LaFlamme v. Essex Junction School Dist., 97-493.
Citation | 750 A.2d 993 |
Decision Date | 21 January 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 97-493.,97-493. |
Parties | Stanley LaFLAMME v. ESSEX JUNCTION SCHOOL DISTRICT and Essex Junction Prudential Committee. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Vermont |
Edwin L. Hobson, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Douglas C. Pierson and Thomas M. Higgins of Pierson, Wadhams, Quinn & Yates, Burlington, for Defendants-Appellants.
Present AMESTOY, C.J., DOOLEY, MORSE and SKOGLUND, JJ., and ALLEN, C.J.(Ret.), Specially Assigned.
Defendants Essex Junction School District and Essex Junction Prudential Committee (school board) appeal a jury verdict awarding plaintiff Stanley LaFlamme damages for violation of his right to procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the evidence was insufficient to support such a claim as a matter of law, we reverse.
This controversy arose when the Essex Junction Prudential Committee, which functions as the school board for the Village of Essex Junction, publicly "censured" LaFlamme, who had been elected to the Prudential Committee in May 1994. Conflict and tension between LaFlamme and other committee members plagued his tenure. For example, members considered LaFlamme difficult to work with and disruptive of committee proceedings. The committee particularly took umbrage at LaFlamme's participation in a May 1995 meeting of the Village of Essex Junction Board of Trustees, at which the formation of a union high school was discussed. During the meeting, LaFlamme offered opinions that, in the Prudential Committee's view, were inaccurate, offensive, and belied its position.
In February 1995, the Chair of the Prudential Committee, Leslie Mooney, sought advice concerning the committee's working relationship with LaFlamme from the Executive Director of the Vermont School Board Association. According to Mooney, the committee considered the possibility of censuring LaFlamme because the members had been unsuccessful in their several attempts to discuss with him issues concerning his committee membership.
The committee held a special meeting on May 30, 1995, which LaFlamme did not attend. While in executive session, the members discussed the ramifications of censure. They agreed to publicly censure LaFlamme during the next regularly scheduled meeting, subject to the approval of the committee's legal counsel.
Following the meeting, Mooney discussed with the committee's counsel the logistics for censuring LaFlamme. Counsel informed Mooney that the committee was not required to publicly warn LaFlamme of the upcoming censure. She and another member drafted the censure motion and marked it on the agenda as a code of ethics discussion to avoid attracting attention and turning the matter into a "circus."
On June 12, 1995, the Prudential Committee held a regularly scheduled meeting, which LaFlamme attended. The committee, again in executive session, presented him with the censure motion. Its substance read in pertinent part:
(Emphasis in original.)
Mooney explained to LaFlamme that, unless he was willing to discuss the committee's concerns, it was prepared to vote on the censure motion during the regular meeting. LaFlamme responded by noting that the motion could not properly be brought during executive session. At that point, the executive session ended and the Prudential Committee resumed its meeting in public.
Committee member James Riley read the motion in its entirety, after which LaFlamme spoke in his own defense. LaFlamme took issue with many of the allegations made in the motion, and challenged in several respects the information upon which the allegations rested. After hearing LaFlamme, the committee granted the motion to censure by a vote of four to one.
On July 21, 1995, LaFlamme sued defendants and the members of the Prudential Committee individually. The superior court dismissed the suit against the individuals on the basis of immunity afforded to municipal officers under 24 V.S.A. § 901(a). While this lawsuit was pending, LaFlamme served on the Prudential Committee a second year before resigning. During that year he made an unsuccessful bid for election to the Village Trustees.
LaFlamme raised three claims: (1) failure to accommodate handicap under 9 V.S.A. § 4502, (2) denial of the right to free speech, and (3) denial of the right to procedural due process. He withdrew a fourth claim alleging defamation.
The jury found in favor of defendants on the handicap accommodation and free speech claims, but awarded LaFlamme $75,000 compensatory and $25,000 punitive damages for violation of his right to procedural due process. In essence, the claim upon which the verdict was rendered, as evidenced by the jury instructions, was that the Prudential Committee damaged LaFlamme's reputation so severely "that his opportunity and ability to associate with others were significantly limited and that the damage resulted without due process of law." Defendants appeal on the ground that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Before reviewing the merits of the appeal, we explain the concept of censure as a method of discipline. In Vermont, school boards derive their power from statute. See Cole v. Town of Hartford School Dist., 131 Vt. 464, 467, 306 A.2d 101, 103 (1973). There is no statutory provision expressly vesting school boards with the authority to censure one of its members. School boards may, however:
approve or disapprove rules and regulations proposed by the principal or super-intendent for the conduct and management of public schools in the district[;]... take any action, which is required for the sound administration of the school district[;] ... exercise the general powers given to a legislative branch of a municipality[; and] ... establish policies and procedures designed to avoid the appearance of board member conflict of interest.
16 V.S.A. § 563(1), (2), (15), (20). Also, Robert's Rules of Order govern the conduct of school board meetings. See 16 V.S.A. § 554. Accordingly, the Essex Junction School District adopted Robert's Rules to govern the conduct of all meetings.
As discussed in Robert's Rules, reprimand is one of several disciplinary actions an organization may undertake. See Sarah Corbin Robert, Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised § 60, at 639 (). Censure is a form of reprimand, defined as "[t]he formal resolution of a legislative, administrative, or other body reprimanding a person, normally one of its own members, for specified conduct." Black's Law Dictionary 203 (5th ed.1979). Per Robert's Rules, conduct subject to disciplinary action such as reprimand may be divided into two categories: (1) offenses committed during a meeting and (2) offenses committed by members outside a meeting.
Determining whether the Prudential Committee possessed the authority to censure LaFlamme, the trial court ruled:
You've heard that there was a question as to whether [the Prudential Committee] had the legal right to censure the plaintiff. The court has determined that it did not have the authority to censure the plaintiff for conduct which occurred outside of committee meetings. It did have the right to censure the plaintiff for words and conduct which occurred during committee meetings.
We need not decide whether the court was correct in this ruling. As discussed below, defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor on the due process claim...
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