Laidlaw v. Sage
Citation | 158 N.Y. 73,52 N.E. 679 |
Parties | LAIDLAW v. SAGE. |
Decision Date | 10 January 1899 |
Court | New York Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.
Action by William R. Laidlaw, Jr., against Russell Sage. From a judgment of the appellate division of the general term (37 N. Y. Supp. 770) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, and, from an order affirming an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed.
The judgment of affirmance was entered March 12, 1896, and contained no provision showing that the appellate division was unanimous in awarding it. Subsequently to its entry, the plaintiff moved for a resettlement of the order of affirmance, so that it should appear in the order that the decision of that court was unanimous; but that motion was denied.
Edward C. James, for appellant.
Joseph H. Choate, for respondent.
This action was commenced May 26, 1892. Its purpose was to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of an explosion which occurred in the defendant's office, in the city of New York, on the 4th day of December, 1891. There is no allegation in the complaint, nor was there any proof upon the trial, which even tended to show that the defendant was in any way responsible for the explosion which was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. The evidence disclosed that a stranger, whose name was subsequently found to be Norcross, called at the defendant's office December 4, 1891, at about 10 minutes past 12 o'clock, said he desired to see the defendant in relation to some railroad bonds, and had a letter of introduction from Mr. Rockefeller. When asked to send it to the defendant, he stated that he preferred to present it in person, and that he only wanted to say two or three words. Upon receiving this message, the defendant stepped from his private office into the anteroom, went to the window, and looked into the lobby, where he saw Norcross sitting upon a settee. At the time the defendant met the plaintiff, who said he had a message from Mr. Bloodgood, and the defendant thereupon turned the knob of the door, and the plaintiff passed into the anteroom of the office. The former then spoke to Norcross, who instantly arose, took his carpet bag in his left hand, and, approaching him, handed him a letter which was supposed to be from Mr. Rockefeller, which he took, opened, and read. It was a typewritten communication, the substance of which was: The defendant read the letter twice, folded it, handed it back to Norcross, and then commenced parleying with him, stating that he had an engagement with two gentlemen, that he was short of time, and, if it was going to take much time, he wanted him to come later in the day. Norcross, after a second, said ‘Then, do I understand you to refuse my offer?’ to which the defendant replied, Norcross held the bag at the end of his fingers, walked backward towards the door through which he came, and, when he reached the threshold, he stopped, and looked at the defendant. The defendant stepped back a little towards the desk that was in the anteroom, while Norcross was going the other way. As he reached the threshold, he looked at the defendant, and said, ‘I rather infer from your answers that you refuse my offer,’ to which the defendant answered, ‘Is there anything in my appearance that would cause you to think that I would not do as I say I would?’ and repeated that he had an appointment with two gentlemen, and that he could get through in about two minutes, and would then see him. Norcross then gave one look, stepped to one side, when the flash came, and it was all over in two seconds. In backing down the room, the defendant came to the desk, and was partially sitting upon the edge of it when the explosion occurred. After the explosion, it was found that everything in the office was wrecked. The partitions, floors, joists, plaster, desks, tables, chairs, and other furniture were destroyed, the window sashes and window frames were blown out, even in the private office. Norcross was blown to pieces, and Norton, one of the clerks in the defendant's office, was hurled through the window to the street below, where he met his death. A steel safe which was locked and stood in an adjoining room was blown open, its contents scattered upon the floor with other débris, and every person who was in the room was either killed or seriously injured. Indeed, the explosion was so violent, so general, and so destructive in its effect that it seems little less than miraculous that any person who was present should have escaped with his life. This portion of the transaction is undisputed in any essential or material particular.
The plaintiff claims that, upon entering the office, he passed the defendant and Norcross, who were conversing in the lobby near the door of the anteroom; that he entered the anteroom, which was about 8 by 16 feet, went to a table or desk near the center of the room, where he stood waiting for the defendant, with his back to the door, looking towards Mr. Norton, who stood by the ticker at the window, looking out on Rector street; that, while he stood there, he once or twice glanced over his shoulder, saw that the defendant was inside the anteroom door, and that Norcross was just outside; that he heard nothing said, said nothing himself, and saw no paper in the defendant's hand; that he turned, and looked towards the window, with his back to the defendant, when the latter suddenly came in range of his vision on his left side, came over, and placed his hand on his shoulder; that afterwards he dropped his left hand, and took the plaintiff's right hand in his, and gently moved him over towards the direction in which he stood, which was from the plaintiff's right to his left, and that he gently moved him about the width of his body, about 15 inches, or probably more. He then testified: Upon cross-examination he testified: He also gave evidence to the effect that he had previously testified that the defendant did not use any force upon him, and he never thought of such a thing as that until after the explosion; that he did not think he was conscious that the defendant was pulling him at the time, and he could not say that he was exactly conscious of any force of Mr. Sage's hands in moving him; that he was moved easily and without resistance; that he moved voluntarily, because he offered no resistance; that he did not think he was conscious of being pulled at the time; and that that testimony was true.
As to this part of the transaction, the defendant testified that, when he reached the corner of the table, the plaintiff was about four feet from him towards the partition, and that they were in that position when the explosion occurred. He denied that he ever had his hands upon the person of the plaintiff in any manner whatever until after the explosion; testified that at the time the plaintiff was not between him and Norcross for an instant, and that he did not at any time intend or design interposing the body of the plaintiff between himself and Norcross; that he did not put himself behind the plaintiff, and that no portion of his body was behind the plaintiff; that he did not touch him at all, and made no such statement to Norcross as was testified to by the plaintiff; that, after the explosion, they were found thrown together, and that he lifted the plaintiff, which was the first time he had his hand upon him. The evidence of the defendant was corroborated in most of its essential particulars by the testimony of Frank Robertson, who was in the office at the time. There was also other proof which tended to corroborate him, and which was in conflict...
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