Lago v. Guerrette

• Decision Date: 18 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 14220,14220
• Citation: 219 Conn. 262,592 A.2d 939
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: John LAGO v. Donald B. GUERRETTE et al.

Page 939

592 A.2d 939

219 Conn. 262

John LAGO v.Donald B. GUERRETTE et al.

No. 14220.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 27, 1991.

Decided June 18, 1991.

Robert P. Hanahan, Middlebury, for appellants(defendants).

Brian Tynan, Wolcott, for appellee(plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ.

COVELLO, Associate Justice.

This is an action to quiet title with respect to an easement that allegedly crosses the defendants' real property on Janet Avenue, Wolcott.The trial court concluded that the plaintiff had an easement by deed over the disputed right of way and rendered judgment accordingly.The issue presented on appeal is whether, as a matter of law, the easement granted to the plaintiff includes the right to pass over the defendants' land.We conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion and therefore affirm the judgment.

The predicate facts are not in dispute.The plaintiff's land is part of what was once a larger tract located on the southerly side of Route 69, Wolcott.Ina M. MacLeod originally owned all of this land.Beginning in 1936, MacLeod conveyed out six parcels from within the tract that abutted, either on the east or west, an old wood road that ran from north to south through the middle of the tract.In the deeds to those parcels MacLeod variously described the road as "Old Wood Road,""old wood road," a "proposed 25 foot passway," a "25 foot passway," or a "25 foot wood road."In each deed, with one exception, ¹ MacLeod granted to the purchaser an easement authorizing the use of this road.MacLeod variously described the easement as follows: "Together with a right of way ... over said 25 foot wood road running from the State Highway southerly to the land herein described"; "[t]ogether with a right of way in common with others over the said old wood road"; and "[t]ogether with a right of way ... to be used in common with others, over said 25 foot passway which runs from the State Highway southerly to the land herein described."

On December 3, 1941, MacLeod conveyed the remainder of her land, the extreme southerly portion of the original tract, to Joseph Brilsky.In that deed MacLeod recited that the property was conveyed: "Subject to a right of way mentioned in a deed to Arthur J. Bouchard and in a deed to Anna B. Brilsky over a 25 foot wood road running from the State Highway southerly to the land conveyed to said Arthur J. Bouchard and now owned by Anna B. Brilsky."The Bouchard/Anna Brilsky parcel thus described is located to the immediate northeast of the land that MacLeod conveyed to Joseph Brilsky.In the deed to Joseph Brilsky, MacLeod further stated that the property was conveyed: "[t]ogether with a right of way to the Grantee, his heirs and assigns, to be used in common with others over [a] ... 25 foot wood road or passway ... running from the State Highway southerly to the land herein conveyed."Thus, when MacLeod conveyed the parcel to Joseph Brilsky, she did not further burden it with the right of way that she had reserved for the use of the earlier grantees to whom she had conveyed land.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

On May 20, 1954, Frances P. Dihlman conveyed to the same Joseph Brilsky a substantial tract located on the northerly side of Janet Avenue, Wolcott.The northerly boundary of this land abutted the southerly boundary of the land that Brilsky purchased from MacLeod.The deed from Dihlman to Brilsky contained no easements or rights of way relevant to the present dispute.²

On October 6, 1969, Brilsky conveyed a portion of the southerly part of the MacLeod tract to the plaintiff, John Lago.The deed described the land as being bounded: "Westerly 200 feet on Janet Lane, so-called, a/k/a Old Wood Road."The deed further stated that the property was conveyed: "Together with a right of way in common with others over Janet Lane, so-called, a/k/a Old Wood Road."This was not the first time that Brilsky had referred to a portion of his property as Janet Lane.On November 13, 1967, Brilsky had conveyed the southwest corner of the tract that he received from Dihlman to Richard W. Schilling and Patricia G. Schilling.That deed stated that the property was bounded: "Easterly--143 feet, more or less, by Janet Lane, a private passway."The defendants' property lies to the immediate east and abuts the land described in the Schilling deed.Thus the Schilling deed raised the clear implication that Brilsky perceived that a private passway burdened the westerly portion of the land that ultimately became the defendants' property.

While both parties agree that the defendants' property is burdened by a right of way, they dispute the extent of the use authorized over the right of way.The plaintiff argues that his "right of way in common with others over Janet Lane, so-called, a/k/a Old Wood Road" as contained in his deed from Joseph Brilsky, gave him the right to pass southerly from his property out to Janet Avenue on the south.The defendants, on the other hand, argued that the private passway southward to Janet Avenue referred to in the Schilling deed, was only for the benefit of the Schillings and the Guerrettes and the right of way conveyed to the plaintiff only authorizes northward travel out to Route 69.

The attorney trial referee, having heard the testimony of two title experts, having examined the various deeds and maps, and having personally viewed the disputed area, concluded in his report that: "By virtue of his October 6, 1969 Deed from Joseph Brilsky(Plaintiff's Exhibit # 1), the Plaintiff has 'a right of way in common with others over Janet Lane so called a/k/a Old Wood Road' southerly to Janet Avenue."(Emphasis in original.)The trial court accepted the attorney...