LaCroix v. American Horse Show Ass'n

• Decision Date: 28 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 1:91CV2106.,1:91CV2106.
• Parties: Eugene LaCROIX, Jr., Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN HORSE SHOW ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

853 F. Supp. 992

Eugene LaCROIX, Jr., Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN HORSE SHOW ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:91CV2106.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

April 28, 1994.

Mitchell J. Yelsky, Leonard W. Yelsky, Fanette Poulos Yelsky, Yelsky & Lonardo, Cleveland, OH, for plaintiff.

Kenneth A. Zirm, Walter & Haverfield, Cleveland, OH, for defendants American Horse Show Ass'n, Inc., Jane F. Clark, Ira A. Finkelstein, Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fallon & Kaplan.

David L. Marburger, Lawrence D. Pollack, Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, OH, for defendants Jane F. Clark, Ira A. Finkelstein, Tenzer, Greenblatt, Fallon & Kaplan.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF JULY 22, 1993

WELLS, District Judge.

This case is before this Court on the following motions: (1) defendants Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt's motion to quash service (docket no. 117), (2) defendants Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt's motion for summary judgment (docket no. 146), (3) defendants American Horse Show Association ("AHSA") and Clark's motion for reconsideration (docket no. 70), and (4) plaintiff Eugene LaCroix's motion for sanctions (docket no. 71).

On July 22, 1993, United States Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Hemann filed a report and recommendation recommending that the Court deny each of these motions. All of the defendants have objected to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation. In addition, defendants Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt have filed a "motion for reconsideration" of the Magistrate Judge's recommendations (docket no. 202). For the reasons that follow, the Court accepts and adopts Magistrate Judge Hemann's report and recommendation, overrules the defendants' objections, and denies defendants Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt's motion for reconsideration. The Court denies defendants Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt's motion to quash and motion for summary judgment, denies defendants AHSA and Clark's motion for reconsideration, and denies LaCroix's motion for sanctions.

ANALYSIS

Defendant Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt's Motion to Quash and Motion for Summary Judgment

Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt were added as defendants in this action when LaCroix filed an amended complaint on July 14, 1992. At the time they were joined, these defendants were representing defendants AHSA and Clark in this litigation.

On July 27, 1992, LaCroix served Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt by certified mail at their offices in New York City. Although they did not formally challenge this service, and eventually waived any objection, they did file a motion challenging the Court's personal jurisdiction over them. LaCroix then made personal service on Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt when Finkelstein appeared for a conference with United States Magistrate Judge Jack B. Streepy on November 20, 1992. Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt later requested leave to withdraw as counsel for the AHSA and Clark.

Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt now seek to quash the second (personal) service of process. They also contend the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. The motion for summary judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction assumes that the personal service was ineffective, and argues that Ohio's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution do not permit this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction. However, these defendants concede the Court has personal jurisdiction if the personal service on them was proper. Therefore, the first issue for this Court to resolve is whether the personal service of process was effective.

Counsel appearing in federal court are generally immune from service in another case if the immunity serves the interest of justice. However, there is no immunity if the service is made in a case related to the one in which the attorney is making an appearance. Here, the service was made in the case in which the attorney was making an appearance.¹

The case is, therefore, not one where the cause pending before the court is subjected to possible hindrance or delay by service of process in some unrelated suit.... Even if we make the assumption that the non-recognition of ... immunity might have discouraged the attorney's participation as counsel, still it would defeat, not aid, the administration of justice in the principal cause to encourage counsel's voluntary presence by the grant of an immunity which would relieve him from any compulsion either to continue his presence or to answer for his acts affecting the progress of the cause.

Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 228, 52 S.Ct. 317, 319, 76 L.Ed. 720 (1932); Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 92 F.Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (counsel who entered jurisdiction to appear for another party in an action was subject to personal service in that action). The personal service of process was therefore proper, and the motion to quash is denied.

Finkelstein and Tenzer, Greenblatt argue the second service of process should not be considered in determining whether this Court has personal jurisdiction, because they were challenging the Court's personal jurisdiction at the time they were re-served. In so arguing, these defendants rely on the abolition of "special" appearances under the Federal Rules. With the abolition of special appearances, parties may appear in an action without waiving jurisdictional defenses.

The abolition of special appearances is irrelevant to the question at hand. LaCroix does not claim the Court has personal jurisdiction merely because these defendants appeared; LaCroix claims personal jurisdiction because he served them while they were here. Furthermore, Finkelstein was not only appearing "specially" on his own behalf; he was also appearing as counsel for AHSA and Clark. Even if he might have been immune from service in the former circumstance, he is not immune in the latter. The abolition of special appearances is irrelevant.

Finkelstein and Tanzer, Greenblatt have admitted that the Court has personal jurisdiction over them if the personal service on them was proper. Since personal service was proper, the Court has personal jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

Defendants AHSA and Clark's Motion for Reconsideration

On March 30, 1992, United States Senior District Judge Alvin I. Krenzler² denied the motion to dismiss or to transfer venue filed by defendants AHSA and Clark. These defendants ask this Court to reconsider that ruling. The motion for reconsideration raises two issues, (1) venue, and (2) personal jurisdiction over defendant Clark.

Venue. AHSA and Clark contend that evidence disclosed during discovery has revealed that plaintiff previously misrepresented the location of witnesses and documents to the Court. AHSA and Clark argue that these facts show the case should be transferred to New York.

Magistrate Judge Hemann determined that venue was proper in this district because this is "a judicial district in which the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action was commenced." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3). She further determined that AHSA and Clark did not meet their burden of proving that the convenience of the parties and witnesses would best be served by a transfer of venue; "transferring this case ... will simply transfer inconvenience from one party to the other." The AHSA and Clark do not object to these determinations except to the extent that they challenge the Court's personal jurisdiction over Clark. As discussed below, Judge Krenzler already determined that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Clark. Therefore, the Court accepts the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation and denies the motion for reconsideration regarding transfer of venue.

Personal Jurisdiction. Magistrate Judge Hemann has recommended that the Court deny AHSA and Clark's motion for reconsideration regarding the Court's personal jurisdiction over defendant Clark, because Judge Krenzler already decided that issue and these defendants raised no new evidence or arguments to bring his ruling into question. The Court agrees. Although this Court has the power to depart from the rulings previously entered in this case, the prior rulings should continue to govern unless they are clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983). The issues raised by Clark in the motion for reconsideration were already considered by Judge Krenzler, and Clark did not demonstrate that the ruling was clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Court accepts Magistrate Judge Hemann's report and recommendation and denies AHSA and Clark's motion for reconsideration regarding the Court's personal jurisdiction.

Motions for Sanctions filed by AHSA and Clark and by LaCroix

Defendants AHSA and Clark moved for sanctions against LaCroix because LaCroix misled the Court about the location of witnesses. Magistrate Judge Hemann has recommended that the Court overrule this motion at this time, but revisit the issue if it becomes obvious at trial that LaCroix did misrepresent the location of witnesses. Neither party has objected to this recommendation. The Court therefore accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation, and denies AHSA and Clark's motion for sanctions at this time.

LaCroix moved for sanctions against all defendants because they filed frivolous and unnecessary pleadings and motions and engaged in other allegedly obstructive behavior during discovery. Magistrate Judge Hemann recommended that the Court overrule this motion because "the conduct is not so egregious as to merit sanctions." Again, neither party has objected to this recommendation. The Court therefore accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation and denies LaCroix's motion for sanctions.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby...