Lacy v. Schlumberger Well Service
| Decision Date | 28 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 72418,72418 |
| Citation | 839 P.2d 157,1992 OK 54 |
| Parties | Thomas H. LACY, Appellant, v. SCHLUMBERGER WELL SERVICE, Travelers Insurance Company, and the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court, Appellees. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division 4 Appeal from the Workers' Compensation Court Noma D. Gurich, Trial Judge.
Claimant, an employee, filed a claim in the Workers' Compensation Court alleging respiratory injury as a result of exposure to chemicals in his workplace. Employer introduced evidence produced by an examining physician showing that claimant had not suffered a job related injury. Claimant objected to the introduction of the medical evidence as lacking in probative value. The court overruled the objection and subsequently denied recovery finding that the claimant had not sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the medical evidence, objected to as lacking in probative value at trial, was incompetent. Employer now petitions this Court for review arguing that because claimant objected only to the probative value of the medical evidence, it was error for the Court of Appeals to address the question of competence as it was not an issue on appeal.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED ORDER OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT REINSTATED AND SUSTAINED.
Richard A. Bell, Norman, for appellant, Thomas H. Lacy.
John A. McCaleb, Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon, Oklahoma City, for appellees Schlumberger Well Service and Travelers Ins. Co.
In this case, Thomas Lacy ("Claimant"), an employee, filed a claim in the Workers' Compensation Court ("trial court") alleging that his lungs and upper respiratory system had been injured by continuous exposure to chemicals during his almost thirteen years of employment. The employer, Schlumberger Well Service ("Employer"), denied that claimant had any job-related injury or disability. At trial, employer offered several witnesses, a number of medical records, and the deposition testimony of M.B. Shook, M.D., to support its defense.
Dr. Shook is a board certified internal medical specialist who concluded that claimant's problems were due to asthma and were not caused by his job. At the time Dr. Shook's testimony was offered into evidence, the only objection made by claimant was: "Your Honor, we would object to the probative value of that document." The objection was overruled and subsequently the trial judge denied claimant's claim finding that he had not sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
Claimant appealed and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, Division 4. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order after an extensive review of Dr. Shook's testimony and a letter from Dr. Shook to the Traveler's Insurance Company, which was admitted into evidence, detailing his examination of the claimant. The appellate court found that the evidence did not constitute competent evidence to support the trial court's order. Employer subsequently petitioned this Court for certiorari which was granted.
Employer asserts that the Court of Appeals did not have the power to declare the testimony of Dr. Shook incompetent because no objection was made to the competency of the evidence when it was offered at trial. Employer cites Whitener v. South Central Solid Waste Authority 1 in support of its argument. In that case, an employee claimed a job-related injury and, as in the instant case, objected to the admission of the employer's medical evidence solely for lack of probative value. The Court of Appeals, in Whitener, held that the evidence was not competent and reversed the trial court's denial of compensation. On certiorari, we stated:
The only issue to be addressed is whether the employer's medical report has probative value. Its admissibility or "competence" is not before us. This is so because the claimant waived his objection to the report when he did not contest that exhibit's admissibility at the time of its offer into evidence. Upon claimant's failure to object timely, the report stood admitted by force of rule 21, Rules of the Workers' Compensation Court. 2
In the instant case also, the claimant objected to the employer's medical evidence solely for its lack of probative value. Thus, under Whitener the only issue to be addressed on appeal is whether the employer's medical report has probative value. However, the Court of Appeals' holding that the testimony was not competent evidence is not necessarily error. This results from loose usage of the term "competence" and its derivatives.
As we explained in Whitener, in the area of workers' compensation an objection to the "competency" of a medical report is directed to the exhibit's admissibility on hearsay or other legal grounds. 3 Alternatively, an objection to an exhibit's "probative value" is used to challenge the evidence for insufficiency as legal proof of (a) medical findings with respect to the presence or absence of compensable disability, or of (b) the compensable impairment's rating. 4 In other words, when evidence is objected to as lacking in probative value, the issue is whether it is probative of the elements it seeks to establish once admitted. 5 Thus, an objection to the "competence" of medical evidence has a separate and distinct meaning from a probative value objection. Medical evidence may be "competent" in the sense that it was correctly admitted and yet lack the required quality of legally sufficient proof. 6
However, in Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 7 this Court adopted the any-competent evidence standard of review for decisions of the Workers' Compensation Court. 8 By force of 85 O.S. 1981, § 26, 9 all findings of fact made in the trial court's decision under review are conclusive and binding unless it is ascertained that such findings lack support by any competent evidence. 10 Clearly, if the only evidence which supports an order of the trial court lacks probative value the Parks test will not be met. In other words, when appellate review is premised on a probative value objection, an appellate court can hold that the trial court's order is not supported by any competent evidence under the Parks test because the supporting evidence lacks probative value. 11 Thus, the term "competency" when used as an objection refers to the evidence's legal admissibility, while the term "competent" as used in the Parks test refers to the legal sufficiency, on any ground of evidence which supports an order of the Workers' Compensation Court.
As a result, the Court of Appeals had the power to declare that Dr. Shook's testimony lacked probative value, and that therefore, the order of the trial court was not supported by the competent evidence under the Parks standard. However, in compliance with the principles stated in Whitener, the admissibility or "competence" of the evidence was not before the Court of Appeals because upon claimant's failure to object timely, the report stood admitted by force of Rule 21 of the Rules of the Workers' Compensation Court. 12
In this case, the Court of Appeals carefully examined the testimony of Dr. Shook and weighed it against other evidence finding the basis of the physician's conclusion considerably flawed. As discussed above, we held in Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 13 that the standard to be applied by this Court, and the Court of Appeals, in reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Court is the any-competent evidence standard. 14 Under this standard, the reviewing court's responsibility is simply to canvass the facts, not to weigh conflicting proof in order to determine where the preponderance lies, but only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the decision is supported by competent evidence. 15
As part of its review, the Court of Appeals examined some of claimant's medical evidence when determining whether the trial court's order was supported by competent evidence. This balancing of the evidence went beyond the proper scope of review and in doing so the Court of Appeals invaded the fact-finding province of the trial court. 16 However, if the result of the Court of Appeals' judgment is otherwise correct, it will not be disturbed on certiorari if there are other grounds to support its decision. 17 Thus, we must determine whether the trial court's decision is or is not supported by competent evidence.
Claimant advances two principal arguments against employer's medical evidence. First, claimant argues that the evidence is flawed because there is not a statement in the evidence on the issue of whether claimant ever sustained an accidental injury, and that therefore, there is no evidence in the record showing that claimant has not suffered an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Claimant argues that the omission renders Dr. Shook's report in violation of Rule 20. We held in Perlinger v. J.C. Rogers Constr. Co., 18 LeBarge v. Zebco, 19 and Whitener, 20 that evidence which is not in substantial compliance with Rule 20 is not competent evidence upon which the trial court may base its conclusion.
The pertinent part of Rule 20, to which claimant refers, provides: "The Court ... encourages the production of medical evidence by verified or declared report which shall contain the following, where applicable: * * * (d) The date and cause of the alleged injury and whether, in the physician's opinion, it is job-related." [emphasis added] 21 The inclusion of the language "where applicable" in the statute indicates legislative intent that the terms of the statute need not be strictly applied where such application is not appropriate.
This case provides an example of the type of situation contemplated by the provision. Here, Dr. Shook found that the claimant was suffering from ...
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