Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't v. United States
| Docket Number | 6:22-CV-01127 |
| Decision Date | 18 August 2022 |
| Parties | LAFAYETTE CITY-PARISH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is a Motion to Reconsider, or alternatively, Motion for Certification for Appeal [doc. 30] filed by plaintiff Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (“LCG”). The motions relate to the court's prior ruling [docs. 28, 29] granting the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction [doc. 16] filed by defendant St Martin Parish Government (“SMPG”). Also before the court is a Motion for Leave to File Second Amending and Supplemental Complaint [doc. 32] filed by LCG. All of the motions are opposed by SMPG.
This suit arises from a flood mitigation project by LCG involving among other things, reducing a spoil bank on the St. Martin Parish side of Vermilion Bayou to improve the flow of stormwater into and out of the Cypress Island Swamp and reduce flooding in Lafayette Parish. See doc. 8 (amended complaint), ¶¶ 3-19. LCG alleged that it began coordinating with SMPG on this project in 2020 but that SMPG opposed permitting by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) and passed Ordinance 14-71, which requires a permit by the parish council for “[a]ny development which includes the construction, alteration, or removal of any sort of levee or levee system,” in order to block the project. St. Martin Par. Ord. 14-71 (No. 21-07-1327-OR, 7-6-2021).
Maintaining that Corps permitting was not required and that Ordinance 14-71 was unconstitutional, LCG executed the spoil bank project in February 2022. Doc. 8, ¶¶ 25, 3031. The SMPG president allegedly responded with threats of litigation. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34. LCG then filed suit in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, against SMPG and the Corps, seeking a declaratory judgment on its compliance with all lawful regulations, rules, ordinances, and laws in the spoil bank project and that a Corps permit was not required. Doc. 1, att. 1. The United States, appearing on behalf of the Corps, removed the action to this court based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Doc. 1. St. Martin Parish filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement [doc. 5], and in response LCG amended its complaint. Doc. 8. The first Motion to Dismiss was then denied as moot. Doc. 25.
In the amended complaint LCG refined its allegations and sought a declaratory judgment that (1) it “has no liability to St. Martin Parish for any work associated with the spoil bank project,” (2) Ordinance 14-71 is unconstitutional; (3) alternatively, LCG did not violate Ordinance 14-71; and (4) no Corps permit was required for the spoil bank project as executed in February 2022. Doc. 8, ¶¶ 35-39. SMPG again moved for dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Doc. 16, att. 1. Over opposition from LCG, the court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Docs. 28, 29. In so doing the court found that the claims against SMPG were not ripe because a declaration of no liability would depend on premature adjudication of LCG's tort liability for any future effects of the project in St. Martin Parish. Doc. 28. Immediately following that ruling, SMPG filed a “Petition for Mandatory Injunction” against LCG in the 16th Judicial District Court, St. Martin Parish, Louisiana. Doc. 30, att. 2. There it requests an order for LCG to restore, replace, and reconstruct the previously existing spoil bank, based on the alleged violation of Ordinance 14-71 as well as its belief that the spoil bank removal will significantly increase the likelihood of flooding in St. Martin Parish. Id.
LCG now moves this court for reconsideration of its dismissal of the suit, asserting that the court erred by (1) considering only one of LCG's claims against SMPG, (2) ruling that the claim was not ripe, (3) failing to remand the claim to state court rather than dismiss it, and/or (4) failing to allow LCG an opportunity to amend its complaint. Doc. 30, att. 1. Alternatively, it requests that the court's ruling be certified for immediate appeal. Id. LCG also moves for leave to amend the complaint a second time, in order to assuage the court's jurisdictional concerns by removing its declaratory request for no liability and because it maintains that SMPG's new suit “is further evidence that LCG's claims . . . are ripe and that this Honorable Court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction.” Doc. 32, att. 1, p. 3. SMPG likewise opposes this motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) allows the court to reconsider an interlocutory order “for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.” Saqui v. Pride Cent. Am., LLC, 595 F.3d 206, 210-11 (5th Cir. 2010). An interlocutory order is one that “adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . of all the parties,” such as the order on the motion to dismiss at issue here. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990); Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985).
Although the rule grants the court broad discretion to reconsider, “this power is exercised sparingly in order to forestall the perpetual reexamination of orders and the resulting burdens and delays.” United States v. Cytogel Pharma, LLC, 2017 WL 3849317 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2017) (internal quotations omitted). Courts evaluate motions to reconsider under Rule 54(b) under a “less exacting” standards than those applied to final judgments under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) but still look to the latter rules for guidance. In re Padco Pressure Control, LLC, 2017 WL 161647, at *1 (W.D. La. Jan. 13, 2017) (collecting cases). To this end, the court should consider whether there are “manifest errors of law or fact upon which judgment is based[,]” whether “new evidence” is available, whether there is a need “to prevent manifest injustice,” or whether there has been “an intervening change in controlling law.” Id. (quoting HBM Interests, LLC v. Chesapeake La., LP, 2013 WL 3893989 (W.D. La. Jul. 26, 2013)).
LCG responded to SMPG's first Motion to Dismiss by filing an amended petition. In opposing SMPG's second Motion to Dismiss, LCG included in footnote a request for Doc. 22, p. 16, n. 68. While the court finds no basis for vacating its ruling as to the prematurity of determining liability issues, it did overlook this statement.[1] Accordingly, it will GRANT the motion to reconsider and consider the request for leave to amend, analyzing the remaining claims under the arguments raised for dismissal under SMPG's prior Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
The time for amending pleadings as a matter of course has passed. Accordingly, LCG may only amend its petition with leave of court or consent of the opposing party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). While the court should “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” it may deny the request for a “substantial reason” such as undue delay, undue prejudice, futility, and repeated failure to cure deficiencies. Id.; United States ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 367 (5th Cir. 2014). Futility alone provides a sufficient basis for denying leave to amend and amended claims are futile if they would be subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Marucci Sports, LLC v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014).
The only changes between the first amended complaint and the proposed second amended complaint are that LCG has dropped its request for declaratory judgment on liability and added factual allegations relating to SMPG's Petition for Mandatory Injunction. Doc. 32, att. 3. In its prior Motion to Dismiss, however, SMPG also raised grounds for dismissing the remaining claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the court will now apply these arguments to the second amended complaint to determine if futility serves as a basis for denying leave to amend.[2] The scope of a 12(b)(6) motion is limited to on the complaint and its attachments. Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2012). The court can also consider documents referenced in and central to a party's claims, as well as matters of which it may take judicial notice. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000); Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 Fed. App'x 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). Because certain attachments to SMPG's prior motion, namely an affidavit and email, fall outside this scope, the court will not consider them in determining futility.
The remaining claims pertaining to SMPG seek a declaratory judgment that (1) Ordinance 14-71 is unconstitutional and (2) alternatively, LCG did not violate Ordinance 14-71. Doc. 32, att. 3. St. Martin Parish argues that LCG fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted because (1) LCG has judicially admitted to its violation of Ordinance 14-71 and therefore cannot obtain a declaratory judgment to the contrary, (2) a litigant with “unclean hands” cannot seek a declaratory judgment, and (3) LCG's allegations are devoid of facts that would show the ordinance is unconstitutional.
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