Ladwig v. Nat'l Guardian Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1933
• Citation: 211 Wis. 56,247 N.W. 312
• Parties: LADWIG v. NATIONAL GUARDIAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

211 Wis. 56

247 N.W. 312

LADWIG

v.NATIONAL GUARDIAN LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

March 7, 1933.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Manitowoc County; Edward Voigt, Circuit Judge.

Action by Henry C. Ladwig against the National Guardian Life Insurance Company. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.--[By Editorial Staff.]

Judgment affirmed.

Action begun April 25, 1932; judgment entered August 29, 1932. Life insurance, suicide. On August 25, 1931, the defendant issued upon the life of Henry Ladwig, Jr., a policy of insurance which contained the provision: “If within two years from the date hereof the insured shall, whether sane or insane, die by his own hand, the liability of the company shall be limited to the premiums paid.”

The sole defense set up in the answer was that the insured died by his own hand within the two-year period, in that on the 11th day of February, 1932, the deceased intentionally and deliberately opened a window in a third floor apartment at 741 North Fourteenth street, Milwaukee, and jumped out of said window onto a pavement beneath, thus causing his death.

The issues were submitted to the jury upon a special verdict, and the jury found as follows:

“Question 1. Did Henry John Ladwig, the deceased, intentionally step or jump out of the window? Answer: No.

Question 2. Did the deceased step or jump out of the window with the intention of causing his own death? Answer: No.

Question 3. At the time the deceased went through the window was he under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such a degree as to be unable to understand that if he stepped or jumped through the window, such act might cause his death? Answer: Yes.”

Upon motions after verdict, the court was of the view that intoxication is not insanity, and therefore, for the purposes of this case, the quoted clause should be held to mean simply that the policy should be void if the insured shall die by his own hand during the two-year period. That whether the deceased at the time he went through the window had sufficient reason left to understand the consequence of his act and the question of his intent were properly for the jury. The plaintiff had judgment accordingly, from which the defendant appeals.

Olin & Butler and C. G. Mathys, all of Madison, for appellant.

Hougen & Brady, of Manitowoc, for respondent.

ROSENBERRY, Chief Justice.

Under the earlier forms of policies which contained the provision that there should be no recovery in case of suicide or in case the insured died by his own hand, it was generally held that death self-caused in an uncontrollable frenzy, without knowledge or appreciation of the physical nature of the act, would not be a death by suicide. Daniels v. N. Y., N. H. R. R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424, 62 L. R. A. 751.

As construed by the courts and applied by the juries, the form of this cause afforded no practical protection to the companies. In order to meet the situation, the clause was rewritten in various forms; the clause appearing in the policy in suit being one of the more common forms used by insurance companies generally. In Cady v. Fidelity Ins. Co., 134 Wis. 322, 113 N. W. 967, 970, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 260, the policy provided that it did not insure against death resulting directly from “suicide, sane or insane.” In that case it was held that “death resulting from an act committed under the influence of delirium, as by one who in a paroxysm of fear precipitates himself from a window, or having been bled removes the bandage, or takes poison by mistake and death ensues, never received nor deserved the name ‘suicide’ and is not within the meaning of the language, ‘death by suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane.’ Such language does not include an act of self-destruction resulting in death whether intentional or not, unaccompanied by a purpose to effect death, with the absence of all design to take life.”

And it was held not error to refuse a requested instruction, which was as follows: “It is immaterial whether Frank A. Cady was delirious or not at the time immediately preceding his death and at the time he went over the railing, if his act in going over the railing was voluntary on his part--that is, that he intended to throw himself over the railing in the manner as shown by the evidence.”

In Pierce v. Travelers' L. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 389, the doctrine of which was followed in the Cady Case, the court said:

“The language of the condition here is, ‘shall die by suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane.’ The intention here manifested is so plain as to seem incapable of further explanation, and unless there is something in the policy of the law which forbids such stipulation, we have nothing to do but to give effect to it. For however the word ‘suicide,’ which is held by the authorities to mean the same thing as ‘death by his own hand’ or ‘take his own life,’ might, if standing alone, be construed to imply a felonious self-destruction, or self-destruction by a sane man or one capable of understanding the...