowed purpose of said act, as expressed in its title, to levy licenses upon all fur dealers and fur buyers, resident or nonresident. In respect to the levying of licenses, we find nothing in the title of said act that is misleading, surprising, or confusing to persons reading it.

The title of a law is not to be strictly or technically interpreted; if it states the object, according to the understanding of reasonable men, it satisfies the Constitution. State v. Boylston, 138 La. 21, 69 So. 860; Municipality No. 3 v. Michoud, 6 La.Ann. 605.

"(2) The said act of the Legislature embraces more than one object."

Plaintiffs' counsel indicated in their brief the following as the different objects set forth in the body of the act:

"One of the objects of the act, as shown by sections 8 and 9 thereof, is the conservation of wild fur-bearing animals and alligators by providing for open and closed season for hunting and trapping them.

"Another object of the act is to regulate the business of fur dealers, the shipment of furs out of the state, and to impose upon the dealers a fixed license tax in addition to the regular annual license tax.

"A third separate and distinct object of the act is provided for in section 3 thereof, which provides for an ad valorem tax of two cents on the dollar on the value of all skins or hides taken from any wild fur-bearing animals or alligators within this state, which severance tax shall be paid by the dealer, etc."

Plaintiffs' counsel state in their brief that --

"Not only are these objects set forth in the body of the act, but they are also expressed in the title."

It is evident from these and other subdivisions in the title of Act 135 of the General Assembly of 1920 that its object is to conserve for the common benefit of the people of the state the property rights in all fur-bearing animals and alligators in this state, including the valuable asset of the skins and hides of these animals, which naturally constitute a part of the common wealth of the state.

The right to preserve game and animals valuable for their skins and hides flows from an undoubted existence in the state of a police power to that end. This authority of a state is derived from the common ownership of the game and of such animals and the trust for the benefit of its people which a state exercises in relation thereto. Under said act, the wild life of the state is made the property of the state; it is a part of the state's natural resources, which the state may, in the exercise of its police powers, enact regulations to preserve and conserve. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600, 40 L.Ed. 793; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 34 S.Ct. 281, 58 L.Ed. 539; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 24 L.Ed. 248.

Act 135 of the General Assembly of 1920 is therefore a police regulation, whose object is to protect and conserve the animals designated therein for the common benefit, and the various subdivisions of the title of said act, pertaining to the "levying of a severance tax"; "fixing the time when, by whom, and under what conditions such severance tax shall be paid"; "prohibiting persons, and firms, and corporations from shipping or selling hides or skins unless said severance tax is paid"; "requiring persons dealing in hides or skins to keep records of all receipts and sales of said hides and skins and to make reports of same to the Department of Conservation"; "defining trappers, fur dealers, fur buyers, resident and nonresident"; "imposing annual license taxes, etc." -- all are branches of the object of the act, germane and incidental thereto, and the means of accomplishing the purpose of said act, and do not in themselves constitute different objects foreign to that embraced in the title of said act. These various subdivisions of the title relate to the conservation and protection of the animals designated in the act, and provide through the imposition of a "severance tax" the means of enforcement of the act, or police regulation enacted for that purpose. They also relate to the collection and protection of the fund derived from the "severance tax," without which the enforcement of said act or police regulation would not be possible.

The constitutional requirement that a statute shall embrace only one object does not mean that each and every means necessary to accomplish an object in the law must be provided for by a separate act relating to it alone. A statute that deals with several branches of one subject does not thereby violate the constitutional requirement that the act must have only one object. State v. Doremus, 137 La. 266, 68 So. 605; City...