Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. McAleenan

Decision Date02 August 2019
Docket NumberCase No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC
PartiesAL OTRO LADO, INC.; ABIGAIL DOE, BEATRICE DOE, CAROLINA DOE, DINORA DOE, INGRID DOE, ROBERTO DOE, MARIA DOE, JUAN DOE, ÚRSULA DOE, VICTORIA DOE, BIANCA DOE, EMILIANA DOE, AND CÉSAR DOE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. KEVIN MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California


In this case, Organizational Plaintiff Al Otro Lado, Inc. ("Al Otro Lado"), an organization that helps individuals seek asylum in the United States, and thirteen Individual PlaintiffsAbigail Doe, Beatrice Doe, Carolina Doe, Dinora Doe, Ingrid Doe, Roberto Doe, Maria Doe, Juan Doe, Úrsula Doe, Victoria Doe, Bianca Doe, Emiliana Doe, and César Doe—challenge conduct that they allege is "designed toserve the Trump [A]dministration's broader, publicly proclaimed goal of deterring individuals from seeking access to the asylum process." (ECF No. 189 Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶ 4.) According to Plaintiffs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") officials "have systematically restricted the number of asylum seekers who can access the U.S. asylum process through POEs along the U.S.-Mexico border." (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiffs seek to hold various Defendant federal officials2 that have authority over immigration enforcement liable in their official capacities for an alleged pattern or practice by CBP officers of denying asylum seekers at ports of entry ("POEs") along the U.S.-Mexico border access to the U.S. asylum process, and an alleged formalized policy designed for the same end, which Plaintiffs refer to as the Turnback Policy.

In the months following the Court's grant in part and denial in part of Defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint, see Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (S.D. Cal. 2018), Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). Like the original complaint, Plaintiffs allege in the SAC that since late 2016 there is an alleged pattern and practice amongst CBP officials at POEs along the U.S-Mexico border to "deny[] asylum seekers access to the asylum process" "through a variety of illegal tactics." (SAC ¶ 2.) Five original Individual PlaintiffsPlaintiffs Abigail Doe, Beatrice Doe, Carolina Doe, Dinora Doe, and Ingrid Doe (the "Original Individual Plaintiffs")—once more allege thatthey were subjected to these tactics when CBP officials denied them access to the U.S. asylum process at various POEs.3 Unlike the original complaint, the SAC now alleges that as early as 2016, Defendants were implementing a policy to restrict the flow of asylum seekers at the San Ysidro POE. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants formalized this policy in spring 2018 in the form of the border-wide Turnback Policy, an alleged "formal policy to restrict access to the asylum process at POEs by mandating that lower-level officials directly or constructively turn back asylum seekers at the border," including through pretextual assertions that POEs lack capacity to process asylum seekers. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 48-83.) Eight new Individual PlaintiffsRoberto Doe, Maria Doe, Juan and Úrsula Doe, Victoria Doe, Bianca Doe, Emiliana Doe, and César Doe (the "New Individual Plaintiffs")—have joined this lawsuit, alleging that they were subjected to this Turnback Policy. Both the illegal tactics and the alleged Turnback Policy have resulted in many asylum seekers, particularly those from Central America, who present themselves at POEs along the U.S.-Mexico border being "turned back by" and "at the instruction of" CBP officials. (Id. ¶ 58.)

Based on the conduct alleged, Plaintiffs press claims for violations of various Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") provisions, which Plaintiffs call "the U.S. asylum process." In connection with the alleged INA violations, Plaintiffs assert claims under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), 706(2), and claims directly under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause for alleged procedural due process violations. All Plaintiffs further assert claims under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, on the ground that the allegedconduct violates a duty of non-refoulement, which Plaintiffs contend is an international law norm that "forbids a country from returning or expelling an individual to a country where he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution and/or torture[.]" Defendants move to dismiss the SAC under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 192, 238.) Plaintiffs oppose. (ECF No. 210.) The parties presented oral argument to the Court. (ECF No. 259; ECF No. 260, Hr'g Tr.) In addition to the parties' submissions, six amicus briefs have been submitted with the Court's permission. (ECF Nos. 215, 216, 219, 221, 223.)4

For the reasons herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to dismiss the SAC.

I. Statutory and Regulatory Background

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) is this case's statutory bedrock. It provides that:

Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United Statesafter having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or. . . section 1225(b)[.]
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).

This case turns on the Section 1225(b) asylum procedure that Section 1158 incorporates. Section 1225 sets forth, in relevant part, certain inspection duties of immigration officers, which undergird additional specific duties that arise when certain aliens express an intent to seek asylum in the United States or a fear of persecution.

Section 1225(a) establishes the general inspection duty: "[a]ll aliens . . . who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission . . . to . . . the United States shall be inspected by immigration officers." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). In language that echoes Section 1158(a)(1), Section 1225(a) defines as an "applicant for admission" "[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). An implementing regulation more broadly defines "arriving alien" as "an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United States waters and brought into the United States by any means, whether or not to a designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the means of transport." 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. By regulation, "application to lawfully enter the United States shall be made in person to an immigration officer at a U.S. port-of-entry when the port is open for inspection, or as otherwise" provided. 8 C.F.R. § 231.1(a).

Section 1225(b) sets forth two sets of procedures that apply to aliens "arrivingin the United States." First, pursuant to the procedure under Section 1225(b)(1), an arriving alien may be summarily "removed from the United States without further hearing or review" "if an immigration officer determines" that the alien "is inadmissible" for making certain fraudulent or misleading representations or for not having valid entry or travel documents. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing, inter alia, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)). Section 1225(b)(1)'s removal mandate, however, does not apply if "the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 [] or a fear of persecution." Id. Instead, "[i]f the immigration officer determines that an alien" is "inadmissible" for making certain fraudulent or misleading representations or for not having valid entry or travel documents "and the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 [] or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). An implementing regulation governing this expedited removal procedure imposes an analogous obligation. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4). In these circumstances, the immigration officer must refer the alien to an "asylum officer," who is statutorily required to be "an immigration officer who has had professional training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques comparable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of applications under section 1158 of this title," and "is supervised by an officer who," inter alia, "has had substantial experience adjudicating asylum applications." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(E).

In contrast with the Section 1225(b)(1) procedure, Section 1225(b)(2) establishes the procedure for "inspection of other aliens." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). "Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission," the alien "shall be detained for a proceeding under [8 U.S.C. §] 1229a" (the general "removal proceedings" provision) "if the examining immigration officerdetermines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Subparagraph (C) provides that "in the case of an alien described in subparagraph (A) who is arriving on land . . . from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States, the Attorney General may return the alien to that territory pending a proceeding under section 1229a[.]" 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT