Lagasse v. City of Waterbury
| Decision Date | 12 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09cv391(VLB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | THOMAS E. LAGASSE, PLAINTIFF, v. CITY OF WATERBURY, SERGEANT CAGNO, and OFFICER M. MODEEN, DEFENDANTs. |
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendants City of Waterbury, Sergeant Cagno ("Cagno"), and Officer M. Modeen ("Modeen"). The Plaintiff, Thomas E. Lagasse ("Lagasse") brought this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of due process, equal protection, and his rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, under the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fourth Amendments respectively.1 In support of his Fourth Amendment claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used excessive force in arresting him and that Defendants unlawfully made a warrantless entry into a private home. Plaintiff also claims he was denied medical treatment in contravention of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that the City of Waterbury is liable in connection with Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims on the basis of its failure to train and supervise its employees. In addition, Plaintiffs assert claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery. Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts of Plaintiffs'Complaint arguing that Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Defendants' actions violated the Fourth, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, constituted false arrest or imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery as Defendants' behavior was objectively reasonable and based on probable cause. In addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no standing to assert a claim for warrantless entry and in the alternative that the warrantless entry was justified due to exigent circumstances. Lastly, Cagno and Modeen assert they are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons stated hereafter, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in favor of all Defendants as to all of Plaintiff's claims.
On March 10, 2009, Plaintiff's Complaint was removed from Connecticut Superior Court. Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on August 31, 2010. [Doc.#23]. The Court notes that Defendants' motion is the first dispositive motion filed in the action. Pursuant to Local Rule 7(a), the Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment was due September 21, 2010. On September 20, 2010, the Plaintiff moved for an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motion until November 1, 2010, which the Court granted. [Docs. #25 and 28, respectively]. On November 1, 2010, Plaintiff moved again for an extension of time to file its response to November 7, 2010, which the Court granted the next day. [Docs.# 30 and 31, respectively]. On November 9, 2010, Plaintiff moved for a third extension of time until November 19, 2010. On November 10, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiff's requested extension of time andinstructed that no further extensions will be granted. [Docs. #31 and 33, respectively]. On November 20, 2010, Plaintiff once again moved for an extension to file its response to November 26, 2011, which was objected to by Defendants. [Docs. #34 and 35, respectively]. On November 23, 2011, the Court denied Plaintiff's fourth motion for an extension of time indicating that "[a]s the Defendant's Motion was filed on 8/31/10, and the Court granted extensions of time for this response on 10/15/10, 11/2/10, and 11/9/10, and provided more time than requested in the most recent order granting the Plaintiff's request, therefore aggregating an additional two months to respond, and as the Plaintiff filed the most recent request on the day that the Response was due despite the Court's indication that 'no further extensions would be granted' and without indication that inquiry was made of opposing counsel, the Plaintiff's motion is denied." [Doc. #36]. To date, the Plaintiff has failed to file a response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. As a result of Plaintiff's failure to file a response, the Court deems the assertions made in Defendants' 56(a)(1) statement as true. [Doc.# 23-2]. LeSane v. Hall's Security Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 210-211 (2d Cir. 2001) (); U.S. v. Cirami, 535 F.2d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1976).
Defendants' 56(a)(1) statement which the Court deems admitted, sets forth the following relevant facts. [Doc.# 23-2]. On June 24, 2007 at 4:12am Officer Modeen was dispatched to 24 Whittier Avenue, Waterbury, Connecticut, inresponse to an attempted burglary. The complainant, Harry Raymond, told Modeen that he heard pounding on his front door and when he opened the door a "light skinned male began to push the door open and attempt to force entry." Mr. Raymond explained that he was able to forcibly push the "light-skinned male" back and close the door. He then saw the male run towards the house next door at 32 Whittier Avenue. Mr. Raymond also explained that 32 Whittier Avenue had been vacant for eight or nine months, but that night he observed a light on in the kitchen for the first time in months. While Modeen was at 24 Whittier Avenue, Sergeant Cagno arrived on the scene.
