LaDuke v. Burlington Northern R. Co., No. 88-3121

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and RIPPLE; RIPPLE
• Citation: 879 F.2d 1556
• Parties: James R. LaDUKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 88-3121
• Decision Date: 20 July 1989

Page 1556

879 F.2d 1556 James R. LaDUKE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. No. 88-3121. United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit. Argued April 7, 1989.
Decided July 20, 1989.

John B. McCarthy, Don C. Aldrich, Yaeger & Yaeger, Minneapolis, Minn., Frank

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R. Christian, Chicago, Ill., for James R. LaDuke.

John Newell, Wysoglad & Associates, Chicago, Ill., for Burlington Northern R. Co.

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

James R. LaDuke filed a negligence claim against the Burlington Northern Railroad Co. (Burlington Northern) under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. Secs. 51-60, in the Circuit Court of Peoria County, Illinois on April 25, 1988. Burlington Northern filed a motion to dismiss or transfer the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. Then, on June 6, 1988, Mr. LaDuke filed this action raising the identical claim in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court, relying on the "exceptional-circumstances test" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), declined to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. LaDuke's federal claim and dismissed the action. We affirm the judgment of the district court with modification. The district court properly decided not to exercise jurisdiction over this action, but Mr. LaDuke's federal action should have been stayed rather than dismissed.

I.

Background

Mr. LaDuke is a resident of the city of Galesburg in Knox County, Illinois and is employed as a locomotive fireman/engineer for Burlington Northern. On May 6, 1985, Mr. LaDuke was working in Burlington Northern's facility at the Union Depot Station in Chicago. ¹ He slipped in a pool of oil while repairing a locomotive and injured his back and shoulder. Burlington Northern's records show that Mr. LaDuke was treated for his injuries by two doctors in Galesburg. In addition, he underwent diagnostic radiology treatments at Galesburg Cottage Hospital and received physical therapy at Galesburg Orthopedic Services. ²

Although Mr. LaDuke was treated for his injuries in Galesburg and the incident underlying his claim occurred in Chicago, Mr. LaDuke chose to file his first FELA claim in Illinois state court in Peoria. In response, Burlington Northern filed a motion to dismiss or transfer the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. The railroad asserted that Peoria had virtually no contact with the FELA claim and suggested Knox County (where Mr. LaDuke resides and most of his medical treatment was administered), Kane County (where Aurora is located), or Chicago as more appropriate alternative forums. R. 12, Ex. B at 2.

Burlington Northern's forum non conveniens motion was argued before Judge Courson of the Peoria County Circuit Court on June 16, 1988, three days after Mr. LaDuke had filed this second identical FELA claim in federal district court in Chicago. Judge Courson did not rule on Burlington Northern's motion on the ground that this action was pending in federal court. However, he explained orally that, if the district court declined to exercise its

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jurisdiction, he would transfer the state case from Peoria County to the more appropriate forum of Knox County. See R. 12 at 2.

Burlington Northern then filed a motion in the district court seeking dismissal of the federal action due to the pendency of the identical action in state court and because the federal action was time barred under the applicable statute of limitations. ³ The district court noted that several factors weighed in favor of dismissing the action: 1) the state court action was filed before the federal action; 2) there was a real possibility of piecemeal litigation; 3) simultaneous litigation in state and federal court would inconvenience both parties; and 4) the state courts could protect adequately Mr. LaDuke's rights. See LaDuke v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., No. 88 C 5094, mem. op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1988); R. 20 at 3 [hereinafter Mem. op.]. In an effort to reduce the impact of these factors, Mr. LaDuke's counsel represented to the district court that the state-court action would be dismissed as soon as the district court exercised jurisdiction over the claim and Burlington Northern answered the complaint. ⁴ In order for the district court to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. LaDuke's claim, however, it would have to determine whether Mr. LaDuke's federal action was time barred and whether venue was appropriate in the Northern District of Illinois. Because addressing these issues would only exacerbate the problem of piecemeal litigation and defeat the purposes of the Colorado River doctrine, the district court dismissed Mr. LaDuke's federal action. Mr. LaDuke's state-court action was then transferred from Peoria to the Knox County Circuit Court in Galesburg. See Appellant's Br. at 10.

II.

Analysis

A. Colorado River Doctrine

The "exceptional-circumstances test" established by the Supreme Court in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-21, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246-48, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), permits a district court to dismiss or stay an action when there is an ongoing parallel action in state court. As the Court explained in Colorado River, the principles underlying this doctrine "rest on considerations of '[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.' " 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. at 1246 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183, 72 S.Ct. 219, 221, 96 L.Ed. 200 (1952)). Because federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them," the mere fact that an action is pending in state court ordinarily is no bar to parallel federal proceedings. Id.; see also Rosser v. Chrysler Corp., 864 F.2d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir.1988) (surrender of jurisdiction not justified merely because a parallel state action exists); Evans Transp. Co v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 717 (7th Cir.1982) (same). Thus, the surrender of jurisdiction in deference to parallel state proceedings for reasons of "wise judicial administration" is warranted only under "limited" and "exceptional" circumstances. Id. at 818. As we explained in Lumen Construction, Inc. v. Brant Construction Co., 780 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir.1985), "a federal court cannot lightly abjure its responsibility to assert jurisdiction." Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that "[o]nly the clearest of justifications" will allow a federal court to surrender jurisdiction because of parallel state-court litigation. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at

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819, 96 S.Ct. at 1247; see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16, 25-26, 103 S.Ct. 927, 942, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). See generally New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2513, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 108 S.Ct. 523, 530, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2327, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984).

Before the Colorado River doctrine can be applied, the district court must first determine whether the concurrent state and federal actions are actually parallel. See Day v. Union Mines Inc., 862 F.2d 652, 655 (7th Cir.1988); Interstate Material Corp. v. City of Chicago, 847 F.2d 1285, 1287 (7th Cir.1988). Suits are " ' "parallel" when substantially the same parties are contemporaneously litigating substantially the same issues in another forum.' " Id. at 1288 (quoting Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1229 n. 1 (7th Cir.1979)). There is no dispute that the actions involved in this case are clearly parallel under this standard, since the parties and the claims in the federal action are identical in all respects to those in the pending state action. ⁵ Thus, this prerequisite to the application of the Colorado River doctrine is satisfied in this case.

After determining that the state and federal actions are actually parallel, the district court must next consider a number of factors that might justify a decision to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over an action. As we explained in Day, and as the district court recognized in this...