LaCourse v. Fleitz

• Decision Date: 26 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86-311,86-311
• Citation: 28 Ohio St.3d 209,28 OBR 294,503 N.E.2d 159
• Parties: , 28 O.B.R. 294 LaCOURSE, Appellee, v. FLEITZ, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 209

28 Ohio St.3d 209

503 N.E.2d 159, 28 O.B.R. 294

LaCOURSE, Appellee, v. FLEITZ, Appellant.

No. 86-311.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 26, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) does not impose a duty on landlords to keep common areas of the leased premises clear of natural accumulations of ice and snow.

On December 23, 1983, plaintiff-appellee, Barbara LaCourse, sustained personal injuries when she slipped and fell on ice that had accumulated on the front of the entrance to the apartment building in which she resided. She had been returning from the store carrying groceries. She first noticed that the walk was covered with ice on her way to the store, so she walked across the yard both going and returning from the store. When she approached the entrance on her return, she set down a carton of soft drinks she was carrying, and stepped onto the front patio step. She grasped the doorknob and attempted to enter the building. She slipped on the ice and injured her back and elbow.

Neither the front patio step nor the walk had been shoveled or salted. The last measurable snowfall had occurred approximately thirty-three hours before the accident.

Plaintiff subsequently brought this action against her landlord, defendant-appellant Phyllis Fleitz, alleging that defendant was negligent in failing to maintain the entranceway in a reasonably safe condition. She further alleged that this negligence constituted a violation of R.C. 5321.04(A)(3), which imposes a duty on a landlord to "[k]eep all common areas of the premises in a safe and sanitary condition."

The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that a "landlord's duty to keep all common areas in a safe condition includes a duty to remedy dangerous conditions resulting from the natural accumulation of snow and ice." The court stressed the fact that the General Assembly, by enacting the Landlords and Tenants Act of 1974, has indicated its intent to provide broader protections for tenants. The court reasoned that the dangers presented by accumulated ice and snow are no different, legally speaking, from those presented by rotted wooden stairs or rusted-out railings. Nor was the court persuaded by the argument that the dangers of ice and snow are so obvious that a tenant can be expected to take action to protect himself. The court likened this argument to the defense of assumption of the risk, which has been merged with contributory negligence and is no longer a complete bar.

The court rejected the argument that the climate in this state renders it impossible for a landlord to maintain common areas free of accumulated snow and ice. The court viewed the fact that ice and snow conditions prevail during Ohio winters as an insufficient rationale in and of itself for insulating a landlord from liability.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Gary W. Osborne, Toledo, for appellee.

Marc J. Meister, Toledo, for appellant.

Arter & Hadden and Eric H. Zagrans, Cleveland, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Ass'n of Civil Trial Attorneys.

CLIFFORD F. BROWN, Justice.

The sole question posed by this appeal is whether a landlord has a duty, at common law or by virtue of R.C. 5321.04(A)(3), to keep common areas of the leased premises free of accumulated ice and snow. We hold that no such duty exists, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

The common law of this state has never recognized a duty on the part of landlords to clear naturally accumulated ice and snow from common areas of the leased premises. This court has held that "[t]he dangers from natural accumulations of ice and snow are ordinarily so obvious and apparent that a landlord may reasonably expect that a tenant * * * will act to protect himself against them." DeAmiches v. Popczun (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 180, 299 N.E.2d 265 , paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, a landlord is under no duty to take action to mitigate the dangers posed by accumulated ice and snow, and may justifiably assume that the tenant will apprehend the danger and act to ensure his own safety.

This court has repeatedly held that an owner of property is not liable for injuries to business invitees who slip and fall on natural accumulations of ice and snow. See, e.g., Debie v. Cochran Pharmacy-Berwick, Inc. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 38, 227 N.E.2d 603 . The common thread running through these cases is the principle that the owner or occupier has a right to assume that his visitors will appreciate the risk and take action to protect themselves accordingly. See Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 45, 233 N.E.2d 589 , paragraphs one and two of the syllabus; Jeswald v. Hutt (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 224, 227, 239 N.E.2d 37 ; Mikula v. Slavin Tailors (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 48, 56-57, 263 N.E.2d 316 . It is only where it is shown that the owner had superior knowledge of the particular danger which caused the injury that liability attaches, because in such a case the invitee may not reasonably be expected to protect himself from a risk he cannot fully appreciate. Debie, supra, 11 Ohio St.2d at 40, 227 N.E.2d 603; Mikula, supra, 24 Ohio St.2d at 57, 263 N.E.2d 316.

We are aware that Debie, Jeswald and Mikula involve the liability of a business owner or occupier for injuries sustained by a business invitee whereas the case sub judice involves the liability of a landlord to his tenant. We do not consider this a material distinction. Where the lease itself imposes no contractual duty on the landlord to clear accumulated ice and snow from the common areas, we see no compelling reason to impose it judicially on a landlord when we have refused to recognize any such duty on the part of business owners and occupiers.

It may be argued that a landlord accepts the benefits of paying tenants and should therefore be charged with the responsibility of taking reasonable steps to ensure their safety. It could be said that a landlord is in the better position to take action to clear accumulated snow and ice, since he owns the property and has the easiest access to all common areas. However, these arguments are no less applicable to business owners. They invite business visitors to enter the premises in hopes of receiving a benefit from them. They are in the best position to keep their property free of accumulated snow and ice. We have declined to elevate these arguments over the more compelling reasoning that the business owner is justified in assuming that his visitors are perceptive enough to observe the conditions and prudent enough to proceed with caution. Moreover, the accumulation of ice and snow is not chargeable to the owner, who did not create it. This natural and unconcealed condition is distinguishable from other conditions, such as a loose stair railing or open elevator shaft, which are often not obvious to the user.

Appellee has not alleged that appellant's knowledge of the risk posed by the ice accumulated on the front step was superior in any way to her own, or that appellant had notice that the conditions on that spot were substantially more dangerous than those prevailing generally. There is nothing to indicate that the dangers posed by the accumulation were not obvious to appellee. In fact, appellee stated in her deposition that she was aware that there was ice on the patio step and that she appreciated the danger it posed. She acknowledged that ice and snow conditions prevailed generally in the area.

We also reject appellee's argument that R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) imposes a duty on the defendant landlord to keep common areas free from accumulated ice and snow. The statute, which was enacted as part of the Landlords and Tenants Act of 1974, provides:

"A landlord who is a party to a rental agreement shall:

" * * *

"(3) Keep all common areas of the premises in a safe and sanitary condition."

We do not agree with appellee's contention that the legislature intended by this provision to impose a duty on landlords to clear accumulated snow and ice from the common areas of the leased premises.

Appellee directs this court's attention to our statements in Shroades v. Rental Homes (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 , to the effect that the legislature's enactment of R.C. Chapter 5321, the Landlords and Tenants Act of 1974, was intended to broaden the protection afforded to tenants. Id. at 25, 427 N.E.2d 774. Appellee contends that Shroades requires that the Act be liberally construed to effectuate this legislative intent of broadening the rights of tenants.

We agree with the proposition that the Act should be read liberally in favor of tenants' rights, but we do not advocate a reading of R.C. 5321.04(A)(3) which would impose a duty on landlords to clear accumulated ice and snow from common areas. It is a firm principle of statutory construction that liability imposed by statute shall not be extended beyond the clear import of the terms of the statute. Weiher v. Phillips (1921), 103 Ohio St. 249, 133 N.E. 67, paragraph one of the syllabus. Courts may not...