Laing v. United N.J. R.R. & Canal Co.

• Decision Date: 17 November 1892
• Citation: 54 N.J.L. 576,25 A. 409
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Parties: LAING v. UNITED NEW JERSEY RAILROAD & CANAL CO.

25 A. 409

54 N.J.L. 576

LAING

v. UNITED NEW JERSEY RAILROAD & CANAL CO.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 17, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to circuit court, Union county; before Justice Van Syckel.

Proceedings by the United New Jersey Railroad & Canal Company against Eden Laing to condemn a strip of land for plaintiff's use. From the judgment defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Mr. Vail, for plaintiff in error.

W. S. Gummere, for defendant in error.

DIXON, J. The United New Jersey Railroad & Canal Company having taken steps to condemn for its use a strip of land about 11 1/2 feet wide and about 110 feet long, lying towards the middle of Railroad avenue, in the city of Rahway, and about 30 feet from the side of the street, an issue was framed in the circuit court of Union county to try (1) what was the value of the land so taken by the company from the plaintiff in error, who owned the fee of the same subject to the public use; and (2) what were the damages which, by reason of the taking, he sustained as owner of the adjoining premises on the corner of Milton and Railroad avenues. The object of the present writ of error is to determine the correctness of the rulings of the trial court upon questions of evidence. By these rulings the opinion of an ordinary real-estate agent as to the value of the land taken, and as to the damage done to the residue of the plaintiff's property, was excluded, and testimony as to what the company had paid for land and damages to other owners in the neighborhood was also excluded.

First we will consider the rejection of the witness' opinion. The principle upon which the opinion of a witness is received as evidence is well stated by the chief justice in Railroad Co. v. Root, 53 N. J. Law, 253,21 Atl. Rep. 285. The witness must be an expert on the subject of inquiry, "and his opinions have no place in the judicial investigation except by reason of such status. Within the sphere of his special knowledge he is competent to express his opinion. Beyond that reach he is not competent. Such is beyond question the general rule. None but experts on the given subject can, in any course of law, express their estimate of the value of anything, real or personal."

Now, the subjects of inquiry at the trial below were—First, the value of the private title in the strip of land forming part of the public highway; and, second, the damage done to the plaintiff's property by appropriating that strip to railroad purposes. On neither of these points had the witness any special knowledge. He was specially conversant with the value of land in the possession of private owners, because his usual business brought inquiries and negotiations for the sale of such lands under his frequent observation. But it is safe to say that he had never known of a transaction for the sale of the private estate in a separate piece of land lying in a public street. Certainly he did not claim experience in dealings of that character. Such an estate can have but little value, except as the land may be available for vaults, awnings, etc., in connection with the private land adjoining it. Hoboken L. & I. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Hoboken, 36 N. J. Law, 510, 551; Sullivun v. Railroad Co., 51 N. J. Law, 518, 543, 18 Atl. Rep. 689. Situate as this strip was, about 30 feet from the plaintiff's private land, it had in itself no elements of utility. Evidently the witness could not have acquired from experience any peculiar knowledge of its market value. Boston & W. R. Corp. v. Old Colony & F. R. R. Corp., 3 Allen, 142. But it is urged by counsel for the plaintiff in error that in other states a more liberal rule is applied respecting the opinions of witnesses as to the value of real estate, under which the...