Lafferty v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dept. of Employment and Training Services

• Decision Date: 22 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-9011-EX-664,93A02-9011-EX-664
• Citation: 600 N.E.2d 1378
• Parties: Patrick C. LAFFERTY, Appellant-Claimant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING SERVICES; Michael K. Bonnell, Joe A. Harris, and George H. Baker, as members of the Review Board; and Wal-Mart, Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1378

600 N.E.2d 1378

Patrick C. LAFFERTY, Appellant-Claimant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING SERVICES; Michael K. Bonnell, Joe A.

Harris, and George H. Baker, as members

of the Review Board; and

Wal-Mart, Appellees.

No. 93A02-9011-EX-664.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Second District.

Oct. 22, 1992.

Gregory L. Volz, Legal Services Organization of Indiana, Inc., Evansville and Kenneth J. Falk, Legal Services Organization of Indiana, Inc., Indianapolis, for appellant-claimant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana and Preston W. Black, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.

CASE SUMMARY

BUCHANAN, Judge.

Patrick C. Lafferty (Lafferty) appeals the denial of unemployment compensation benefits, claiming the Review Board of the Indiana Department of Employment and Training Services (Board) erred in its determination that he was not entitled to unemployment benefits because he left his position at Wal-Mart without good cause and that the application of the ten week statutory requirement to a claimant who is fired without just cause, violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions. ¹

We affirm.

FACTS

The facts which support the Board's decision show that in 1987, Wal-Mart hired Lafferty to take care of the floors of its store. In this position Lafferty worked forty hour weeks at $4.55 an hour; his lunch hour was unpaid.

Searching for a new job, Lafferty contacted the Job Service Division of the Indiana Department of Employment and Training Services (IDETS). On May 8, 1990, Mrs. Nally, an employee of IDETS, informed Lafferty of a job opening with ABA Building Management (ABA) and assisted Lafferty by calling ABA on his behalf. ABA offered Lafferty a floor maintenance position similar to the one he held with Wal-Mart. However, the ABA position offered several advantages: the starting wage was $5.00 an hour with the likelihood it would increase to $6.00 an hour within six months, he would have a paid, one half hour lunch break, and the equipment and supplies provided by ABA would make his work easier and increase his efficiency. Lafferty accepted the ABA position. His last day at Wal-Mart was May 9, 1990; the next day he began his new job.

On June 8, 1990, Lafferty was discharged from ABA over an incident involving his having pushed a grocery cart into a customer's cart causing minor damage and a dispute between Lafferty and his supervisor "The claimant ... left the employment in order to take a higher paying job with better working conditions. This is a perfectly understandable and rational reason for leaving the employment, however, it is an entirely personal reason for leaving the employment, as it is done to improve the claimant's financial condition. Therefore, the administrative law judge must conclude that the claimant did not have good cause in connection with the work for leaving the employment."

over the adjustment of Lafferty's working hours. Lafferty filed for unemployment benefits, and following a hearing on whether he had been properly discharged by ABA, a claims deputy ruled that ABA did not have "just cause" to dismiss him and there would be no disqualification on that basis. Approximately a week later, another claims deputy heard Lafferty's underlying claim for unemployment and ruled that he was not entitled to benefits because he voluntarily left employment with Wal-Mart without good cause in connection with work and had failed to work at ABA for the ten week period required by Ind.Code 22-4-15-1(c) (1990), which decision was affirmed by an administrative law judge (ALJ). On appeal, the Board on September 21, 1990 affirmed the decision of the ALJ:

Record at 20.

ISSUES

On appeal, Lafferty raises two issues which we reorder and restate as:

1. Did the Board err in not finding that Lafferty's leaving employment to accept a better paying job constituted "good cause in connection with work" so as to not disqualify Lafferty from receiving benefits under IC 22-4-15-1(a)?

2. Does the application of the ten week requirement to an employee who leaves employment to accept a better paying job and then is fired by the second employer without just cause, violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions?

