Ladd v. Pickering
Decision Date | 30 March 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 4:05–CV–916–UNA (RHK/AJB).,4:05–CV–916–UNA (RHK/AJB). |
Citation | 783 F.Supp.2d 1079 |
Parties | Abu Bakr LADD, Plaintiff,v.Jeffrey PICKERING, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Anser Ahmad, Ahmad Law Offices, P.C., Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.Dana C. Ceresia, Missouri Attorney General's Office, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on (1) Defendant Jeffrey Pickering's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law After Judgment on the Verdict or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial (Doc. No. 226), and (2) Plaintiff Abu Bakr Ladd's Motion for an Award of Reasonable Attorney's Fees, Litigation Costs, Expenses and Interest (Doc. No. 224). For the reasons set forth below, Pickering's Motion will be denied and Ladd's Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
The background in this case has been set forth extensively in the Court's prior opinions and will not be repeated here; familiarity with those opinions is assumed. See, e.g., Ladd v. Pickering, No. 4:05–CV–916, 2010 WL 3892139 (E.D.Mo. Sept. 29, 2010). Following the denial of Pickering's Motion for Summary Judgment, trial before the undersigned and a jury took place between December 3, 2010, and December 8, 2010. The jury awarded Ladd $5,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages, having determined that Pickering had lied in the search-warrant affidavit at the heart of this case. On December 10, 2010, the Court adopted the jury's verdicts, and the Judgment was entered that same day.
Pickering now moves for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the jury did not have “a legally sufficient evidentiary basis from which to conclude that [the] search warrant was unlawful.” (Def. Mem. at 3.) He also argues, in the alternative, entitlement to a new trial due to several evidentiary errors allegedly committed by the Court and a “flawed” verdict form. ( Id. at 3–9.) Ladd has moved for an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. (Doc. No. 224.) The Court addresses these Motions in turn.
Pickering first argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law for “the reasons set forth more fully in [his] motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence and the close of all evidence.” (Def. Mem. at 3.) That earlier Motion asserted that Ladd had “failed to provide sufficient evidence showing that Pickering's statements” in the search-warrant affidavit were “deliberately false,” because he offered nothing more than “inconsistent testimony as to his whereabouts on September 19, 2003 and testimony regarding the amount of traffic in and out of his house.” (Doc. No. 212 at 1–2.) The Court orally denied the earlier Motion, and it perceives no reason to reach a different result here.
Suffice it to say, Pickering grossly mischaracterizes the evidence presented at trial. Most notably, he overlooks that Ladd expressly and unambiguously testified that several of the matters described in the search-warrant affidavit were untrue. ( See, e.g., Trial Tr. Vol. I at 83 () ; id. at 85 ( ); id. at 87 ( ); id. at 88 () ; id. at 92 () ; id. at 93 ( ).) This testimony alone is sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. Moreover, as the Court previously noted when denying Pickering's Motion for Summary Judgment, other evidence supports the jury's conclusion that Pickering lied about the confidential informant, including the “sketchy” facts described in the search-warrant affidavit and that the affidavit was internally inconsistent. See 2010 WL 3892139, at *6.
“A grant of judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict is appropriate only when the evidence is entirely insufficient to support the verdict.” Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 727 (8th Cir.2003) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such a motion can be granted only if “all of the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inference sustaining” the non-movant's claims. Manus v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 314 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.2003) (emphasis added). This “high standard” is designed to prevent courts from usurping the jury's function in assessing credibility and determining what inferences are to be drawn from the evidence. Garcia, 348 F.3d at 727; Fogelbach v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 270 F.3d 696, 702 (8th Cir.2001). Those concerns are particularly heightened in a case such as this, which was, in essence, a “he said, she said” case.
The evidence recited above provided ample support for the jury's verdict. The Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law will be denied.
Pickering argues in the alternative that the Court's “erroneous” evidentiary rulings and “flawed” verdict form entitle him to a new trial. A new trial on the basis of evidentiary errors is warranted only when those errors were so prejudicial that a new trial, absent the errors, “would be likely to produce a different result.” Pointer v. DART, 417 F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir.2005) (citation omitted); see also Fed.R.Evid. 103(a). Moreover, “[n]o error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence ... is ground for granting a new trial ... unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” Harris v. Chand, 506 F.3d 1135, 1138 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting McPheeters v. Black & Veatch Corp., 427 F.3d 1095, 1100 (8th Cir.2005)); accord Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. As for the allegedly “flawed” verdict form, a new trial is warranted only if the form failed to “fairly and adequately submit[ ] the issues in the case to the jury.” Gasper v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 270 F.3d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir.2001).
After careful consideration, and for the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that no evidentiary errors were committed and the case was properly submitted to the jury.
Pickering first argues that the Court erred in permitting Ladd to testify about his conversations with FBI agent Luke Adler following his arrest. In those conversations, Adler inquired about certain of Ladd's financial transactions and then asked him to work for the FBI as an informant on the Muslim community. (Trial Tr. Vol. I at 119–20.) Pickering argues that Ladd's conversations with Adler were hearsay, but the Court concludes otherwise.
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). A “statement,” in turn, is “an oral or written assertion.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(a) (emphasis added). These definitions lay bare the flaw in Pickering's argument. He complains that Ladd “testified that Adler inquired about certain business transactions, including a receipt of $57,000 from Harris Place, LLC, and that Adler asked him if he would be willing to infiltrate the Islamic Center and serve as an informant.” (Def. Mem. at 4 (emphases added).) The transcript confirms Ladd's testimony. (Trial Tr. Vol. I at 120 () (emphases added).) But questions are not “statements,” because they are not “assertions.” Hence, they necessarily fall outside Rule 801's definition of hearsay. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 330 (3rd Cir.2005) () (internal quotation marks omitted); Quartararo v. Hanslmaier, 186 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir.1999) () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir.1990) (); United States v. Honken, 381 F.Supp.2d 936, 1000 (N.D.Iowa 2005) (collecting cases). Moreover, because questions “are neither true nor false,” the challenged testimony cannot have been offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Servants of Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F.Supp. 1560, 1567 (D.N.M.1994); accord, e.g., United States v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319, 1330 (1st Cir.1988).
Simply put, there was no hearsay error.
Pickering next argues that the Court erred in permitting the jury to learn that the criminal charge against Ladd had been dismissed. Courts have reached different conclusions whether the dismissal of a criminal charge is admissible in a subsequent Section–1983 action arising out of or connected with that charge. Compare, e.g., Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th...
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