Lagasan v. Al-Ghasel

Decision Date12 March 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 1:14–cv–1035 AJT/TCB.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
PartiesArmiya Bani LAGASAN, Plaintiff, v. Hadban AL–GHASEL, et al., Defendants.

Jason Craig Schwartz, Anna Maria McKenzie, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

ANTHONY J. TRENGA, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 18] of the Magistrate Judge recommending that default judgment be entered against defendants Hadban Al–Ghasel and Jimla Al–Ghasel (defendants) and in favor of plaintiff Armiya Bani Lagasan (plaintiff), in the amount of $749,351. No objections to the Report and Recommendation have been filed. The Court conducted a de novo review of the evidence in this case and adopts and incorporates the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(1) [Doc. No. 13] be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that default judgment be, and the same hereby is, entered against defendants, jointly and severally, and in favor of plaintiff, in the amount of $749,351, which consists of $369,606 in compensatory damages under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPA”), $369,606 in punitive damages under the TVPA, and an additional $10,319 in damages for breach of contract.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this Order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 and to forward copies of this Order to all counsel of record and to defendants at the following addresses:

Jimla Al–Ghasel a/k/a Zamia Mohd a/k/a Zamla Mohd
100 South Reynolds Street, # 603
Alexandria, VA 22304
Habdan Al–Ghasel
100 South Reynolds Street, # 603
Alexandria, VA 22304
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THERESA CARROLL BUCHANAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Motion for Default Judgment by plaintiff Armiya Bani Lagasan (plaintiff) against defendants Hadban Al–Ghasel and Jimla Al–Ghasel, also known as Zamia Mohd, also known as Zamla Mohd (defendants). (Dkt. 13.) After a representative for defendants failed to respond to plaintiff's Motion or to appear at the hearing on January 9, 2015, the undersigned Magistrate Judge took this matter under advisement.1

INTRODUCTION
I. Background

Plaintiff is a 27–year–old Filipino woman who was trafficked through Qatar into the United States and forced to work excessive hours in abominable working and living conditions for meager wages by defendants Hadban Al–Ghasel (defendant Mr. Al–Ghasel”) and Jimla Al–Ghasel, also known as Zamia Mohd, also known as Zamia Mohd (defendant Mrs. Al–Ghasel”). (Compl. ¶¶ 1–2.) Plaintiff had previously lived in the Philippines with her husband, daughter and other family members, and decided to travel abroad to work as a domestic servant so she could send money home to her family. (Id. at ¶¶ 27–32.) Plaintiff was recruited by an individual in the Philippines and a recruiting agency, which arranged for her to travel to Qatar and work as a domestic servant. (Id. at ¶¶ 33–48.) The representative for the recruiting agency gave plaintiff a receipt indicating that her salary in Qatar would be $400 USD per month. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Plaintiff worked from September 28, 2010 to February 12, 2011, in Qatar for members of defendants' families. (Id. at ¶¶ 53–74.)

Plaintiff was then sent to the United States in February 2011 to work for defendants in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (Id. at ¶¶ 76, 86.) Defendants confiscated plaintiff's passport and visa upon her arrival in the United States. (Id. at ¶ 82.) From January 12, 2011 until August 30, 2012, defendants forced plaintiff to work at least 18 hours a day, seven days a week, for as little as $200 per month. (Id. at ¶ 2.) They prohibited her from leaving the house, from communicating with anyone outside their presence, and denied her access to medical care, while subjecting her to verbal abuse and inhumane living conditions. (Id. ) Plaintiff was rescued by ICE agents from the defendants' home on August 30, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1590, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and Virginia state law. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry of default judgment when “a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” The court must have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a defaulting party before it can render default judgment.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because plaintiff's allegations concern the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1590, and the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because they form part of the same case or controversy and share a common nucleus of operative fact with her federal law claims. Therefore, federal question subject matter jurisdiction exists.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants because they purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in the Commonwealth of Virginia. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Specifically, defendants employed plaintiff to work as a domestic servant within this district from September 2011 through August 2012. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Therefore, personal jurisdiction is proper.

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because defendants are residents of the state in which this District is located. (Id. at ¶¶ 23–25.)

III. Service of Process

On October 17, 2014, plaintiff's private process server served defendant Mrs. Al–Ghasel. (Dkt. 9.) He also left process with Mrs. Al–Ghasel at defendants' residence for Mr. Al–Ghasel. (Dkt. 10.) Therefore, service was proper under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), which provides that process may be served in any district where a defendant resides or may be found.

IV. Grounds for Default Judgment

Plaintiff filed this action on August 13, 2014. (Dkt. 1.) Defendant has not appeared, answered, or otherwise filed any responsive pleadings in this case. On November 13, 2014, the Clerk of this Court entered default pursuant to plaintiff's Request for Entry of Default and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. (Dkt. 12.) Plaintiff filed her Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 13) and a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 14) on December 17, 2014. After defendants failed to appear at the hearing on plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment on January 9, 2015, the undersigned took this matter under advisement. (Dkt. 17.)

FINDINGS OF FACT

Upon a full review of the pleadings, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that plaintiff established the following facts.

Plaintiff is a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines currently residing in Washington, D.C., and defendants, husband and wife, are citizens of Qatar currently residing in Alexandria, Virginia. (Compl. ¶¶ 21–25.) At the time of the events giving rise to this action, defendants lived in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and then Alexandria, Virginia. (Id. at ¶¶ 22–23.)

In June 2010, plaintiff met a woman named Nuriya who offered to help plaintiff find work as a domestic servant overseas. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Nuriya was a recruiter for Golden Future, a recruiting agency in the Philippines, and worked with Golden Future to obtain plaintiff obtain a passport. (Id. at ¶¶ 35–37.) Nuriya brought plaintiff to Cotabato City to pick up plaintiff's passport and sent that passport to Golden Future in Manila. (Id. at ¶ 39.) On August 27, 2010, plaintiff traveled to Manila to attend a three-week orientation program at Golden Future. (Id. at ¶ 40.) At the Golden Future training, plaintiff was informed that even if she decided not to undertake employment overseas, she would be required to pay Nuriya and Golden Future an amount equivalent to four months' salary. (Id. at ¶ 43.) On September 23, 2010, a Golden Future representative brought plaintiff to the airport and gave plaintiff her passport, a plane ticket to the United Arab Emirates, and a receipt signed by the Philippine Department of Labor and Employment which indicated that her salary in Qatar was to be $400 USD per month. (Id. at ¶¶ 45–47.)

Upon her arrival at the airport in Doha, Qatar, plaintiff's passport and cellphone were taken from her by representatives from Gulf Spring Manpower, Golden Future's sister agency. (Id. at ¶¶ 49–50.) Plaintiff was informed that her salary would be only 730 Qatar Riyals per month, about $200 USD. (Id. at ¶ 51.) On September 28, 2010, Mrs. Al–Ghasel's sister, Baniya, picked plaintiff up from agency. (Id. at ¶ 53.) Plaintiff worked for Baniya for one week, and was then brought to Umm Bab, a desert town, to work for Mrs. Al–Ghasel's mother. (Id. at ¶¶ 54–55.) Plaintiff was forced to work eighteen or nineteen hours a day without any days off, cleaning Mrs. Al–Ghasel's mother's tent, cooking meals, and washing Mrs. Al–Ghasel's mother's hair and legs. (Id. at ¶¶ 56–58.) Throughout this period, plaintiff was forced to sleep outdoors on a mattress on the sand; when she awoke, she could see trails in the sand around her mattress left by snakes. (Id. at ¶ 59.) Plaintiff was not permitted to speak with other domestic servants she encountered, was not allowed to sit down during the work day, and at one point in time, was physically forced into a goat pen while threatened by Mrs. Al–Ghasel's mother. (Id. at ¶¶ 61–63.)

In December 2010, plaintiff was taken from Umm Bab back to Doha where she worked for Mrs. Al–Ghasel's sister, Baniya. (Id. at ¶ 65.) In Doha, plaintiff performed...

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