Laidlaw Waste Systems (Madison), Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd.

• Decision Date: 18 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 5-91-0004,5-91-0004
• Citation: 230 Ill.App.3d 132,595 N.E.2d 600,172 Ill.Dec. 239
• Parties: , 172 Ill.Dec. 239 LAIDLAW WASTE SYSTEMS (MADISON), INC., Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, v. The POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, Village of Roxana, Richard Worthen, Clarence Bohm, Harry Parker, George Arnold, City of Edwardsville, City of Troy, Village of Maryville, and Village of Glen Carbon, Respondents and Cross-Petitioners.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 600

595 N.E.2d 600

230 Ill.App.3d 132, 172 Ill.Dec. 239

LAIDLAW WASTE SYSTEMS (MADISON), INC., Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, v. The POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, Village of Roxana, Richard Worthen, Clarence Bohm, Harry Parker, George Arnold, City of Edwardsville, City of Troy, Village of Maryville, and Village of Glen Carbon, Respondents and Cross-Petitioners.

No. 5-91-0004.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

June 18, 1992.

Brian E. Konzen, Leo H. Konzen, Lueders, Robertson & Konzen, Granite City, for Laidlaw Waste Systems (Madison), Inc.

George J. Moran, Sr., Callahan & Moran, P.C., Trenton, for Village of Roxana, Richard Worthen, Clarence Bohm, Harry Parker, George Arnold, City of Edwardsville City of Troy, Village of Maryville, and Village of Glen Carbon.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Sol. Gen., Chicago, (Daniel N. Malato, Asst. Atty. Gen. of counsel), for Illinois Pollution Control Bd.

Justice WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

Laidlaw Waste Systems (Madison), Inc. (hereinafter "Laidlaw"), appeals from an order of the Pollution Control Board, entered November 29, 1990, which reversed the decision of the Village of Roxana Board of Trustees granting pollution control facility siting approval to Laidlaw. The Pollution Control Board (hereinafter "Board") found that, because the application of Laidlaw for siting approval had been filed within two years of the disapproval of a previous application which was substantially the same as the present application, the Village of Roxana had no jurisdiction to consider the application pursuant to section 39.2(m) of the Environmental Protection Act (hereinafter "Act"). That section provides as follows:

"An applicant may not file a request for local siting approval which is substantially the same as a request which was disapproved pursuant to a finding against the applicant under any of criteria (i) through (ix) of subsection (a) of this Section within the preceding 2 years." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1039.2(m).)

For reasons which follow, we reverse the decision of the Pollution Control Board and remand this cause to that Board for further proceedings.

The facts are as follows. On August 19, 1987, GSX Corporation of Illinois filed with Madison County an application requesting local siting approval for expansion of its regional pollution control facility. On February 8, 1988, the county denied the application for the reason that the applicant had failed to satisfy several of the criteria contained in subsection (a) of section 39.2. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1039.2(a).

Subsequently, the regional pollution control facility in question was taken over by Laidlaw. It was also annexed to the Village of Roxana, giving the Village jurisdiction over any application for local siting approval for expansion of the facility. On January 2, 1990, Laidlaw filed with the Village of Roxana a new application requesting local siting approval for expansion of the regional pollution control facility.

At public hearing on the application, held pursuant to section 39.2(d) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1039.2(d)), intervenors, the municipalities of Troy, Maryville, Edwardsville and Glen Carbon, through their attorney, made a motion to dismiss the application of Laidlaw for the reason, among others, that it is substantially the same as the previous application filed by GSX Corporation of Illinois, which was disapproved by the County Board less than two years before the instant application was filed, all in violation of section 39.2(m) of the Act.

The hearing officer who presided over the hearing denied the motion to dismiss. He stated that the two-year proscription began to run as of the date of filing of the previous application, not as of the date of its disapproval. The instant application was filed more than two years after the filing of the previous application. The hearing officer also stated that the second application was not substantially the same as the previous application as it involved a "different facility".

