Lafayette City Gov. V. Lafayette Mun. Bd.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-1460.,01-1460. |
| Citation | 816 So.2d 977 |
| Parties | LAFAYETTE CITY-PARISH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT v. LAFAYETTE MUNICIPAL FIRE & POLICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Richard D. Chappuis Jr., Voorhies & Labbe, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government.
Marie Candice Hattan, Roy & Hattan, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellant Lafayette Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Board.
Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, MARC T. AMY, and GLENN B. GREMILLION, Judges.
The defendant, the Lafayette Municipal Fire and Police Service Board (Board), appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (LCG), granting it a preliminary injunction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In 1986, the LCG petitioned the Board to pass a Rule that would reduce the number of annual leave days given to Lafayette Police Officers. At that time, La.R.S. 33:2214(A)(1) required that police department employees be given fifteen days of annual leave, but the LCG and the Board agreed to reduce that number to twelve annual leave days per year.1 At the request of the Board and the LCG, the legislature enacted La.R.S. 2214.2, which allowed them to agree to provide vacation benefits in accordance with the Lafayette Civil Service System rules.2 This annual leave policy was in effect until early 1999, when the Board proposed an amendment to the current rule (Rule XVI) that would restore the annual leave to fifteen days per year. After proceeding through the various required formalities, and allowing the LCG ample time to object to the amendment, the Board unanimously passed the amendment to become effective in January 2000.
The LCG filed suit in December 1999, urging that the Board unilaterally acted in July and October 1999, to amend Rule XVI, which violated the previously reached January 1987 agreement and, therefore, violated La.R.S. 33:2214.2, because the 1987 agreement "effectively repealed La. R.S. 33:2214(A) as previously applicable to the Lafayette Police Department." It further argued that the Board's amendment would require it to come up with additional money to fund the annual leave increase and, because the request for funding had not been submitted to the LCG President, the Board could not enforce its amendment as it was contrary to law. The LCG requested a determination of whether the amended Rule XVI was contrary to law and whether the unilateral decision of the Board to adopt the amendment violated its prior agreement with the LCG and violated State law, particularly La.R.S. 33:2214.2. The LCG further requested an injunction, arguing that it would suffer irreparable injury if Rule XVI was permitted to go into effect, on January 1, 2000. The trial court granted a stay on December 22, 1999, pending further hearings on the matter. The Board filed a motion for dissolution of the stay order on February 18, 2000.
After a hearing on April 17, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment cancelling and dissolving the stay order previously issued in favor of the LCG, but temporarily restrained the Board from enforcing its amendment until May 12, 2000. At that time, it would be given the opportunity to show cause why a permanent injunction should not be issued.
On May 19, 2000 (a mutually agreed upon later date), the trial court ruled on the requested injunction. It found the issues to be whether the Board could unilaterally adopt a rule which increased the number of annual leave days for police officers, and in doing so, obligate the LCG for the unappropriated fiscal consequences thereof.
The trial court concluded that the Board "has the exclusive authority to adopt rules to provide for leaves of absences in the various classes of the classified service and to provide for annual vacation and sick leave with pay and special leave with or without pay." However, after examining the LCG's Home Rule Charter provisions, the trial court found that the Board's amendment of Rule XVI violated Section 5-06 of the Home Rule Charter, which is in violation of La.R.S. 33:2478, formerly La. Const. art. XIV, § 15.1 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, which prohibits the adoption of a Civil Service Board Rule which is contrary to any other provision of law. Therefore, the Board may not adopt a rule which violates the Home Rule Charter. Thus, the Board could not adopt a rule regarding annual leave which obligated the LCG for unappropriated fiscal consequences.
Finding that Section 5-06 of the Home Rule Charter was a prohibitory law, the trial court determined that the LCG need not show irreparable injury and granted its request for a preliminary injunction. The Board, thereafter, timely appealed to this court.
The Board assigns as error:
1. The trial court's issuance of an indefinite temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of an annual leave rule duly enacted by it pursuant to its legislative powers without the mandatory procedural prerequisites set out by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure first being met.
2. The trial court's conversion of the TRO into a permanent injunction five months after issuance, based upon its finding that the rule would require LCG to pay additional monies that have not been allotted in violation of the mandatory language of La. Const. art. 6, § 14(A).
3. The trial court's denial of damages arising from the issuance of the TRO which was obtained without compliance with the procedural mandates of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
The thrust of the Board's argument is that the TRO/preliminary injunction was improperly issued 1) for failure to follow the proper procedural requirements and 2) because the trial court erred in determining that the home rule charter of Lafayette took precedence over La. Const. art.14, §§ 15.1(8) and (27) and La.R.S. 33:2497, which sets forth the power and authority of the Board. The Board argues that the home rule charter "can not operate to abrogate the provisions of our law pertaining to Constitutionally created Civil Service systems."
The Board urges that the LCG did not properly request a TRO when it originally filed its "Petition for Declaratory Relief and Stay Order" in December 1999, as it did not provide the trial court with a memorandum of authority, or any written brief to support the request for the relief sought; did not notify the Board or its attorney of its intended action; did not provide a copy of its Petition to either the Board or its attorney; and did not afford the Board or its attorney the opportunity to be present when the Petition was presented to the duty judge. The Board claims that "[t]here is no issue that when the duty judge signed the Order presented to him by LCG, the effect was that a Temporary Restraining Order became effective against the Board, enjoining the effective date of the amended rule." La. Code Civ.P, art. 3612(A) states, "There shall be no appeal from an order relating to a temporary restraining order." We have also held that we have "no power to hear an appeal from an order relating to a TRO under any circumstance." Budd Constr. Co., Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 401 So.2d 1070, 1073 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1981), writ denied, 404 So.2d 1262 (La.1981). For the same reasons, the Board's third assignment of error relating to damages associated with the issuance of the order is without merit. Id. See also Vienna Bend Subdivision Homeowners v. Manning, 459 So.2d 1345 (La.App. 3 Cir.1984).
At the outset we observe that appellate review of the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction is limited. The issuance of a preliminary injunction addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal only if it be shown that such discretion has been abused or improvidently exercised.
Concerned Citizens of Rapides Parish v. Hardy, 397 So.2d 1063, 1072 (La.App. 3 Cir.1981).
Initially, we note the provisions of the home rule charter relied on by the LCG pertaining to the incurring of fiscal obligations. Those provisions are found in Section 5-06 of the Lafayette Home Rule Charter and state:
A. No payment shall be made or obligation incurred against any allotwent or appropriation except in accordance `with the approved operating budget and capital improvement budget and appropriations duly made and unless the president or the president's designee first certifies that there is a sufficient unencumbered balance in such allotment or appropriation and that sufficient funds therefrom are or will be available to cover the claim or meet the obligation when it becomes due and payable. However, this section shall not limit the authority to borrow funds in anticipation of revenues as provided in the general laws of the state. Any authorization of payment or incurring of obligation in violation of the provisions of this charter shall be void and any payment so made illegal; such action shall be cause for removal of any official, officer or employee who knowingly authorized or made such payment or incurred such obligation or who caused such payment to be authorized or made or obligation to be incurred. Such persons shall also be obligated to the City-Parish Government for any amount so paid.
B. Nothing in this charter shall be construed to prevent passage of any ordinance making or authorizing of payments or making of contracts for capital improvements to be financed wholly or partly by the issuance of bonds or to prevent the making of any contract or lease providing for payments beyond the end of the fiscal year. Contracts for services not covered by the public bid law shall be for a period not to exceed the term for which the council members and the president are elected.
C. Deficit spending is prohibited except for emergencies as...
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