Laface v. E. Suffolk BOCES
| Decision Date | 14 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-cv-1314 (ADS) (AKT) |
| Parties | JOHN LAFACE, Plaintiff, v. EASTERN SUFFOLK BOCES; BOARD OF TRUSTEES, EASTERN SUFFOLK BOCES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
Harriet A. Gilliam, Esq.
Attorney for the Plaintiff
21 W. Second Street
Riverhead, NY 11901
179 Westbury Avenue
Carle Place, NY 11514
By: Adam I. Kleinberg, Esq.
Chelsea Ella Weisbord, Esq., Of Counsel.
I. BACKGROUND
This opinion rules on two motions concerning the amendment of the complaint in an employment action. In March 2018, plaintiff John Laface (the "Plaintiff") sued his employer, Eastern Suffolk BOCES ("BOCES"), its Board of Trustees (the "Board"), and several individual BOCES employees (collectively, the "Defendants"), in response to his involuntary transfer in October 2016. He raised causes of action for discrimination and retaliation, as well as due process and free speech claims under the Constitution, federal law, and state law. After multiple motions to dismiss the action, only BOCES and the Board remain as Defendants in this case.
In June 2019, the Plaintiff moved to file an amended complaint, his second amended complaint in the action. The Defendants move to strike portions of this second amended complaint, contending that the Plaintiff raises allegations that the Court had previously dismissed with prejudice. The Plaintiff claims that he inadvertently failed to remove those allegations, and, that in any event, he had corrected this error by moving to file a third amended complaint. He has filed a proposed version of that complaint with the Court.
In the proposed third amended complaint, the Plaintiff seeks to raise new claims. He also seeks to add as a Defendant one of the BOCES employees that the Court had previously dismissed from the action. The Defendants oppose this motion, arguing that the proposed amendments, as well as the adding of the employee as a party, are futile.
The background of this opinion briefly describes the underlying action, as well as the action's now voluminous procedural history. The discussion section rules on the two pending motions. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part the motion to amend and denies it in part. The Court also denies as moot the motion to strike.
The facts of this case were previously set forth by this Court and need not be repeated in their entirety. For the purposes of the instant motions, it is sufficient to note the following facts.
The Plaintiff worked as a custodial worker for BOCES at the Gary D. Bixhorn Technical Center in Bellport, New York (the "Bixhorn Center"). ECF 1 at 1. During his 30-year tenure at BOCES, the Plaintiff developed a condition that caused him stress and anxiety, and kept him from driving more than ten miles from his home. Id. at 2. He also had a history of filing grievances with BOCES concerning work conditions. Id. at 15. In October 2016, the Plaintiff's supervisors informed him by letter that he had been reassigned to the H.B. Ward Camps("HBW") in Riverhead, New York, which, unlike the Bixhorn Center, was located more than ten miles from the Plaintiff's home. Id. The administration at BOCES knew of the Plaintiff's disability at the time they reassigned him. Id. at 8.
The Plaintiff began a period of sick leave upon the date of his transfer to HBW, from October 28, 2016, to November 27, 2016. Id. at 8. At a meeting with a BOCES administrator on November 28, 2016, the Plaintiff asked that BOCES make a reasonable accommodation for his documented disability. Id. at 8-9. The Plaintiff alleged that BOCES made no such accommodation, and that it placed him on administrative leave in December 2016. Id. at 9-11. In January 2017, the Plaintiff received a temporary reassignment to the Jefferson Academic Center ("JAC") in Port Jefferson, New York, a location that was fewer than ten miles from the Plaintiff's home. Id. at 11; ECF 10-7 at 2.
The Plaintiff brought this action against BOCES, the Board, and several BOCES employees, including Jill Diamond ("Diamond"), the BOCES Personnel Officer. He raised several causes of action: disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; retaliation under the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; a hostile work environment claim under the ADA; protected speech, redress of grievances, and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, grounded in the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and violations of the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 et seq.. Id. at 12-25.
The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FED. R. CIV. P.") 12(b)(6). ECF 9. In November 2018, the Court granted the motion in part (the "November 2018 Order"). ECF 25. As an initial matter, the Court ruled that defendant Diamond, the BOCES Personnel Officer, was a school "officer" within the meaning of state education law. Id. at 43. The Court dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act discrimination claims; the ADA hostile work environment claim; the Title VII retaliation claim; the § 1983 First Amendment redress of grievances claim; the § 1983 due process claim; and the NYSHRL claims. Id. at 10-16, 23-25, 31-43. The Court dismissed without prejudice the ADEA discrimination claim and the § 1983 First Amendment free speech claim, and allowed a portion of the ADA retaliation claim to proceed. Id. at 16-23, 26-30. As to the ADA retaliation claim, the Court ruled that "the only adverse employment act at issue" was the January 2017 temporary transfer to JAC. Id. at 22. The Court dismissed the remainder of the retaliation claim with prejudice. Id. at 23. The Court later denied the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. ECF 41.
In December 2018, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. ECF 29. The amended complaint asserted five causes of action, some of which contained multiple claims: (1) ADA retaliation; (2) ADEA discrimination and hostile work environment; (3) a § 1983 claim under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) a § 1983 First Amendment speech claim; and (5) NYSHRL claims. Id. at 12-20.
The Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to partially dismiss the amended complaint, seeking dismissal with prejudice of all causes of action other than the ADA retaliation claim. ECF 31. In May 2019, the Court granted the motion in part (the "May 2019 Order"). ECF 43.The Court dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiff's third and fifth causes of action in their entirety, and the ADEA hostile work environment claim. Id. at 5-12, 18. It also dismissed all individual Defendants from the action. Id. at 16-18. The Court also held that the Plaintiff could proceed with the ADA retaliation claim, the ADEA discrimination claim, and the § 1983 free speech claim. Id. at 19.
The Plaintiff made multiple attempts to file an amended complaint by way of other motions. ECF 42 (preliminary injunction), 46 (Order to Show Cause), 51 (seeking permission to file second amended complaint nunc pro tunc). The Court denied two of the motions, and granted the Plaintiff's motion to withdraw the other. ECF 44, 56, 9/27/19 entry.
On June 14, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the second amended complaint. ECF 57. The Defendants moved to strike the second amended complaint. ECF 59.
Two days later, the Plaintiff moved to amend the second amended complaint, attaching a proposed third amended complaint, as well as an affidavit from the Plaintiff. ECF 60. Both motions are presently before the Court.
II. DISCUSSION
The Court now rules on the two pending motions. The Court first rules on the motion to amend, because granting that motion would render moot the motion to strike. See Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 461 F. App'x 18, 23 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) ( that an amended complaint "'ordinarily supersedes the original, and renders it of no legal effect'") (quoting Dluhos v. Floating & Abandoned Vessel, Known as "New York", 162 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1998)). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part the motion to amend, denies the motion in part, and denies as moot the motion to strike.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a), which typically governs a motion to amend a complaint, states, in relevant part, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Unless there is a showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility or undue prejudice to the non-moving parties, the district court should grant leave to amend. See Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp, 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2011); Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1998).
The decision on whether to grant a motion to amend rests within the sound discretion of the district court. Aetna Cas. & Sr. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 603-04 (2d Cir. 2005); Hemphill, 141 F.3d at 420. In choosing whether to grant leave to amend, prejudice to the opposing party is one of the "most important" issues to consider. AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 725 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, where, as here, the proposed amended complaint adds new parties, FED. R. CIV. P. 21 also governs. Rule 21 explains that "[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party." FED. R. CIV. P. 21; see also City of Syracuse v. Onondaga Cty., 464 F.3d 297, 308 (...
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