Lacy v. County of Maricopa
| Decision Date | 23 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-06-2865-PHX-GMS.,CV-06-2865-PHX-GMS. |
| Parties | Byron Tennel LACY, an unmarried man; and Debra Ann Finley, his mother, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF MARICOPA; the City of Phoenix; Phillip Keen, M.D.; Ronald Jones, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Meghann Leigh St. Thomas, Richard T. Treon, Treon, Aguirre, Newman & Norris, PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiffs.
Randall R. Garczynski, Michele Molinario, Kathleen L. Wieneke, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants City of Phoenix and Ronald Jones. (Dkt. # 113.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
On May 1, 1994, a shooting occurred at the "Sister's Auto Club," a nightclub located in Phoenix, Arizona. At approximately 4:00 a.m. that morning, Plaintiff Byron Lacy and three of his friends attempted to exit the Sister's parking lot in a white Volvo station wagon. A second vehicle, driven by Danny King blocked the Volvo's exit from the lot. One of the individuals in the front seat of the Volvo drew a pistol and fired multiple warning shots into the air. Plaintiff Lacy, who was sitting in the rear passenger seat, likewise extended his .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun out of the rear passenger window and fired multiple shots. King reported hearing several gunshots, which caused him to seek cover. After the initial series of shots, King reported that he sat up and observed the white station wagon proceeding eastbound on Broadway. He then observed a person on the passenger side of the Volvo stick his right arm out of the vehicle, point a handgun in the direction of the club, and fire numerous shots.2 Other witnesses testified to hearing initial shots followed by a pause and then more shots. Shawn Mayon and Calvin Pink, security guards for the nightclub, were struck by a bullet or bullets during the second series of shots.
Police responded to a 911 call, finding that Mayon had been killed by a single gunshot wound to the head and Pink had been injured by a bullet that grazed his shoulder. Police dispatch issued a description of the white Volvo over the radio. Shortly thereafter, Phoenix Police stopped a white Volvo station wagon with four passengers—one of whom was Plaintiff Byron Lacy. Ernest Austin, a witness from the scene of the shooting, was taken to the Volvo and verified that it was the same vehicle that he had seen exiting the Sister's parking lot at the time of the shooting. Lacy was arrested without incident under suspicion of his involvement in the nightclub shooting. During a pat-down search, police found .45 caliber ammunition rounds in his left front pocket. Police also recovered .45 caliber shell casings from inside the Volvo and a .45 caliber pistol from the rear seat.
That afternoon, Detective Jones interviewed Lacy and the other passengers regarding the nightclub shooting. All four men admitted to being at Sister's, leaving in a white Volvo, and the shooting involved in their exit from the parking lot. Torron Jarret, who was seated in the front passenger seat, admitted to firing his 9 millimeter weapon first in an effort to clear the roadway. During Lacy's interrogation, he eventually admitted to ownership of the .45 caliber pistol and admitted that, earlier in the evening, he was at the nightclub parking lot and fired his weapon multiple times. Lacy contended several times that he shot five or six times into the air and did not shoot towards Sister's nightclub. However, Lacy eventually did admit that he may have fired his weapon horizontally.3 Lacy stated:
But I, man, I, I guess I shot it straight, I can't, man I, but, in my thinking in my mind is I shot in the air. I was drunk, it could have, it ain't hundred percent. If I take a urine test right now, I was full of alcohol but I did not mean to shoot nobody, I did not, if I did shoot straight the gun just you know on my way out probably pop, pop, pop, pop cause other then that I, I, I know I didn't mean to fire in no crowd of people.4
(Dkt. # 160 Ex. G at COFP01658.) After the interrogation, Lacy was released from custody.
During the police investigation, seven .45 caliber shells were found in the roadway, 130-200 feet from Mayon's body. Other casings were located in a vacant field. Phoenix Police Officer Orona found a fully-jacketed bullet next to a pay-phone outside the nightclub that Pink reportedly used to call 911 following the shooting. He placed the bullet in a closed, clear plastic vial. Jones was conducting interviews at the time the bullet was found and asked Orona and Detective Hansen to take the bullet to the lab.
