Ladewig, Matter of
| Court | Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | BURMAN |
| Citation | Ladewig, Matter of, 340 N.E.2d 150, 34 Ill.App.3d 393 (Ill. App. 1975) |
| Decision Date | 26 November 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 61447,61447 |
| Parties | In the Matter of William LADEWIG, a minor. PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Ann E. LADEWIG, Respondent-Appellant. |
Bruce L. Levin, Chicago, for respondent-appellant.
Bernard Carey, State's Atty., County of Cook, for petitioner-appellee (Laurence J. Bolon, Linda Ann Miller, Kevin Sweeney, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel).
The instant appeal stems from a juvenile court proceeding that was brought to empower a court-appointed guardian to consent to the adoption of a minor, one William Ladewig. The trial court found Ann E. Ladewig, the minor's natural mother, to be 'unfit' within the purview of the Illinois Adoption Act for her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in her welfare (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 4, par. 9.1--1( D)(b)) and for her lack of reasonable progress in seeking the return of her child within the time period sanctioned by statute. (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 4, par. 9.1--1(D)(l)). The court also terminated Mrs. Ladewig's parental rights and appointed a guardian with the authority to consent to the legal adoption of her son.
On appeal, Mrs. Ladewig contends that the two statutory grounds under which she was adjudicated 'unfit' are unconstitutional in that (1) Section 9.1--1(D) (b) of the Adoption Act violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution because of its vagueness and failure to adequately specify the conduct which it prohibits and (2) Section 9.1--1(D)(l) was applied retroactively in violation of the ex post facto laws contained in article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution. As a third basis of appeal, she posits that the evidence adduced at trial was insignificant to support a finding that she was 'unfit' within the meaning of either of the two statutory grounds specified in the amended petition.
A review of the record indicates that seven weeks after William Ladewig was born, he was removed from his mother's custody since the boy's father was in jail on armed robbery charges and his mother was involved in an automobile accident which caused her to be hospitalized for almost two months. Subsequent to Mrs. Ladewig's departure from the hospital, a petition was filed in January, 1970, alleging neglect by the child's parents and that the best interests of the minor required that he be declared a ward of the court. After proper service was given to the parents, the court found on April 2, 1970, that William Ladewig was a neglected minor and placed him under state guardianship. In that same month, he was placed in the foster home of Mr. and Mrs. Walter Wassinger, the aunt and uncle of the child's godfather. Since the child was placed in their home, the Wassingers have cared for and supported him.
On December 12, 1973, a petition for supplemental relief was filed by the Department of Children and Family Services which sought the appointment of a guardian who had the power to consent to the adoption of the child in question. The rationale behind this petition, which was amended on January 31, 1974, was that the minor's parents were 'unfit' under the Illinois Adoption Act in that they failed to (1) 'maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to (their) child's welfare' (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 4, par. 9.1--1(D)(b)) and (2) 'make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to * * * (their custody) within twenty-four months after an adjudication of neglect under Sec. 2--4 of the Juvenile Court Act.' (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 4, par. 9.1--1(D)(l)). Since this petition was contested only by Mrs. Ladewig, the court found Mr. Ladewing 'unfit' by default.
At the trial, the State presented evidence from two social workers, the foster mother, the child and from Mrs. Ladewig herself, who was called as an adverse witness, pertaining to the infrequency of visitation between Mrs. Ladewig and her son during the years 1971 through 1973. Robert Johnson was called by the defense and testified that he intended to marry Mrs. Ladewig after she procured a divorce. Both Johnson and Mrs. Ladewig indicated that they were financially and emotionally prepared to provide a suitable home for the child. At the conclusion of all the testimony, the trial court ordered an examination of Mrs. Ladewig by a court psychiatrist. After obtaining the report, the trial court summarized it as follows:
The trial court then concluded that Mrs. Ladewig was unfit in light of both grounds specified in the petition. The Department of Children and Family Services, through the guardianship administrator, Richard I. Laymon, was appointed guardian with the right to consent to adoption.
