Al Otro Lado. v. Mayorkas
| Decision Date | 05 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 17-cv-2366-BAS-KSC |
| Parties | AL OTRO LADO, INC.; ABIGAIL DOE, BEATRICE DOE, CAROLINA DOE, DINORA DOE, INGRID DOE, URSULA DOE, JOSE DOE, ROBERTO DOE, MARIA DOE, JUAN DOE, VICTORIA DOE, BIANCA DOE, EMILIANA DOE, AND CESAR DOE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in his official capacity; CHRIS MAGNUS Commissioner, U.S. Customs and B Protection, in his official capacity; PETE FLORES, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, in his official capacity, Defendants.[1] |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Hon Cynthia Bashant United States District Judge In its September 2, 2021 decision, this Court held the right to access the U.S. asylum process conferred vis a vis § 1158(a)(1) applies extraterritorially to noncitizens who are arriving at Class A POEs along the U.S.-Mexico border, but who are not yet within the jurisdiction of the United States and is of a constitutional dimension. It further held that Defendants' systematic turnbacks of asylum seekers arriving at Class A POEs (the “Turnback Policy”) amounted to an unlawful withholding by immigration officials of their mandatory ministerial “inspection and referral duties” detailed in 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“§ 1225”), in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) et seq., and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. (MSJ Opinion at 33-34, 37-38); see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(3) (), 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (mapping out immigration officials' duty to refer asylum seekers to the U.S-asylum process).
In casting appropriate equitable relief to rectify the irreparable injury Defendants' unauthorized and constitutionally violative Turnback Policy has inflicted upon members of the Plaintiff class,[2] this Court ordinarily would be guided by the fundamental principle that an equitable remedy should be commensurate with the violations it is designed to vindicate. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979) (). Equitable relief should leave no stone unturned: it should correct entirely the violations it is aimed at vindicating. That cornerstone of Article III courts' equitable powers generally is unfaltering, whether the party against whom an injunction is sought is a private entity, a state actor, or, as here, a federal official. Thus, in the ordinary course of things, this Court would not hesitate to issue broad, programmatic relief enjoining Defendants from now, or in the future, turning back asylum seekers in the process of arriving at Class A POEs, absent a valid statutory basis for doing so.
Yet the circumstances with which this Court is presented are not ordinary because of the extraordinary, intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S.Ct. 2057 (2022). That decision takes a sledgehammer to the premise that immigration enforcement agencies are bound to implement their mandatory ministerial duties prescribed by Congress, including their obligation to inspect and refer arriving noncitizens for asylum, and that, when immigration enforcement agencies deviate from those duties, lower courts have authority to issue equitable relief to enjoin the resulting violations. It does so through unprecedented expansion of a provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1989 (“IIRIRA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) et seq. (“§ 1252(f)(1)”), which for years the Ninth Circuit has interpreted as placing a relatively narrow limit on injunctive relief. In essence, Aleman Gonzalez holds that § 1252(f)(1) prohibits lower courts from issuing class-wide injunctions that “require officials to take actions that (in the Government's view) are not required” by certain removal statutes, including § 1225, or “to refrain from actions that (again in the Government's view) are allowed” by those same provisions. Id., 142 S.Ct. at 2065. Federal courts (except for the Supreme Court) now may only issue injunctions enjoining federal officials' unauthorized implementation of the removal statutes in the individual cases of noncitizens against whom removal proceedings have been initiated. See id.
In no uncertain terms, the logical extension of Aleman Gonzalez appears to bestow immigration enforcement agencies carte blanche to implement immigration enforcement policies that clearly are unauthorized by the statutes under which they operate because the Government need only claim authority to implement to immunize itself from the federal judiciary's oversight.
With acknowledgment that its decision will further contribute to the human suffering of asylum seekers enduring squalid and dangerous conditions in Mexican border communities as they await entry to POEs, this Court finds the shadow of Aleman Gonzalez inescapable in this case. Even the most narrow, meaningful equitable relief would have the effect of interfering with the “operation” of § 1225, as that term is construed by the Aleman Gonzalez Court, and, thus, would clash with § 1252(f)(1)'s remedy bar. Aleman Gonzalez not only renders uneconomical vindication of Plaintiff class members' statutorily- and constitutionally-protected right to apply for asylum, those inefficiencies inevitably will lead to innumerable instances in which Plaintiff class members will be unable to vindicate their rights at all. Thus, while the majority and dissent in Aleman Gonzalez hash out their textual disagreements concerning § 1252(f)(1)'s scope in terms of remedies, make no mistake, Aleman Gonzalez leaves largely unrestrained immigration enforcement agencies to rapaciously scale back rights. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1633, 1634 (2004) ( .
Although it is no substitute for a permanent injunction, class-wide declaratory relief is both available and warranted here. In lieu of even a circumscribed injunction enjoining Defendants from again implementing a policy under which they turn back asylum seekers presenting themselves at POEs along the U.S.-Mexico border, the Court enters a declaration in accordance with its MSJ Opinion that turning back asylum seekers constitutes both an unlawful withholding of Defendants' mandatory ministerial inspection and referral duties under § 1158 and § 1225 in violation of both the APA and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The Court also issues relief as necessary to named Plaintiff Beatrice Doe.
On September 2, 2022, this Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their APA and Fifth Amendment claims.[4] (See generally MSJ Op.) Specifically, this Court found that Defendants' implementation of the Turnback Policy withheld their mandatory ministerial duties to inspect and refer asylum seekers who present themselves at Class A POEs along the U.S.-Mexico border, but who are not yet within the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of Section 706(1) of the APA.[5] (See id. at 34.) This Court further found that, because Defendants' withholding of inspection and referral duties infringed upon the Plaintiff class's right to access the U.S.-asylum process secured by § 1158(a)(1), and because the Plaintiff class's Fifth Amendment due process rights are coextensive with that statute, the Turnback Policy also violates the Fifth Amendment. (Id. at 37-38.)
The Court asked the parties to weigh in on what equitable relief these statutory and constitutional violations warrant. (Id. at 44.) The parties contemporaneously filed briefs in accordance with the MSJ Opinion on October 1, 2021. (See Pls.' Remedies Br., ECF No. 768; Defs.' Remedies Br., ECF No. 770.) Plaintiffs additionally filed a Proposed Order listing the injunctive, oversight, and declaratory relief they believe is appropriate to rectify Defendants' systemic violations. (See Proposed Order, ECF No. 773-4.) On October 22, 2021, Defendants sought leave to file essentially a sur-reply, which addresses the purported overbreadth of Plaintiffs' proposed class-wide injunctions.[6] (See Mot. for Leave to File Sur-Reply, ECF No. 773; Defs.' Sur-Reply, ECF No. 773-2.)
Several requests for relief Plaintiffs proffer are not in dispute. The parties agree Plaintiffs are entitled under the APA to vacatur of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)'s Metering Guidance and Prioritization-Based Que Management (“PBQM”) Memorandum and the Office of Field Operations' Metering Guidance Memorandum, both of which served to formalize Defendants' Turnback Policy in approximately 2018. (See Proposed Order ¶ 5; Defs.' Remedies Br. at 6-8 ().)
Furthermore, Defendants do not appear to oppose entry of an order restoring the status quo ante for named Plaintiffs Roberto Doe and Beatrice Doe, including requiring Defendants to issue any necessary travel documents to allow them to travel to the United States and to ensure their processing for asylum upon arrival. (See Proposed Order ¶ 7.)
Finally Defendants appear to welcome Plaintiffs' request for entry of a declaratory judgment giving legal effect to the MSJ Opinion's conclusion that §...
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