Ladwig v. Arlington Hotel Co., 5-853
| Decision Date | 13 February 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 5-853,5-853 |
| Citation | 286 S.W.2d 853,225 Ark. 972 |
| Parties | Charles E. LADWIG et al., Appellants, v. The ARLINGTON HOTEL COMPANY et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Tom Gentry and Roy Finch, Jr., Little Rock, for appellants.
House, Moses & Holmes, Little Rock, Wootton, Land & Matthews, Richard W. Hobbs, Hot Springs, for appellees.
Appellees are the owners of certain hotels and bathhouses located outside the boundaries of Hot Springs National Park but within the city of Hot Springs, Arkansas, and are engaged in the business of giving baths in the therapeutic waters of the government-owned hot springs. Appellants are the officers and members of the 'Arkansas Board of Massage,' created pursuant to Act 180 of 1951, which is known as the "Massage Registration Act." 1 Ark.Stats. § 72-1201 et seq.
Appellants brought this suit alleging appellees were employing many persons as masseurs and masseuses who were unqualified to engage in the practice of massaging because of their failure to obtain a certificate of registration in compliance with Act 180, and that such employment was in violation of Section 3 of said act. None of said employees were made defendants to the suit, it being alleged that individual criminal actions against them would be so numerous that adequate relief could not be obtained against the irreparable injury which it was further alleged the public would suffer by failure of appellees to comply with the act. Appellants asked that appellees be enjoined from further violation of Sec. 3(b) of said act.
Appellees demurred to the complaint on the following grounds. 1. The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 2. Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue. 3. There is a defect of parties plaintiff. 4. There is a defect of parties defendant. The chancellor sustained the demurrer on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against appellees and overruled it as to other grounds urged. Upon appellants' failure to plead further, the complaint was dismissed. The appellant board members have appealed and part of the appellees have cross-appealed from the action of the court in refusing to sustain the demurrer on the additional grounds of appellants' incapacity to sue and a defect of parties defendant.
The question on direct appeal is whether the complaint stated a cause of action against appellees for violation of Section 3(b) of Act 180 of 1951, Ark.Stats. Sec. 72-1203(b), which reads:
'It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to operate or conduct any massage establishment which does not conform to the sanitary regulations herein contained, or which may be adopted by the Board created herein, or to employ any person or persons as an operator or instructor who does not hold a certificate of registration, or to open and conduct a massage establishment or school in a place of residence in the state of Arkansas.' (Italics supplied.)
It should be noted that the complaint does not charge that appellees failed to conform to sanitary regulations contained in the act, nor that they conducted a massage establishment or school in a 'residence.' So the real issue is whether the only other prohibition in Sec. 3(b) makes it unlawful for appellees to employ any person as a masseur or masseuse who does not hold a certificate of registration, as appellants contend, or whether it merely makes it unlawful for them to employ any person as an 'operator' of a massage establishment or an 'instructor' in a massage school if such person does not hold a certificate of registration, as appellees insist. We think the chancellor correctly adopted the latter view.
To adopt appellants' contention, we must construe the word 'operator' as having been used by the Legislature as...
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...in favor of the defendant in construing such statutes. Stuart v. State, 222 Ark. 102, 257 S.W.2d 372. See also, Ladwig v. Arlington Hotel Company, 225 Ark. 972, 286 S.W.2d 853. No case may be brought within the purview of a criminal statute by construction unless it is completely within the......
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Corey v. City of Dallas, Civ. A. No. CA-3-5519-D.
...police power for a city to regulate massage establishments on the basis of public health, safety and morality. Ladwig v. Arlington Hotel, 225 Ark. 972, 286 S.W.2d 853 (1956); Lancaster v. Municipal Court for Beverly Hills, J. D., 6 Cal.3d 805, 100 Cal.Rptr. 609, 494 P.2d 681 (1972). People ......