Lacy v. People

• Decision Date: 24 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87SC262,87SC262
• Citation: 775 P.2d 1
• Parties: John Wesley LACY, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1

775 P.2d 1

John Wesley LACY, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 87SC262.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

April 24, 1989.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

June 5, 1989.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Judy Fried, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for petitioner.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Peter J. Stapp, Robert M. Russel, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for respondent.

LOHR, Justice.

We granted certiorari to review an unpublished decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of defendant-petitioner John Wesley Lacy, Jr., on three habitual criminal counts. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the habitual criminal counts at issue in this petition. The defendant asserts on certiorari that his guilty pleas to the charges underlying the habitual criminal counts were constitutionally infirm. We conclude that two of these convictions were based on constitutionally infirm pleas of guilty and could not be used as predicates for habitual criminality charges. Since at least two habitual criminal counts must be proved before a defendant can be adjudged a habitual criminal and therefore subject to mandatory increased sentencing, see § 16-13-101, 8A C.R.S. (1986), we need not address the validity of the defendant's plea underlying the single remaining habitual criminal count. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the case for resentencing.

I.

The defendant was initially charged in a two-count information alleging attempted second degree kidnapping, ¹ which is a class five felony, and assault in the third degree, ² which is a class one misdemeanor. These charges arose out of an attempted abduction that occurred in the early morning on February 9, 1985, outside of the Elks Club in Arvada, Colorado. The victim testified at trial that after leaving her job at the Elks Club and waiting in the parking lot for her car to warm up, Lacy approached her and pushed her into the car. During the subsequent struggle Lacy covered the victim's mouth to keep her from screaming and punched her in the face. While Lacy was attempting to get the car into gear, the victim managed to escape from the vehicle and run away.

On March 25, 1985, the information was amended to add four habitual criminal counts, § 16-13-101(2), 8A C.R.S. (1986), alleging prior felony convictions in 1967, 1973, 1976, and 1980. ³ Lacy moved to dismiss the habitual criminal counts, contending that the guilty pleas supplying the bases for the convictions underlying the habitual criminal counts were accepted in violation of his constitutional rights and state law prescribing procedures for accepting guilty pleas. The trial court received into evidence certified records of each of the earlier proceedings, including transcripts of the providency hearings at which the pleas were entered. The trial court took no testimony with respect to any of the prior guilty pleas, although it did hear extensive arguments directed toward the question of their validity. On June 24, 1985, the trial court dismissed the habitual criminal count relating to the 1967 conviction and denied the defendant's motion as to the remaining counts. Specifically, the court concluded that the guilty pleas underlying the remaining counts met "the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States, the statutes, decisions and rules in the [states in which the pleas were taken] and by the statutes, decisions and rules in the state of Colorado."

Trial to a jury began on July 23, 1985. The jury found the defendant guilty of attempted kidnapping and third degree assault, and also found that the defendant had been convicted of a felony on each of three prior occasions as charged in the three remaining habitual criminal counts. The trial court sentenced Lacy to the Department of Corrections for a term of life imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge imposed an alternative sentence of four years to take effect in the event the habitual criminal adjudication were to be overturned on appeal.

Lacy appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, challenging the constitutional validity of each of the three convictions that formed the basis of his adjudication as a habitual criminal. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals rejected his challenges to the guilty pleas underlying the habitual criminal counts and therefore affirmed the judgment of conviction. The court held that the record supported a finding that each of Lacy's guilty pleas was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Lacy then sought certiorari review in this court. He specifically assigns as error the trial court's refusal to dismiss the habitual criminal counts relating to the felony convictions obtained in 1973, 1976, and 1980. He asserts that these convictions were based on constitutionally defective guilty pleas and therefore were obtained in violation of due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, sec. 25. As to the convictions obtained in 1976 and 1980, we agree. We find it unnecessary to address the validity of the conviction obtained in 1973.

II.

A.

A prior conviction obtained in a constitutionally invalid manner cannot be used against an accused in a subsequent criminal proceeding to support guilt or to increase punishment. E.g., Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 481, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 1018, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967); Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo.1982); People v. Quintana, 634 P.2d 413, 416 (Colo.1981). We therefore must determine whether Lacy's prior convictions comply with constitutional standards. See People v. Meyers, 617 P.2d 808, 814-15 (Colo.1980). ⁴

Due process of law requires that in order to provide the basis for a judgment of conviction, a guilty plea must be made voluntarily. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); People v. Chavez, 730 P.2d 321 (Colo.1986); Wilson v. People, 708 P.2d 792 (Colo.1985); Harshfield v. People, 697 P.2d 391 (Colo.1985); People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37 (Colo.1983); U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, sec. 25. A guilty plea may be involuntary in the constitutional sense for one of two reasons. First, a plea may be involuntary because the defendant does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections he is waiving. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. at 2257 n. 13; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023-24, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Alternatively, a plea may be involuntary because the defendant "has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt." Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. at 2257 n. 13. In the latter case, a plea is not voluntary unless the defendant received " 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.' " Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645, 96 S.Ct. at 2257 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 61 S.Ct. 572, 574, 85 L.Ed. 859 (1941)).

To establish that the constitutional requirement of voluntariness has been satisfied, the record as a whole must affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant understood the constitutional rights he was waiving and the critical elements of the crime to which the plea was tendered. People v. Wade, 708 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Colo.1985); Harshfield, 697 P.2d at 393; People v. Keenan, 185 Colo. 317, 319, 524 P.2d 604, 605 (1974). A reviewing court cannot presume from the mere fact that a guilty plea was entered that the defendant waived his constitutional rights and understood the critical elements of the crime with which he was charged. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43, 89 S.Ct. at 1711-12; Wade, 708 P.2d at 1368-69.

1.

As to the requirement that the defendant understand the nature of the constitutional protections he is waiving, we have previously held that the trial court need not follow a formalistic litany when accepting a guilty plea. E.g., Wade, 708 P.2d at 1368. Rather, the record as a whole must simply show that the defendant entered his guilty plea voluntarily and understandingly. Wade, 708 P.2d at 1368-69; Keenan, 185 Colo. at 319, 524 P.2d at 605; People v. Marsh, 183 Colo. 258, 263, 516 P.2d 431, 433 (1973). Moreover, due process does not require a specific waiver of even the three constitutional rights highlighted in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709. ⁵ Wade, 708 P.2d at 1369; Marsh, 183 Colo. at 262-63, 516 P.2d at 433; see generally J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas § 3.8(b) (2d ed. 1983) (a majority of courts have refused to vacate pleas simply because the record does not affirmatively show a specific waiver of the three constitutional rights referred to in Boykin ). Thus, we have rejected an assertion that "when the record of providency proceedings contains no evidence of any reference to the prosecution's burden of proof in criminal trials, any guilty plea accepted during such proceedings must be deemed constitutionally invalid." Wade, 708 P.2d at 1370.

Nor does due process generally require that the record demonstrate an adequate factual basis for the plea. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (procedure embodied in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which directs court to determine that factual basis exists for guilty plea, has not been held to be constitutionally mandated); Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 702-03 (5th Cir.1986); Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 777 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir.1985); Willbright v. Smith, 745 F.2d 779, 780 (2d Cir.1984); Paulsen v. Manson, 203 Conn. 484, 525 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1987); see also 2 W....