Modeen and Cagno then walked over to 32 Whittier Avenue where they observed a "For Sale" sign in the front yard and a realtor's lock box on the front door. They also observed that there was a light on in the home and the front door was partially open. Modeen and Cagno observed that the home was empty and unfurnished and pushed the door slightly further to look inside the home for the burglary suspect. They then observed through the opening a light skinned male slumped on the floor of the home. Modeen and Cagno upon the belief that the individual slumped over maybe seriously injured and in need of medical attention entered the home through the door while announcing that it was "Waterbury Police." After entering, they observed another body slumped on the floor and observed that the two bodies slumped on the floor, who were later identified as Plaintiff Lagasse and John Stankus, "appeared to be breathing, were snoring and smelled of alcohol." Once inside the dwelling, Defendant Modeen observed thatboth Lagasse and Stankus "fit the light skinned description of the perpetrator described by Mr. Raymond."
Defendant Modeen then observed another male, later identified as Rick Lyons, sitting on a bathtub in the bathroom. Modeen asked Lyons who lived at the residence to which Lyons responded "No one does." Modeen and Cagno observed several other intoxicated individuals throughout the empty home and then began to handcuff them while they completed their investigation for safety reasons as they had not been able to ascertain if any of the individuals had weapons. Modeen and Cagno instructed these individuals to stand back or to sit down. However, these individuals repeatedly approached Defendants disregarding their instructions and were verbally combative. Modeen first placed Lyons and Stankus in handcuffs. Modeen then attempted to place Plaintiff Lagasse into handcuffs. Modeen identified himself as police to Plaintiff Lagasse. As Modeen began to cuff Lagasse's left wrist, Lagasse pulled his left arm forward and elbowed Modeen in the abdomen with his right elbow causing Modeen to sustain a bruise and seven cuts to his left hand from the handcuffs. Modeen then requested that Lagasse "stop resisting" to which Lagasse responded by yelling profanities at Modeen. Modeen then applied an arm bar to the left arm of the Plaintiff and took him to the ground. Lagasse continued to resist being handcuffed and continued to use his right elbow to strike Modeen in the abdomen and yell obscenities. Modeen used two open palm strikes to the head of Lagasse while he continued to physically resist and be verbally combative. Afterward,Lagasse complied and put his right arm out with his palm out and was handcuffed without further incident.
While handcuffing Lagasse, Modeen observed that Lagasse's breath smelled of alcohol and his speech was slurred. Modeen also observed empty alcohol containers in plain view at the residence of 32 Whittier Avenue. In addition, Lagasse admitted that he consumed several alcoholic beverages on the evening of June 23, 2007 into the morning of June 24, 2007.
Lagasse, who was a minor on the date of the incident, was transported to the Waterbury Police Department and arrested on a charge of interfering with a police officer in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167 and issued an infraction ticket for possession of alcohol by a minor in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-89(b). On August 30, 2007, Lagasse's charge of Interfering with a Police Officer was nolled as a result of completion of a family violence education program. On October 5, 2007, the infraction ticket was nolled. A nolle is not a dismissal, but merely a suspension of prosecution which can ripen into a dismissal. Love v. Town of Granby, No. CIV3:03CV1960, 2004 WL 1683159, at *4 (D. Conn. 2004).
On June 24, 2007, the residence of 32 Whittier Avenue was owned by Mildred Lyons, was up for sale, and currently vacant. Mildred Lyons is the mother of Rick Lyons. On June 24, 2007, Rick Lyons did not have permission to be in the house at 32 Whittier Avenue nor did any of the other occupants. This fact was corroborated by Michelle Williams, the sister of Rick Lyons, who arrived on the scene on June 24, 2007 and spoke with Modeen informing him that no oneincluding her brother is allowed in the house and that Rick Lyons was aware that he was not allowed in the house.
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