DECISION

ISSUE ONE --Did the Board err in not finding that Lafferty's leaving employment to accept a better paying job constituted "good cause in connection with work" so as to not disqualify Lafferty from receiving benefits under IC 22-4-15-1(a)?

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS --Lafferty claims that changes in the unemployment statute indicates that "good cause in connection with work" should include leaving employment to take a better paying job. In addition, Lafferty claims that IDETS' role in helping him find employment with ABA also provides the necessary "good cause" to qualify for benefits. The Board responds that Lafferty was properly denied unemployment benefits because his reasons for quitting his job with Wal-Mart were personal rather than objectively related to his work conditions and thus he did not have "good cause in connection with work" for leaving so as to entitle him to unemployment benefits.

CONCLUSION --The Board did not err in concluding that Lafferty left his employment with Wal-Mart "without good cause in connection with work."

The general disqualification provision of IC 22-4-15-1(a) (1990) provides:

"With respect to benefit periods established on and after July 6, 1980, an individual who has voluntarily left his employment without good cause in connection with the work or who was discharged from his employment for just cause is ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights for the week in which the disqualifying separation occurred and until he has earned remuneration in employment equal to or exceeding the weekly benefit amount of his claim in each of eight (8) weeks. If the qualification amount has not been earned at the expiration of an individual's benefit period, the unearned amount shall be carried forward to an extended benefit period or to the benefit period of a subsequent claim."

This disqualification provision is modified by IC 22-4-15-1(c) "(c) The disqualifications provided in this section shall be subject to the following modifications:

(1) an individual shall not be subject to disqualification because of separation from his prior employment if he left to accept with another employer previously secured permanent full-time work which offered reasonable expectation of betterment of wages or working conditions and thereafter was employed on said job for not less than ten (10) weeks...."

(Emphasis supplied).

It is undisputed that Lafferty left employment to take a permanent, full-time position with another employer who offered better wages and working conditions, a situation explicitly covered under the modification provision of (c). Although Lafferty contends that leaving for a better paying job should be interpreted as "good cause in connection with work" so as to not disqualify him from receiving benefits under (a), his interpretation is not supported by the statute's construction. The "modification" provision in (c) clearly provides an exception to the general disqualification provision in (a). When an exception is used in a statute it "carves something out of the general provision which, in the opinion of the law-giver, would be within the general provision if the exception had not been made." Taylor v. Phelan (1946), 117 Ind.App. 40, 47, 69 N.E.2d 145, 148 (emphasis supplied).

Applying that principle it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended the modification to carve out of the general disqualification provision an exception for an individual who leaves employment to accept a better paying job. Indeed should the legislature have intended for that reason to constitute "good cause in connection with work" so that individual would not be disqualified from receiving benefits under (a), then there would have been no need for the legislature to explicitly include a modification in (c) so that individual would not be disqualified.

Thus, it is unnecessary to examine whether an individual's leaving employment to accept a better paying job is leaving employment "without good cause in connection with work" under (a). By virtue of the statute's construction that reason for leaving employment is without good cause and the individual is disqualified from receiving benefits unless it can be shown that, in addition to having left employment to accept a better paying job, the individual also worked at least ten weeks at the second job. Lafferty concedes that he did not work ten weeks at the new job, but argues that application of the ten week provision to an employee who, like himself, was discharged by the second employer without just cause, is a violation of equal protection. We now address that contention.

ISSUE TWO --Does the application of the ten week requirement to an employee who leaves employment to accept a better paying job and then is fired by the second employer without just cause, violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions?

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS --Lafferty concedes, and we agree, that an employee who leaves employment to take a better paying job and then is dismissed without just cause before working ten weeks for the second employer, is not entitled to receive unemployment benefits, ² but argues that the distinction between employees who are discharged without just cause based solely on the length of time worked for the second employer violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The Board responds that different treatment of the classifications of employees is supported by the state's interest in promoting employment stability and not unfairly penalizing the first employer who was not responsible for the employee's dismissal.

CONCLUSION --Denial...