Lacy v. City of Monrovia

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ASHBY; STEPHENS, Acting P.J., and HASTINGS
• Citation: Lacy v. City of Monrovia, 118 Cal.Rptr. 277, 44 Cal.App.3d 152 (Cal. App. 1974)
• Decision Date: 27 December 1974
• Parties: Esse L. LACY and Pauline Lacy et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF MONROVIA, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 44257.

Page 277

118 Cal.Rptr. 277

44 Cal.App.3d 152

Esse L. LACY and Pauline Lacy et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF MONROVIA, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 44257.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Dec. 27, 1974.

As Amended Jan. 7, 1975.

Steven Kaufman, Martin H. Flam, Sherman Oaks, and Enrique R. Sanchez, and Martin H. Flam, Sherman Oaks, for plaintiff and appellant Pauline Lacy.

Hahn & Hahn and William K. Henley, Pasadena, for defendant and respondent.

ASHBY, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff Pauline Lacy (appellant) appeals from an order granting the City of Monrovia's (respondent) motion for summary judgment.

On January 4, 1973, Esse L. Lacy presented to respondent a claim for damages. In the claim Esse L. Lacy alleged that on October 1, 1972, at approximately 4 a.m., 'Police Officers of the City of Monrovia broke into my home at the above address ¹ in county territory in the County of Los Angeles, and terrorized me and my family,' and the particular act or omission on the part of respondent's agents was '(t)he detention of me and the said members of my family, our humiliation in front of members of my family, our humiliation in front of the neighbors who were looking out of their windows as to what was going on. We were all caused embarrassment and humiliation and were detained and deprived of our liberty for about fifteen minutes. My wife was exposed to the gaze of strange men. My life and hers were threatened. Recurrence of duodenal and peptic ulcer, and further bulging of hiatus hernia,' resulting in the following damage: 'Damage for detention, humiliation and embarrassment and was held and detained and deprived of our liberty for about fifteen minutes. Damage for above physical injuries.'

The claim was rejected by respondent on January 16, 1973. On June 7, 1973, a complaint was filed in superior court on behalf of Esse L. Lacy in the first cause of action, Pauline Lacy, in the second cause of action and in the third cause of action for Gregory by His Guardian Ad Litem, Esse L. Lacy; Anthony Crawford by His Guardian Ad Litem, Esse L. Lacy; Charlotte Crawford by Her Guardian Ad Litem, Esse L. Lacy, for false arrest, physical injuries and property damage caused by defendant City and its employees acting within the scope of their employment.

Respondent moved for summary judgment on the second and third causes of action on the ground that only Esse L. Lacy had properly filed a claim and that the other plaintiffs were barred under section 945.4 by their failure to present their claims pursuant to the appropriate section 911.2 of the Government Code.

The trial court found that: '. . . Plaintiff Pauline Lacy failed to present a Claim to Defendant, The City of Monrovia, as required by the California Government Code. The Court further finds that the Claim of Plaintiff Esse L. Lacy presented to said defendant on January 4, 1973, is sufficient to support the causes of action of Plaintiffs, Anthony Crawford, Charlotte Crawford and Gregory Crawford against said Defendant in that said claim may be considered to be a Claim filed on Behalf of said minor Plaintiffs.'

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether or not the claim presented by Esse L. Lacy is sufficient to support appellant's cause of action. We hold that it is.

Respondent's position is simply this: Appellant did not file a claim, therefore appellant is barred from bringing a lawsuit under the provisions of section 954.4. ² We do not agree.

The principal purposes of the claims statute are to give notice to the municipality in order that it be afforded a timely opportunity to investigate the claim and determine the facts; and to avoid unnecessary lawsuits by giving the municipality the opportunity to settle meritorious claims without going through an avoidable trial. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701; see Foster v. McFadden, 30 Cal.App.3d 943, 949, 106 Cal.Rptr. 685; Myers v. County of Orange, 6 Cal.App.3d 626, 637, 86 Cal.Rptr. 198). These purposes were accomplished by the Esse Lacy claim. The wording of the claim relating to appellant gives respondent all the notice and knowledge he needs concerning her claim. The fact that appellant did not sign a separate claim form is of no consequence. Government Code section 910 provides that a claim shall be presented by a claimant or 'by a person acting on his behalf' and section 910.2 provides that the claim shall be signed by claimant or 'by some person on his behalf.' (Emphasis added.) It is clear that Esse L. Lacy presented the claim to respondent on his own behalf and on the behalf of his wife and children.

In the case at bench paragraph 6 ³ of the claim form contains the following question: 'What sum do you claim on account of each item of injury or damage?' (Emphasis in original.) One of the items of damages in essence sets forth appellant's claim which Esse Lacy could make only on her behalf: 'Damage for detention, humiliation and embarrassment and threat to my wife's life . . . $10,000.00.' In the remaining subparagraphs of paragraph 6, Esse L. Lacy set forth the damages he was claiming for his children. (See Kelso v. Board of Education, 42 Cal.App.2d 415, 421, 109 P.2d 29.)

The amount of the claim of appellant was set forth in Esse L. Lacy's claim. The total amount of the claim against respondent is the same whether it is all included in the claim presented by Mr. Lacy on behalf of his wife and children or presented separately in two claims. The claim statute was not intended to be used as a trap for the unwary. To require that the Lacy claim be divided into two separate claims in this situation would not serve the intended purposes of the claim statute and would result in unfairly precluding a determination of appellant's claim on its merits.

Roberts v. State of California, 39 Cal.App.3d 844, 114 Cal.Rptr. 518, which respondent cites is consistent with our decision. There a claim was filed on behalf of the decedent's workmen's compensation carrier and employer. The plaintiff, decedent's wife, did not timely file a wrongful death claim against the state. Her argument that the claim filed by the workmen's compensation carrier and employer fulfilled the requirements of the statute by providing notice to the state was rejected by the court. The court held that although the claim by the workmen's compensation carrier alerts the state to possible litigation, the exposure is different in kind and nature from...