Lacy v. Massanari, 4:01CV3000 (D. Neb. 10/23/2001), 4:01CV3000.
| Decision Date | 23 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | 4:01CV3000. |
| Parties | ROBET C. LACY, Plaintiff, v. LARRY G. MASSANARI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This case is now before me on Robert C. Lacy's Complaint To Review and Set Aside Decision under the Social Security Act and Request for Trial, which is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of his claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended. See 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. In accordance with my order dated March 5, 2001, the parties have submitted briefs in support of their respective positions. Filing 7. The defendant has also filed an answer to the complaint, along with a transcript of the administrative record. Filings 5, 6. After carefully reviewing these materials, I find that the Commissioner's decision must be reversed and the case remanded for further consideration.
The plaintiff, born on June 10, 1944, filed an application for disability insurance benefits on October 9, 1997, alleging that he was disabled and unable to work since June 3, 1997. Tr. at 134-136.1 According to the plaintiff, he is disabled because of a torn rotator cuff in his right shoulder, as well as arthritis in his shoulders, elbows, wrists, and fingers. Tr. at 167.2 His application was initially denied on November 11, 1997, and his request for reconsideration was denied on May 8, 1998. Tr. at 98-100, 105-106. The plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ). Tr. at 108-109. The ALJ conducted a hearing on December 30, 1998, and, in a decision dated January 25, 1999, concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to disability insurance benefits. Tr. at 45-95, 17-32. In reaching this decision, the ALJ found, inter alia, the following:
4. The record establishes that the Claimant has the following medically determinable impairments which have imposed more than slight limitations upon his ability to function: arthralgias/myalgia, early degenerative changes of the right acromioclavicular joint, full thickness tear of the right rotator cuff, and a sleep disorder.
5. While his medically determinable impairments, either singly or collectively, have not revealed the same or equivalent attendant medical findings as are recited in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the Social Security Administration's Regulations No. 4, they have imposed the following limitations upon his ability to perform basic work-related functions: frequent lifting/carrying in excess of 10 pounds; more than the occasional lifting/carrying of 20 pounds; unlimited use of the upper extremities to push/pull and/or reach overhead; climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and working at heights and around heavy, running, dangerous machinery.
6. Notwithstanding such limitations, the Claimant is able to perform his past relevant work as a security guard and vending machine attendant.
7. The Claimant's testimony, when evaluated under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1984) and Social Security Ruling 96-7p, was generally credible but does not form the basis for a finding of disability.
8. Accordingly, the Claimant is not disabled, as that term is defined under the Social Security Act, as amended, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
The plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration review the ALJ's decision, but his request was denied by letter dated November 8, 2000. Tr. at 6-8. Thus, the ALJ's decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. See Tr. at 6.
The plaintiff filed the present action on January 4, 2001, claiming that "[t]he Commissioner's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence." Filing 1 at 3. In his brief, the plaintiff argues the following: (1) the ALJ's credibility finding, combined with the vocational expert's testimony, demonstrate that the plaintiff is, in fact, entitled to an award of benefits; (2) the ALJ used an incorrect legal standard in finding that the plaintiff is able to return to his past relevant work; (3) the vocational expert's testimony on which the ALJ relied to deny the plaintiff's claim was given in response to a legally defective hypothetical question and therefore cannot serve as substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision; and (4) the ALJ's decision lacks a legally sufficient analysis of the mental and physical demands of the past work used to deny the plaintiff's claim, and the decision is therefore unsupported by substantial evidence. In terms of relief, the plaintiff requests that I reverse the Commissioner's finding that the plaintiff is not disabled and award the plaintiff benefits. In the alternative, the plaintiff asks that I remand his case for a new hearing.
In reviewing the ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits, I must ascertain "whether there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the [Commissioner's] decision." Hutsell v. Sullivan, 892 F.2d 747, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence consists of "`more than a mere scintilla,'" and "`means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The ALJ's decision should not be reversed "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite conclusion." Harris v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). However, the court's review is not simply "a rubber stamp for the [Commissioner's] decision and involves more than a search for evidence supporting the [Commissioner's] findings." Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, in analyzing whether existing evidence is substantial, I "`must consider evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] decision as well as evidence that supports it.'" Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993)).
The ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis in determining whether an individual claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ continues the analysis until either (1) a claimant is found to be "not disabled" at one of the steps, or (2) the claimant is found to be "disabled" at step three or step five. Step one requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in any substantial gainful activity. Id. § 404.1520(b). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. Step two requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has an impairment or a combination of impairments that significantly limits the ability to do basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). "Basic work activities" include, inter alia, walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, seeing, hearing, speaking, and understanding. Id. § 404.1521(b). If the claimant cannot prove such an impairment, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(c). Step three requires the ALJ to compare the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments, as the medical evidence alone dictates, to a list of predetermined "disabling" impairments. Id. § 404.1520(d). If the claimant has an impairment that is listed or is equal to a listed impairment, the analysis ends and the claimant is found to be "disabled." Id. If a claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the analysis then proceeds to steps four and five. Step four requires the ALJ to determine whether the impairment or impairments prevent the claimant from engaging in past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant is able to perform any past relevant work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(e). Step five requires the ALJ to consider the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience to determine whether the claimant can do any work other than that which the claimant has done in the past. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the ALJ determines that the claimant cannot do such work, the claimant will be found disabled. Id.
The plaintiff first contends that "[b]ecause of the ALJ's credibility finding and the actual vocational testimony, this matter should be reversed and benefits awarded." Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Position [hereinafter Plaintiff's Brief] at 2. In support of his claim, the plaintiff directs me to the ALJ's findings, in which the ALJ characterizes the plaintiff's testimony as "generally credible." See Tr. at 31, ¶ 7; see also supra at Part I (). The plaintiff also directs me to the following passage from the transcript of the plaintiff's December 30, 1998, hearing:
[ALJ]: Another question, if you consider the clamant's [sic] testimony to be credible, do you think that he could do the jobs that you've identified whether it's the semi-skilled jobs or the unskilled jobs?
[Vocational Expert]: Your Honor, taking into consideration the claimant's testimony today, that was presented today, it be [sic] my opinion that he would not be able to perform, perform the positions that have been identified or other positions and this would deal with his physical tolerances which he talked about sitting 20 to 25 minutes at a time. Standing 5 minutes. Walking 15 minutes and lifting up to 1 pound and he also talked about frequent naps throughout the day and even more importantly the inability to repeat activities or to be available...
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