LaGuire v. Kain

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BRICKLEY; MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH; BOYLE; MALLETT
• Citation: LaGuire v. Kain, 487 N.W.2d 389, 440 Mich. 367 (Mich. 1991)
• Decision Date: 01 December 1991
• Docket Number: 7,Nos. 6,90657,Docket Nos. 89871,s. 6
• Parties: Betty Jane LaGUIRE, Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael John Mihailuk, deceased, Michael Grant Mihailuk, Janet Sue Mihailuk, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. William James KAIN, d/b/a Copa Nite Club, and Charles Baker Scott, III, (not an Appellee) Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellants. Thomas WARANICA, Barbara Waranica, Colleen Waranica and John Waranica, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CHEERS GOOD TIME SALOONS, INC., d/b/a Cheers Good Time Saloon, a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar,

Page 389

487 N.W.2d 389

440 Mich. 367

Betty Jane LaGUIRE, Personal Representative of the Estate of

Michael John Mihailuk, deceased, Michael Grant

Mihailuk, Janet Sue Mihailuk, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. William James KAIN, d/b/a Copa Nite Club, and Charles Baker

Scott, III, (not an Appellee) Jointly and

Severally, Defendants-Appellants.

Thomas WARANICA, Barbara Waranica, Colleen Waranica and John

Waranica, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CHEERS GOOD TIME SALOONS, INC., d/b/a Cheers Good Time

Saloon, a Michigan corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 89871, 90657.

Calendar Nos. 6, 7, Dec. Term, 1991.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 3, 1991.

Decided July 29, 1992.

Rizik & Zintsmaster, P.C. by Michael B. Rizik, Flint, Bueche & Failer by Patrick J. O'Callaghan, Flushing, for plaintiffs-appellees in Case No. 89871.

Robert P. Keil, Flint, for defendant-appellant, William James Kain, in Case No. 89871.

Kallas, Lower, Henk & Treado, P.C. by Constantine N. Kallas, Robert P. Hurley, Bloomfield Hills, for amicus curiae in Support of defendant-appellant, Michigan Licensed Beverage Ass'n, Michigan Licensed Beverage Ass'n Ltd. Liability Pool, Bowling Centers Ass'n of Michigan, Bowling Proprietors of Michigan Ltd. Liability Pool, Northpointe Ins. Co., First Sec. Ins. Co., and Sourceone Ins. Co., in Case No. 89871 and 90657.

Verspoor, Waalkes, Lalley & Slotsema, P.C. by Daniel J. Slotsema, Grand Rapids, for plaintiffs-appellees in Case No. 90657.

Frank S. Spies, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant in Case No. 90657.

BRICKLEY, Justice.

The question presented in these companion cases is whether Michigan's Liquor Control Act, as amended in 1986, ¹ entitles a minor's estate or a minor's family to recover from a liquor licensee for injuries allegedly resulting from the licensee's illegal provision of alcohol to a minor. We hold that the 1986 amendments of the dramshop act bar both a minor's estate and the family of that minor from recovery under the act. Therefore, we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals in Waranica v. Cheers Good Time Saloons, Inc., 186 Mich.App. 398, 464 N.W.2d 902 (1990), and LaGuire v. Kain, 185 Mich.App. 239, 460 N.W.2d 598 (1990).

I

Each of these cases arises out of an automobile collision that occurred after the defendant liquor licensee allegedly illegally served alcohol to the driver of a vehicle, a minor, who became intoxicated, caused a collision resulting in the minor's death, and injured others.

A

In LaGuire v. Kain, the plaintiff's decedent, Michael John Mihailuk, then seventeen, purportedly used an altered driver's license to purchase alcoholic beverages from the defendant liquor licensee, William James Kain, doing business as Copa Nite Club. After leaving the bar, the decedent drove his car across the center line and collided head-on with another vehicle, injuring the driver, Lisa Lord, and killing himself. Lisa Lord sued Betty Jane LaGuire, personal representative of the estate of the decedent, Michael John Mihailuk, and his parents, Michael Grant Mihailuk and Janet Sue Mihailuk. The defendants in the original suit, the minor's estate and parents, filed cross-claims against the liquor licensee. After Lisa Lord, the original plaintiff, settled with the minor's estate and family and gave up her claim against the licensee, the trial court realigned the parties and ordered a revised caption, which represented the original defendants, the minor's estate and his family, as plaintiffs, and the licensee as the defendant. ²

The defendant licensee moved for summary disposition on the basis that the statute failed to create a cause of action in favor of plaintiffs. Relying on Cornack v. Sweeney, 127 Mich.App. 375, 339 N.W.2d 26 (1983), the defendant argued that no cause of action existed in favor of the minor or his estate before the 1986 amendments and that the 1986 amendments of the statute created no cause of action in their favor. In response, the plaintiffs focused on subsection 10 of the dramshop act, M.C.L. Sec. 436.22(10); M.S.A. Sec. 18.993(10). In analyzing that provision, the plaintiffs relied on Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971), for the rule of statutory construction providing that the expression of one thing in a statute excludes the inclusion of other similar things. Plaintiffs claimed that because neither the minor nor the minor's family were specifically mentioned in subsection 10, which barred actions by visibly intoxicated persons, the statute was not intended to bar their claims. The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs.

