Laferty v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 May 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-00853-TBR
• Citation: 186 F.Supp.3d 702
• Parties: Daryl L. Laferty, Plaintiff, v. United Parcel Service, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

186 F.Supp.3d 702

Daryl L. Laferty, Plaintiff,

v.United Parcel Service, Inc., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-00853-TBR

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division .

Signed May 3, 2016

Filed May 4, 2016

Michael L. Boylan, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff.

Carrie B. Pond, Jennifer R. Asbrock, Tony C. Coleman, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Thomas B. Russell, Senior Judge, United States District Court

Daryl Laferty filed this disability-discrimination action in Jefferson County Circuit Court against his employer, United Parcel Service, Inc., alleging UPS failed to accommodate his disability as required by the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.010, et seq. UPS removed Laferty's action to this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Now, UPS seeks summary judgment as to Laferty's failure-to-accommodate claim. Because Laferty does not qualify as "disabled" under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.010(4), UPS's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 18, is GRANTED .

I.

A.

Daryl Laferty has worked for United Parcel Service, Inc. since 1997, R. 18-4 at 9–10 (Laferty's Deposition), and has been a member of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 89, which represents all production employees at UPS's Louisville, Kentucky facility, see id. at 15; R. 18-2 at 3, ¶ 7 (Capps' Affidavit). Over the years, Laferty has held several jobs with UPS. See R. 18-4 at 10–14. From 2000 until 2013, Laferty worked as a full-time package car driver, id. at 10–11, delivering and retrieving packages to and from residential and business customers, R. 18-2 at 3, ¶ 11. Because UPS package cars are commercial vehicles, employees (such as Laferty) are required to maintain a current U.S. Department of Transportation certification to operate them off of UPS property. See R. 18-4 at 50; R. 18-2 at 3, ¶ 12.

On December 8, 2011, Laferty informed UPS that he would be off work for three weeks because he was seeking treatment for migraine headaches. See R. 18-4 at 34; R. 18-5 at 17 (Medical Records); R. 21-1 at 1, ¶ 2 (Laferty's Affidavit). Laferty returned to work on January 3, 2012. R. 18-4 at 34, 37, 41. However, due to the medication proscribed for his headaches, Laferty was unable to drive a commercial vehicle under Department of Transportation regulations. See id. at 41, 59–61; R. 21-1 at 1, ¶¶ 4–5. Laferty never sought a medical waiver or exemption from the Department of Transportation, R. 18-4 at 61, and sometime between April and June 2012, lost his Department of Transportation certification due to nonrenewal before expiration, compare id. at 50, with R. 18-2 at 4, ¶ 16.

Because the position was temporarily available due to other absences, Laferty worked full-time as an adjustment clerk between January 2012 and August 2013. See R. 18-4 at 38–39, 41, 59. Throughout that period of time, Laferty's treating neurologist, Dr. Brian M. Plato, prescribed four alternative medications which would not disqualify Laferty from holding a Department of Transportation certification. See R. 18-5 at 23. However, none controlled his symptoms. See id. Accordingly, on August 20, 2013, Dr. Plato recommended Laferty "find another job title that does not require a [Department of Transportation] license." Id.

In July and August 2013, UPS Business Manager Tim Capps twice "invited Laferty to apply for an accommodation to determine the existence of any disability, if one existed, and to engage in the interactive process." R. 18-2 at 4, ¶ 18. On both occasions, however, Laferty refused to "apply for an accommodation, adamantly denying that he had any sort of disability." Id. ; see also R. 18-4 at 126–27. Instead, Laferty requested to remain in the adjustment clerk position for an indeterminate period of time on a full-time basis. See R. 18-4 at 98–99, 126. Capps explained that Laferty could not remain in that position indefinitely, and offered him two options: either reinstate his Department of Transportation certification, or seek an accommodation through UPS's internal process. See R. 18-2 at 5, ¶ 20. Laferty refused both, so on August 19, 2013, Capps placed Laferty on medical leave pursuant to the terms of his collective-bargaining agreement. Id. ; see also R. 18-2 at 6–20 (National Master United Parcel Service Agreement).

