Lagway v. Dallman

Decision Date13 November 1992
Docket NumberNo. 5:90CV1653.,5:90CV1653.
Citation806 F. Supp. 1322
PartiesWillie LAGWAY, Petitioner, v. William DALLMAN, Warden, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kort W. Gatterdam, Ohio Public Defender Com'n, Columbus, Ohio, for petitioner.

Jack W. Decker, Office of the Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for respondent.

ORDER

SAM H. BELL, District Judge.

On September 17, 1990, petitioner, Willie Lagway, filed a motion with the court seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On July 23, 1992, pursuant to this court's order of reference, Magistrate Judge Gallas returned his report and recommendations. Both petitioner and respondent filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendations.

BACKGROUND

For reasons which will be apparent in the discussion which follows, a detailed exposition of the proceedings in this matter is necessary. The Summit County Grand Jury indicted petitioner on six counts of aggravated robbery, six counts of kidnapping, four counts of rape, one count of gross sexual imposition, and one count of grand theft. Two of the aggravated robbery counts included a specification that the petitioner had a knife and/or handgun. The acts comprising the alleged crimes were asserted to have taken place February 10-15, 1983.

On March 7, 1983, on the occasion of petitioner's arraignment, he, through his then counsel, Attorney Ralph Capriolo, entered a formal plea of not guilty. Counsel noted at that time that a written plea of not guilty by reason of insanity had been filed. But Mr. Capriola asked permission "to withhold that, at least for one week, to determine whether or not it is advisable to go forward with that." (T. Vol. I, 2-3.) Without further discussion, Judge Reece, the trial judge, granted the request.

On March 16, Attorney Capriolo withdrew from the case. At a hearing on that date, the subject of the "withheld" plea did not arise. The trial court acted promptly to secure successor counsel for petitioner — by March 30, Attorney Patricia Millhoff had been appointed. Both she and prosecutor Robert Bulford received a report generated by the court's Psycho-Diagnostic Clinic concerning the competence of petitioner to stand trial. That report was discussed at the March 30 status conference. (Id. at 7.)

According to the report, psychologist Dan Reinhold was unable to administer a formal competency screening test because petitioner felt that formal tests would be very biased by reason of the examiner's affiliation with the state. However, based on the his interview of petitioner, Reinhold did give the following conclusions:

Willie was fairly well oriented in all spheres, and probably had good recall of both recent and remote events if he wished to reveal his recall. No readily apparent hallucinations or delusions were manifested.
Willie did state that he does go, at times, into a dream-like state which might reflect hallucinatory adventures, and part of his conversation was very similar to delusional systems found in psychotic patients. His judgment was somewhat impaired, although he seemed to have adequate insight into his behavior. His obscured in copy was appropriate, he gave evidence of having an average to above average intelligence, and he was in good contact with reality.
Willie gave all evidence of being a schizophrenic individual. Some thought disorders and pathological ideations were manifested. He was alert and lucid, coherent, but not always logical or rational. At times, he gave relevant answers to questions asked of him, and other times he would answer, in no way, relevant to the conversation. It is reasonable to believe that his behavior in the courtroom might be acceptable because he wants to be sent to jail where he can receive atonement for every day he spends in prison. His comprehension and conceptualization appeared to be highly impaired.
Willie is not competent to stand trial at the present time, he cannot appreciate the nature and consequences of the charge made against him, he does, apparently, have an adequate understanding of courtroom procedures but might find it very difficult to cooperate with his attorney to acquire a suitable defense. Willie is a mentally ill individual subject to hospitalization. There is a substantial possibility that he will be restored to reason within one year.
He is not a dangerous individual but one should be cautious that he might find a way to disassociate himself from any hospital to which he is admitted.
The information upon which this finding is made can be found in the Psycho-Diagnostic Clinic. If we can be of any further assistance, feel free to call this office.

(Respondent's Ex. B.)

On April 8, 1983, the trial judge held a competency hearing in which the Psycho-Diagnostic Clinic report was jointly submitted as evidence. (T. vol. I, 10.) No other reports or evidence were submitted. At the same time, Judge Reece dealt with petitioner's request to proceed in the case on his own. In the course of addressing petitioner's pending motion to withdraw Ms. Millhoff as his attorney, the judge also questioned petitioner at great length regarding his competency to stand trial. (Id. at 11-48.) Without referencing the expert's report, the trial judge reached his own conclusion on the competency issue:

Well, you seem pretty competent to me. You seem to know what is going on around you. You don't seem to be out of touch with reality anyway. I mean you got enough sense to tell me you don't like the lawyer you got, and you tell me why you got problems with her. You know what I'm doing here, you know what the prosecutor is doing here. You know what a jury's going to be doing here. You've been in a courtroom before in California, it seems to me like you know what you're doing.

