De Ladson v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 16 April 1919
• Citation: De Ladson v. Crawford, 93 Conn. 402, 106 A. 326 (Conn. 1919)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: DE LADSON v. CRAWFORD. CARTWRIGHT et al. v. SAME.

106 A. 326

93 Conn. 402

DE LADSON v. CRAWFORD.

CARTWRIGHT et al. v. SAME.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 16, 1919

Case Reserved from Superior Court, New Haven County; Howard J Curtis, Judge.

In the matter of the accounting of George W. Crawford, trustee of two separate trusts created by the will of Ella De Ladson. From orders of the probate court approving two separate accounts, Mary F. Cartwright and Edward S. De Ladson appeal. Reserved for advice of Supreme Court on agreed statement of facts. Superior court advised to affirm decrees.

These are two appeals from decrees of probate dated November 20 1918, approving and allowing two separate accounts presented by George W. Crawford as trustee of two separate trusts created by the will of Ella De Ladson of New Haven, who died in 1916. The two appeals were tried together in the superior court and argued together in this court and present identical questions of law. The clauses of the will creating these trusts are as follows:

" 11. I give, devise and bequeath to William F. Alcorn of New Haven, Connecticut, $1,500 to hold the same in trust however, for the term of ten years from the date of my death and to pay the income thereof to my niece Mary Scott, also known as Mary Cartwright, now or formerly of 143 W. 132d street, New York City, and at the expiration of said ten years to pay over to said Mary Scott, also known as Mary Cartwright, the said sum of $1,500."

" 15. All the rest and residue of my estate, both real and personal of whatever nature and description and wheresoever located, including all mortgages owned by me, I give, devise and bequeath to William F. Alcorn, of New Haven, Connecticut, to hold the same in trust, however, for a period of ten years, and to pay the income thereof to my husband, Edward S. De Ladson, and at the expiration of said period of ten years to turn over to my said husband all said rest and residue of my estate then remaining in said trustee's hands."

On June 24, 1918, Mr. Alcorn was removed as trustee on account of his absence in the military service of the United States in France, and the present trustee was appointed and qualified in his place. The estate was settled, and on November 15, 1918, the trustee presented his first accounts under the trusts in question showing in each case that he had on hand the principal of the trust fund, intact save for the premium upon the trustee's bond. Each of these appeals rests on the same ground; that the decree allowing and approving the trustee's account is erroneous because the appellant is by the terms of the will the sole and absolute owner of the fund, because the trust attempted to be created is a dry or naked trust, because the attempted trust constitutes an illegal and invalid restriction upon the appellant's power of alienation of his property, and because appellant is entitled to an order directing the trustee to turn over all the principal and interest of the trust funds, less necessary expenses, to the appellant.

A probate court may construe a testamentary trust so far as is necessary to enforce the execution of it, but it may not construe a trust to ascertain whether it is void or whether it should be terminated, for it has no express power to declare testamentary trusts void or to terminate them.

Charles E. Clark, of New Haven, for appellants.

George W. Crawford, of New Haven, pro se.

BEACH J.

Although in form appeals from decrees allowing the accounts of the trustee, these appeals are in substance applications to have the trusts terminated, and the first question which suggests itself is whether the probate court, or the superior court sitting as a probate court of appeals, has jurisdiction to terminate testamentary trusts which by the terms of the will have still ten years to run. The jurisdiction of probate courts over testamentary trusts is very limited, exclusively statutory, and largely of recent origin. The history of the statutes on this subject down to 1877 may be found in Prindle v. Holcomb, 45 Conn. 111, 121. Since then, by chapter 36, 1881, probate courts were given power to call testamentary trustees to account and to make orders necessary and proper to secure the due enforcement of such trusts. This authority apparently included final as well as intermediate accounts, for it makes no distinction between them. None the less the revised probate law of 1885 mentions only annual accounts, and for that reason the jurisdiction remained limited to the settlement of annual accounts of testamentary trustees until it was extended by chapter 125 of 1911, now 5045, G. S. 1918, to final accounts also. The express authority to settle accounts of testamentary trustees and to make orders necessary and proper for the due execution of such trusts carries with it implied power to do what is necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction expressly conferred. Chamberlin's Appeal, 70 Conn. 363, 378, 39 A. 734, 41 L.R.A. 204. Beyond that the probate jurisdiction over testamentary trusts does not go. A probate court may construe such a trust so far as is necessary to enforce the execution of it, but it may not construe a trust to ascertain whether it is void or whether it should be terminated, for it has no express power to declare testamentary trusts void or to terminate them. Possibly a trust may be so hopelessly illegal or unintelligible as to be incapable of enforcement; but if any reasonable basis of fact or law exists for a claim, made in good faith, that the trust is valid, the duty of the probate court is to exercise its limited statutory authority of enforcing the execution of the trust, and leave the contestant to pursue his remedy in a court of chancery. Chamberlin's Appeal, supra, 70 Conn. p. 379, 39 A. 734, 41 L.R.A. 204. In this case neither the probate court, nor the superior court as a probate court of appeal had jurisdiction to disallow these accounts on the ground that the trusts were invalid; and for that reason alone we should be compelled to advise the superior court to affirm the decrees of probate.

In the interest of the parties and to avoid further litigation on the subject, we also discuss the questions argued before us. The rule relied on by appellants is stated in Gray on Perpetuities (3d Ed.) par. 120. In substance, it is that, when a person is entitled absolutely to property, a provision postponing its transfer or payment to him is void. That, if there is a gift over in case the cestui que trust dies before the trust terminates, the trustee retains the property for the possible benefit of the substitutionary donee, but to postpone an absolute gift to A. by interposing a trust to pay the income to A. for a term of years, is void " in pursuance of the general doctrine that it is against public policy to restrain a man in the use or disposition of property in which no one but himself has any interest."

It is not easy to find a satisfactory legal basis for this rule in the form in which Prof. Gray states it. Lord Eldon's statement of the rule in Brandon v Robinson, 18 Ves. 433, that, " if property is given to a man for life, the donor cannot take away the incidents of a life estate," is self-explanatory; although the rule is not without exceptions in this state. Clark v. Baker, 91 Conn. 663, and cases cited on page 666, 101 A. 9. Most of the English cases to which we have been referred, including Gosling v. Gosling, Johns. 265, which was especially relied on, exemplify the simpler rule that a...