Three days later, Laferty filed a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement challenging Capps' decision. See R. 18-4 at 106; R. 18-5 at 33 (Record of Grievance). By Laferty's estimation, the collective-bargaining agreement provided him the right to continue working as an adjustment clerk indefinitely until his Department of Transportation certification could be restored. See R. 18-4 at 107.¹ UPS took the position that the collective-bargaining agreement conferred no such entitlement. See R. 18-2 at 3, ¶ 13.² Ultimately, a panel composed of both UPS and Union representatives unanimously denied Laferty's grievance. See R. 18-4 at 155; R. 18-2 at 5, ¶ 21.

Thereafter, in May 2014, Laferty contacted UPS and requested to apply for an accommodation. See R. 18-3 at 3, ¶ 5 (Peyton's Affidavit); see also id. at 5 (Correspondence from UPS Human Resources to Laferty). Between May and July, UPS Area Human Resources Manager Lucia Peyton worked with Laferty to find a position meeting his proffered criteria. See id. at 3–4, ¶¶ 7–10; id. at 7–11 (Accommodation Checklist). In July 2014, Laferty bid on, and was awarded, a full-time car washer/refueler position at the Louisville facility. See R. 18-4 at 128; R. 18-3 at 4, ¶ 11. Because Laferty indicated his satisfaction with that position, UPS discontinued the accommodation process. See R. 18-4 at 129–30, 170; R. 18-3 at 4, ¶ 11.

B.

On November 10, 2014, Laferty filed this disability-discrimination action in Jefferson County Circuit Court, claiming UPS refused to accommodate his disability in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.010 et seq.See R. 1-1 at 2, ¶¶ 6–10 (Complaint). Relying on this Court's diversity jurisdiction, UPS removed Laferty's action under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See R. 1 at 2, ¶ 7 (Notice of Removal). Now, UPS moves for summary judgment. See R. 18 at 1 (Motion for Summary Judgment).

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists where "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court "may not make credibility determinations nor weigh the evidence when determining whether an issue of fact remains for trial." Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir.2014) (citing Logan v. Denny's, Inc. , 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir.2001) ; Ahlers v. Schebil , 188 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir.1999) ). "The ultimate question is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.' " Back v. Nestlé USA, Inc. , 694 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

As the party moving for summary judgment, UPS must shoulder the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to at least one essential element of Laferty's claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see Laster , 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). Assuming UPS satisfies its burden of production, Laferty "must—by deposition, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file—show specific facts that reveal a genuine issue for trial." Laster , 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).

III.

Laferty brings his disability-discrimination claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.010 et seq. Because the language of the KCRA mirrors (for the most part) that of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , courts interpret the KCRA consistent with the ADA.³ SeeHoward Baer, Inc. v. Schave , 127 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Ky.2003) ; Bryson v. Regis Corp. , 498 F.3d 561, 574 (6th Cir.2007) ; Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp. , 610 Fed.Appx. 519, 526 (6th Cir.2015).

The KCRA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual on the basis of a disability. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.040(1)(a) ; accord 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A disability discrimination claim may be asserted under various legal theories, including disparate treatment and failure to accommodate, see Webb v. Humana Inc. , 819 F.Supp.2d 641, 645 (W.D.Ky.2011), and established through either direct or indirect evidence, see Noel v. Elk Brand Mfg. Co. , 53 S.W.3d 95, 100–01 (Ky.Ct.App.2000) ; Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. , 485 F.3d 862, 868–69 (6th Cir.2007). Here, Laferty brings a failure-to-accommodate claim.⁴ Such a claim necessarily involves "direct evidence (the failure to accommodate) of discrimination." Kleiber , 485 F.3d at 868. To make out the corresponding prima facie case, then, Laferty must show that he is disabled and otherwise qualified for the position despite his disability without accommodation from UPS, with an alleged "essential" job requirement eliminated, or with a proposed reasonable accommodation. See Noel , 53 S.W.3d at 101 ; Hallahan v. The Courier – Journal , 138 S.W.3d 699, 706 n. 5 (Ky.Ct.App.2004) ; accord Kleiber , 485 F.3d at 869.⁵

In this case, UPS maintains that Laferty's failure-to-accommodate claim cannot make it out of the gate. A person is "disabled" under the KCRA, UPS says, if he (1) suffers from a "physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one ... or more of [his] major life activities," (2) has...