Lacoste v. Lacoste, 2014–CA–01724–COA.
| Decision Date | 19 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–CA–01724–COA.,2014–CA–01724–COA. |
| Citation | 197 So.3d 897 |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Paul V. LACOSTE, Appellant v. Laura R. LACOSTE, Appellee. |
J. Peyton Randolph II, Ridgeland, Rick D. Patt, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
William R. Wright, Ridgeland, E. Foley Ranson, Ocean Springs, Sarah Ann Ellis, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.
Before LEE, C.J., BARNES and ISHEE, JJ.
BARNES
, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. Laura Lacoste was granted a divorce from Paul Lacoste based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Laura was granted sole custody of the couple's two children, and Paul was ordered to pay rehabilitative alimony and child support. Paul appeals, arguing the chancellor erred in awarding Laura sole physical and legal custody of the children, erred in reducing his visitation schedule, erred in determining child support and alimony, and erred in refusing to consider newly discovered evidence posttrial. We find no error and affirm as to these issues. Paul also argues the chancellor erred in valuing his business and, consequently, erred in dividing the marital property. We agree the chancellor's ruling on Paul's business valuation was in error. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings as to the valuation of Paul's business. Because we remand on this issue, we likewise remand for the chancellor to revisit the equitable distribution of property, since it hinged on the business's valuation.
¶ 2. Paul and Laura were married in April 2006 and separated in December 2012. Two children were born of the marriage, Cannon and Cole, who were six and three at the time of trial. On January 2, 2013, Paul filed for a divorce in the Madison County Chancery Court on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and, alternatively, irreconcilable difference. Laura counterclaimed for a divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, constructive desertion, and, alternatively, irreconcilable differences. Laura later amended her counterclaim to add adultery as a ground for divorce.
¶ 3. On March 20, 2014, Laura was granted a divorce from Paul on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor ordered Paul to pay $1,000 monthly in rehabilitative alimony for twenty-four months. Laura was awarded sole custody of the couple's children, and Paul was granted visitation. Paul was ordered to pay $4,280 in child support monthly, as well as the remainder of the older child's private-school tuition for the 2013–2014 school year. School and childcare expenses were ordered to be divided equally after that. Paul was ordered to provide health and hospitalization insurance for the children, and both Paul and Laura were ordered to maintain life-insurance policies with the children as beneficiaries. For tax purposes, Paul was allowed to claim the children as dependents from 2014–2016 and every even-numbered year thereafter. Laura was awarded ownership of the marital home, her vehicle, two bank accounts, the children's college trust accounts, and various personal property. Paul received all interest in his business, Next Level Sports LLC (NLS), also known as Paul Lacoste Sports—a fitness training company owned and operated by Paul—his vehicle, two bank accounts, and various personal property. After the division of property, Paul was ordered to pay Laura $73,000 within ten years for her interest in the marital estate. Paul was also ordered to pay $5,000 toward Laura's attorney's fees.
¶ 4. On March 28, 2014, Paul filed a motion for a new trial and to clarify and amend the chancellor's opinion and final judgment. Laura filed a motion for reconsideration. A hearing was held on November 14, 2014, following which the chancellor denied both motions. However, the chancellor entered an order clarifying certain aspects of the final judgment related to the children's school expenses—specifically, that Paul was not required to pay all private-school tuition beyond the 2013–2014 school year; rather, Paul would pay half of the children's education in either public or private school, and college tuition would be capped at the cost of an in-state public four-year Mississippi university.
¶ 5. Paul now appeals, raising five issues: (1) the trial court erred in awarding Laura sole physical and legal custody of the couple's children and erred in limiting his visitation; (2) the trial court erred in calculating child support; (3) the trial court erroneously valued NLS and used the erroneous valuation to calculate alimony and divide the marital property; (4) the trial court failed to consider Laura's posttrial actions that affected child custody and support, and the posttrial tax consequences of Laura's liquidation of her retirement account; and (5) cumulative error warrants reversal.