On June 14, 1990, the Regional Pollution Control Hearing Committee of the Village of Roxana entered its findings of fact and recommendations. It found that all of the criteria set forth in section 39.2(a) had been satisfied and recommended that the application be approved. The Committee made no express finding with respect to the motion to dismiss made by intervenors but found that the application conformed to the requirements of section 39.2 of the Act. On June 18, 1990, the Village of Roxana Board of Trustees adopted the findings of fact of the Hearing Committee and approved Laidlaw's request for siting approval for expansion of its regional pollution control facility.

Intervenors petitioned the Illinois Pollution Control Board for hearing to contest the decision of the Village of Roxana Board of Trustees pursuant to section 40.1 of the Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1040.1.) Public hearing was held before the Board on October 2, 1990, and on November 29, 1990, the Board rendered its decision reversing the decision of Village of Roxana Board of Trustees. Among the issues raised before the Board were whether fundamental fairness was denied when the hearing officer, rather than the Hearing Committee, decided the intervenors' motion to dismiss the application because it was filed within two years of the disapproval of a previous application and whether fundamental error occurred when the Hearing Committee failed to make a finding on this issue. The Board did not address these issues because it found that, in any event, the Village of Roxana Board of Trustees had no jurisdiction over Laidlaw's application as it was, in fact, filed in violation of section 39.2(m) of the Act.

Acknowledging that no court had construed section 39.2(m) of the Act, the Board found that, based on the plain language of the statute, the two-year time period begins to run as of the date of disapproval of the previous application, not as of the date of its filing. The Board further found that the application filed by Laidlaw was "substantially similar" to the application previously filed by GSX Corporation of Illinois because both applications sought expansion of the same facility. The Board further found that it made no difference that the two applications were filed before different local governing bodies, i.e., Madison County and the Village of Roxana. The Board concluded that, because Laidlaw's application was filed within two years of the disapproval of the previous, "substantially similar" application for expansion of the same facility, in violation of section 39.2(m) of the Act, the Village of Roxana Board of Trustees had no jurisdiction to consider the application. Accordingly, the Board reversed the decision of the Village of Roxana Board of Trustees granting siting approval to Laidlaw.

Laidlaw now appeals to this court pursuant to section 41 of the Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1041.) Laidlaw contends that the Board erred in three respects: (1) in construing the statute to mean that the two-year prohibition against refiling begins to run as of the disapproval of the previous application rather than its filing; (2) in exceeding its authority by deciding a question of fact (that the two applications were substantially the same) de novo instead of deciding whether the decision of the Village of Roxana Board of Trustees on this issue was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) in finding that the two applications are substantially the same within the meaning of section 39.2(m) of the Act.

With respect to the first issue, we agree with the Board's interpretation of section 39.2(m) as prohibiting the filing of a new application within two years of the disapproval of a previous application. The meaning of a statute in the first instance is determined by the statutory language, and where the intent of the legislature can be ascertained from the language of a statute, it will be given effect without resorting to other aids of construction. (Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1987), 165 Ill.App.3d 235, 240, 117 Ill.Dec. 56, 60, 520 N.E.2d 46, 50.) Statutory language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Laborer's International Union, Local 1280 v. State Labor Relations Board (1987), 154 Ill.App.3d 1045, 1058, 107 Ill.Dec. 831, 839, 507 N.E.2d 1200, 1208.

Laidlaw argues that the language of section 39.2(m) is vague. We disagree and find it to be clear. That section provides,

"An applicant may not file a request for local siting approval which is substantially the same as a request which was disapproved * * * within the preceding 2 years." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1039.2(m).)

The phrase "within the preceding 2 years" can only refer to the disapproval, not the filing, of the previous application. Indeed, section 39.2(m) does not even refer to the filing of the previous application, but only to its disapproval. Thus, the plain language of section 39.2(m) establishes that if an application that is substantially the same has been disapproved within the two years prior to the filing of the second application, the second application is barred.

Laidlaw argues that interpreting the statute to require a two-year delay from the date of an adverse siting decision, instead of counting from the earlier date of the filing of that application, increases the difficulty of obtaining a local siting permit by unduly extending the time required to obtain approval. Laidlaw argues that this frustrates the policy set forth in section 20(b) of the Act to minimize environmental damage by reducing the difficulty of disposal of waste. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1020(b).) Laidlaw argues that the State cannot reduce the difficulty of waste disposal without locating sites for solid waste disposal. In presenting this argument, Laidlaw...