(Id. at 48.) Immediately thereafter, the trial judge ruled that petitioner could proceed pro se subject to the continuing presence of Ms. Millhoff as stand-by counsel in the event petitioner changed his mind or had any questions. (Id. at 52). While the April 8 hearing is the focal point of petitioner's stated objections to the findings of the Magistrate Judge, this court believes it necessary to consider, as well, other hearings in the trial court bearing on issues of competency.

On May 4, the day before petitioner's trial, Ms. Millhoff renewed her motion concerning petitioner's competence by the following statement addressed to the trial court:

He has basically not discussed with me the matters concerning this case, but most of our discussions have been of a philosophical nature and, in addition, it is my understanding that he is not eating in the Summit County Jail and has not done so for several days, and I would ask the Court on that basis, in addition to the fact that the report of Dan Reinhold of the Psycho-Diagnostic Clinic, that report is uncontroverted at this time — that the Court reconsider its motion and inquire of Willie regarding his competency at this time.

Id. at 66. Judge Reece did not address this motion at that moment but returned to it at the end of the meeting. By this time, petitioner had told the judge that he would not answer any questions because the judge was forcing him to participate in something of which he did not want to be a part. (Id. at 70-72.)

In response to counsel's motion, the trial court said: "I suppose the only new development I know of or has been brought to my attention regarding that aspect is his recent fast at the County Jail, I guess." Petitioner was then asked: "Do you have anything you choose to tell me about why you're fasting over at the jail?" (Id. at 73-74.) Petitioner refused to respond.

On the morning of May 5, at a suppression hearing, Ms. Millhoff withdrew completely from her active representation of petitioner. Petitioner did not respond to questions from the court at that hearing as well, so the trial court concluded that, "in the interest of protecting the Defendant's rights, in spite of his apparent desire not to have his rights protected, I believe that we should have counsel present, at least in the event the Defendant wishes to consult counsel during some course of the proceedings." (T. vol. II, 4-5.)

At that same hearing Ms. Millhoff once again renewed her motion to consider petitioner's competency.

I have, again, no new information to give the Court, but he is obviously not speaking here today. We have documented evidence from the dispensary at the jail that he has not been eating. Based on the fact that there have been found ketones in his urine and that he has continued to indicate that he does not wish to have counsel present. Further, as I've indicated previously, the report of Dan Reinhold, as to his lack of competency to counsel, was still uncontroverted, and I would renew my motion on that basis. Thank you. If I might add, I would just ask that that be an ongoing motion rather than continue to make it throughout trial.

(Id. at 6-7.)

The trial judge's only response was to agree to the nature of the objection. "Yes, I think it is proper that it be an ongoing motion. In fact, I think the Court has an obligation to consider the matter at all stages of the proceedings." (Id. at 7.) He did not respond to the objective indicia of incompetence and still did not comment on the Reinhold report. The cause proceeded to trial.

Prior to the voir dire on the afternoon of May 5, Ms. Millhoff placed in the record petitioner's desire that she not "voir dire the jury, give an opening statement or cross-examine witnesses." (T. vol. III, 5.) Prior to the defense voir dire, Ms. Millhoff noted for the record a written request by petitioner which she felt compelled to disregard or incompetent to perform. "If you address the jury to use any other law than my Father sic law, you are committing a crime against me and my Father, and I must ask my Father for justice in reference to you." (Id. at 8-9.)

The trial judge asked petitioner if he had any questions ...

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18 cases
  • Banks v. Horn
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • 7 Mayo 1999
    ...discussion of the procedural and substantive aspects of a due process claim relating to competency is provided in Lagway v. Dallman, 806 F.Supp. 1322, 1333-1342 (N.D.Ohio 1992). 5. Unlike the Seventh Circuit in Pitsonbarger, the Third Circuit in Hull did not analyze the underlying claim rel......
  • State v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Nebraska Court of Appeals
    • 25 Junio 1996
    ...in order to protect Johnson's substantive due process right not to be tried for a crime while incompetent. See, Lagway v. Dallman, 806 F.Supp. 1322 (N.D.Ohio 1992); Martin v. Dugger, 686 F.Supp. 1523 Lagway is a federal habeas proceeding and addresses the adequacy of a competency determinat......
  • State v. Vrabel, 2000-0644.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 2 Julio 2003
    ...he was incompetent to stand trial because his paranoia did not permit him to trust his lawyers. Appellant relies on Lagway v. Dallman (N.D.Ohio 1992), 806 F.Supp. 1322, 1341, for the proposition that a court may disregard or discount expert testimony in a competency hearing if there are obj......
  • Doughty v. Grayson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • 31 Octubre 2005
    ...held after the fact violates established Supreme Court precedent. There is some support for that argument in Lagway v. Dallman, 806 F.Supp. 1322, 1339 (N.D.Ohio 1992), where the court, when confronted eight years after the fact with the state trial judge's inadequate treatment of a competen......
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