¶ 6. We review a chancellor's factual findings for abuse of discretion. McNeil v. Hester, 753 So.2d 1057, 1063 (¶ 21) (Miss.2000)
. “The findings of a chancellor will not be disturbed on review unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong [or] clearly erroneous, or applied the wrong legal standard.” Id. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
¶ 7. Paul argues that the chancellor abused her discretion in awarding Laura sole physical and legal custody of the couple's two children.
¶ 8. When determining child custody, the chancellor must consider the factors set out in Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss.1983)
. The Albright factors are: (1) the children's age, health, and sex; (2) continuity of care prior to the separation; (3) parenting skills and willingness and capacity to provide primary child care; (4) the employment of the parents and responsibilities of that employment; (5) the physical and mental health and age of the parents; (6) the emotional ties of the parents and children; (7) the moral fitness of the parents; (8) the children's home, school, and community record; (9) the preference of the children at the age sufficient to express a preference by law; (10) the stability of the home environment and employment of each parent; and (11) other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship. Id.
¶ 9. The polestar consideration in child-custody cases is the best interest of the child. Id. “[T]he chancellor has the ultimate discretion to weigh the evidence the way [she] sees fit.” Johnson v. Gray, 859 So.2d 1006, 1013–14 (¶ 36) (Miss.2003)
. “So long as there is substantial evidence in the record that, if found credible by the chancellor, would provide support for the chancellor's decision, [we] may not intercede simply to substitute our collective opinion for that of the chancellor.” Bower v. Bower, 758 So.2d 405, 412 (¶ 33) (Miss.2000).
¶ 10. The chancellor analyzed the Albright factors and found the following factors neutral: the children's age, health, and sex; physical and mental health and age of the parents; emotional ties of parents and children; and the stability of the home environment and employment of each parent. The children's preferences were not applicable due to their young ages. The chancellor found the remaining factors favored Laura. No “other factors” were considered. Paul takes issue with the chancellor's findings on two Albright factors: continuity of care; and the home, school, and community record of the children.
¶ 11. First, Paul argues that the chancellor's finding that the continuity-of-care factor strongly favored Laura was manifestly wrong and clearly erroneous. He points to the chancellor's own language in the final judgment, which details Paul's involvement with the children: “Paul planned outings for the children and actively participated in sports events, school events, teacher conferences, birthday parties, and medical care of the children through the parties' marriage and year-long separation.” While it is undisputed that Paul was an involved parent, the evidence nonetheless overwhelmingly supports the chancellor's finding that this factor favored Laura. The testimony showed that Laura was the children's primary caregiver during the marriage and after the separation. Laura did not work outside the home. She cared for the children while Paul worked approximately fourteen hours a day. Laura testified that prior to and after the separation, she picked the children up from school, prepared their meals, bathed them, put them to bed, got up with them at night, provided discipline, and spent more time with them. She testified she scheduled and took the children to all doctor's appointments. She also stated she was actively involved in Cannon's school and extracurricular activities, and she coached Cannon's soccer team.
¶ 12. Paul argued that he was more concerned and attentive regarding Cole's medical needs, and that Laura relied on babysitters and had called him home from work several times to help with the children. Laura testified that this was untrue; rather, Paul used this as an excuse in order to stay home to work on their marriage.
¶ 13. While both parties presented corroborating witnesses, the chancellor gave greater weight to “Laura's credibility, her role as primary caregiver prior to and after their separation, and her corroborating witnesses.” Weighing “[t]he evidence and credibility of a witness is the sole responsibility of the chancellor[.]” Mabus v. Mabus, 890 So.2d 806, 816 (¶ 38) (Miss.2003)
. “[T]he chancellor, by [her] presence in the courtroom, is best equipped to listen to witnesses, observe their demeanor, and determine [their] credibility ... and what weight ought to be ascribed to the evidence given by those witnesses.” Id. at 819 (¶ 56). We find the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in finding this factor strongly favored Laura.
¶ 14. Next, Paul argues that the chancellor erred in finding the children's home, school, and community record favored Laura. Both parties lived in Madison County. Paul argues there was ample testimony that both parents were involved in the...
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