With reference to the constitutional challenges proffered by Mrs. Ladewig, we initially emphasize that it is well settled in Illinois that issues of constitutionality of a statute are properly preserved for review only when they have been raised in and passed upon by the trial court. (E.g., People v. Amerman, 50 Ill.2d 196, 197, 279 N.E.2d 353, 354; Department of Public Works v. Schon, 42 Ill.2d 537, 538, 250 N.E.2d 135, 136). This judicial precept has recently been invoked to resolve a challenge of constitutional dimensions to the Adoption Act, where, as in the instant case, Section 9.1--1(D)(b) was castigated as being vague. (In re Einbinder, 31 Ill.App.3d 133, 136, 334 N.E.2d 187, 189). Therefore, since Mrs. Ladewig failed to raise the instant constitutional arguments in the trial court, she thereby waived them on appeal.
Assuming arguendo that Mrs. Ladewing preserved the right to proffer such constitutional issues, we nevertheless believe that the respective two sections of the Adoption Act do not suffer the same infirmities as so contended. Concerning the due process attack of Section 9.1--1(D)(b), it is argued that the language of this legislative enactment does not provide adequate warning to parents as to the type of conduct prescribed by law in order to enable them to avoid the effect of the law. While Mrs. Ladewig argues that the only evidence of 'unfitness' on her part pertained to the number of visits she had with her son, she emphasizes that Section 9.1--1(D)(b) neither specifies whether visitation is the criterion in determining fitness nor delineates the number of visits that would evince a parent's reasonable degree of 'interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. While due process of law requires that a statute shall not be vague, indefinite or uncertain, (People v. Tibbitts, 56 Ill.2d 56, 59, 305 N.E.2d 152, 155; People v. Simpson, 24 Ill.App.3d 835, 840, 321 N.E.2d 464, 467), both the United States and Illinois Supreme Courts have indicated that this constitutional tenet does not require that a statute be more specific than is possible under the circumstances. (See, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886; Wadlington v. Mindes, 45 Ill.2d 447, 457--58, 259 N.E.2d 257, 263--64). Moreover, both courts have enunciated that a statute is vague and thereby violates due process of law when men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. (E.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377; People v. Palkes, 52 Ill.2d 472, 475, 288 N.E.2d 469, 471; Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Adamowski, 22 Ill.2d 36, 43--44, 174 N.E.2d 200, 204).
Applying the above-mentioned judicial precepts to the case at bar, we believe that Section 9.1--1(D)(b) is valid and does not violate due process. As pointed out in the State's brief, the adoption laws of Illinois are not unique but somewhat analogous to those enacted in each of the other forty-time states. Except for...
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In re JB
...does not amount to an absolute vested right." S.W., 315 Ill.App.3d at 1156, 249 Ill.Dec. 102, 735 N.E.2d 706; In re Ladewig, 34 Ill.App.3d 393, 398, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975). Section 1(D) is a list of statutory grounds that will support a finding of parental unfitness; it is not a list of pare......
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In re JA
...right or interest in his children does not constitute an absolute vested property right, as established in In re Ladewig, 34 Ill.App.3d 393, 398, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975). However, Rosado claims that the application of the amended version of subsection (i) to this case would deprive him of his......
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In re EC
...102, 735 N.E.2d 706 (2000); In re Sheltanya S., 309 Ill.App.3d 941, 950, 243 Ill.Dec. 441, 723 N.E.2d 744 (1999); In re Ladewig, 34 Ill.App.3d 393, 398, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975). In In re S.W., the respondent father contended that because section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act was added to the st......
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Lewis, In Interest of
...v. Burns and Roe, 536 F.2d 251, 254 (8th Cir. 1976); In re T.,9 Cal.App.3d 815, 88 Cal.Rptr. 418, 419 (1970); Matter of Ladewig, 34 Ill.App.3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150, 153 (1975); 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law, § 552. Despite the fact § 232.41 is not a crime-related enactment, the termination......