The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, noting that Rosas v. Damore, 171 Mich.App. 563, 430 N.W.2d 783 (1988), had been released after argument of the defendant's motion for summary disposition. The defendant contended that Rosas had interpreted the amended statute to preclude a noninnocent party, including a minor, from recovering damages under the statute. In response, the plaintiffs sought to undermine the authority of Rosas by suggesting that it erroneously relied on Longstreth v. Gensel, 423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804 (1985), a case involving common-law liability of social hosts and not applicable to dramshop liability under the statute. Concluding that it was bound by Rosas, the trial court granted the motion for reconsideration and granted summary disposition for the defendant with respect to the claims of the minor's estate and the claims of the minor's parents.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that both the minor's estate and the minor's family were entitled to sue under the amended statute. ³ Noting that before the 1986 amendments the actions would have been barred, the Court of Appeals examined the language and structure of the amended statute in light of several rules of construction, concluding that both a minor and the minor's family could sue. The Court then certified that its opinion conflicted with Rosas v. Damore, supra, and Saavedra v. Ghannan, 183 Mich.App. 234, 454 N.W.2d 134 (1989).

We granted leave to appeal. 437 Mich. 1046, 472 N.W.2d 638 (1991).

B

In Waranica v. Cheers Good Time Saloons, Inc., the parents of decedent Deborah Waranica, Thomas and Barbara Waranica, and two siblings, Colleen and John Waranica, sued a liquor licensee, Cheers Good Time Saloons, claiming that the licensee unlawfully sold, gave or furnished alcohol to Deborah Waranica, a minor, before her death in a car accident on April 10, 1987. The plaintiffs claimed that, as a result of her intoxication, Deborah Waranica drove her car on the wrong side of a state highway and collided head-on with another car.

The defendant unsuccessfully sought summary disposition, contending that M.C.L. Sec. 436.22 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 18.993 et seq. did not provide a cause of action for the family of a minor who had been illegally served alcohol. The Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal the trial court's order denying summary disposition.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, deciding that the minor's family had a cause of action under the amended statute. The Court of Appeals took as its starting point the traditional interpretation of the dramshop act that precluded the intoxicated person's action, the noninnocent party doctrine. It then examined the 1986 amendments to see whether the language changed prior law to give the imbiber a cause of action. Disagreeing with the LaGuire Court's rationale, the Waranica Court concluded that the Legislature did not intend to allow minors who are noninnocent parties to sue. Reviewing the effect of changes in subsections 4, 6, 8, and 10, the Court concluded that, although the minor's suit was precluded by the noninnocent party doctrine, the family's suit was permissible.

This Court granted the defendant leave to appeal and ordered that the case be argued and submitted to the Court together with LaGuire v. Kain. 437 Mich. 1046, 472 N.W.2d 638 (1991).

II

The dramshop act ⁴ occupies the field of liability arising out of the selling, giving or furnishing of alcoholic liquor to minors or visibly intoxicated persons. Jackson v. PKM Corp., 430 Mich. 262, 279, 422 N.W.2d 657 (1988). In enacting the dramshop act, the Legislature created a new remedy, not available at common law, and "provided a specific action with which to achieve that remedy." Browder v. Int'l. Fidelity Ins. Co., 413 Mich. 603, 613, 321 N.W.2d 668 (1982). This Court previously acknowledged that the Legislature has attempted to keep the act internally balanced, id. at 614, 321 N.W.2d 668, resulting in a "complete and self-contained solution to a social problem not adequately addressed at common law." Id. at 615, 321 N.W.2d 668. Therefore, in interpreting the various provisions of the dramshop act, this Court must reconcile seeming inconsistencies, if possible, in order to give a common effect to the entire act that is consistent with the Legislature's intent. In re State Hwy. Comm., 383 Mich. 709, 714, 178 N.W.2d 923 (1970).

Statutory interpretation analysis must begin with an examination of the words chosen by the Legislature. Subsection 4 of the dramshop act, as amended in 1986, sets forth the persons entitled to bring a cause of action:

"Except as otherwise provided in this section, an individual who suffers damage or is personally injured by a minor or visibly intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor to the minor or visibly intoxicated person, if the unlawful sale is proven to be a proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death, or the spouse, child, parent, or guardian of that individual, shall have a right of action in his or her name against the person who by selling, giving, or furnishing the alcoholic liquor has caused or contributed to the intoxication of the person or who has caused or contributed to the damages, injury or death." M.C.L. Sec. 436.22(4); M.S.A. Sec. 18.993(4) (emphasis added).

...