On January 25, 1995, Jones testified at the grand jury proceedings that he delivered the shell casing found by the phone booth to Phoenix Criminalist Lee Garrett, who performed initial ballistics tests. Jones testified that Garrett determined that the bullet found by the phone booth had been fired from Lacy's .45 caliber pistol and that the shell casings found on the road were either fired from Lacy's weapon, or were entirely consistent with being fired from his weapon. At the Grand Jury, Jones also testified that "Mr. Edwards (the driver of the Volvo) and [Lacy] both agreed that [Lacy] raised his arm out the window and fired numerous shots from his .45-caliber out the passenger side window towards the Sisters social club." (Dkt. # 161 Ex. H at 12.)5
On January 25, 1995, a grand jury indicted Lacy on charges of murder in the first degree and aggravated assault.6 Based on the indictment, a warrant was issued and Lacy arrested. Prior to trial, Lacy requested a remand for a new finding of probable cause. On March 23, 1995, after reading the Grand Jury transcript and hearing arguments on the matter, the court denied Lacy's motion. During July and August, 1996, Lacy was tried on murder and aggravated assault charges. Prior to the close of trial, Lacy moved for a judgment of acquittal arguing insufficiency of the evidence. The court denied the judgment for acquittal stating, "Without commenting on the evidence, other than to determine whether or not there is substantial evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ concerning the offense with which the defendant is charged[,] we order denying the judgment for acquittal." (Dkt. # 114 Ex. 7 at 6.)
Lacy was convicted of reckless manslaughter and aggravated assault and was sentenced to seventeen years. Lacy appealed his convictions, arguing prosecutorial misconduct and police perjury. Specifically, Lacy argued that the indictment was based on perjury because Jones testified to the existence of a strike mark on the building behind Pink and because Jones did not testify to Pink's statement that he heard a gunshot come from across the street. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that neither argument raised meritorious issues about grand jury perjury. Lacy's alternative arguments were also denied and the conviction was affirmed. Lacy then filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. On April 12, 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Lacy then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County. On October 25, 2002, the court granted the petition, set aside Lacy's conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and insufficient evidence, and ordered a new trial. Upon reassignment, the court determined that a new trial was improper because double jeopardy applied. Therefore, on February 23, 2004, the court dismissed the charges against Lacy.
In this action, filed July 29, 2006, Lacy alleges that the investigation of the crime, his arrest, and his prosecution were improper and deprived him of his constitutional rights. The Court previously dismissed counts seven, nine, and ten against Defendants City of Phoenix and Jones. (Dkt. # 64.) Plaintiffs have since expressly abandoned counts five and six. Accordingly, the following counts remain against Phoenix and Jones on which they now seek summary judgment: (1) count one (breach of investigative policy); (2) count two (mishandling of crime scene evidence and failure to report); (3) count four (lack of probable cause); and (4) count eight (a derivative claim on behalf of Debra Finley for denial of familial association). (Dkt. # 151 at 12-13.) On June 24, 2008, Defendants City of Phoenix and Ronald Jones filed a motion for summary judgment seeking judgment on the remaining counts. (Dkt. # 113.)
A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.1994). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. In addition, the dispute must be genuine, that is, the evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.1994). The moving party...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Merritt v. Arizona, CV-17-04540-PHX-DGC
...("Under Arizona law, probable cause is an absolute defense to a claim of false arrest and imprisonment."); Lacy v. Cty. of Maricopa , 631 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1193 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("Probable cause to arrest or detain is an absolute defense to any claim under § 1983 against police officers for ......
-
Rodrigues v. Cnty. of Haw.
...police officers for wrongfularrest . . . as the lack of probable cause is a necessary element" of the claim. Lacy v. Cty. of Maricopa, 631 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1193 (D. Ariz. 2008); see also Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Because police had probable cause to arrest him, Har......
-
Morgan v. Cnty. of Haw.
...charges made . . . then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails." Lacy v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1194 (D. Ariz. 2008) (citation omitted). Morgan was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of simple trespass. It stands to reason that......
-
Rodrigues v. Cnty. of Haw.
...police officers for wrongful arrest . . . as the lack of probable cause is a necessary element" of the claim. Lacy v. Cty. of Maricopa, 631 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1193 (D. Ariz. 2008); see also Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). As explained in Section II, supra, Defendant Jelsma ......